







# **THE GERMAN PERIL**





# THE GERMAN PERIL:

FORECASTS 1864—1914 —

REALITIES - - 1915

HOPES - - - 191—

BY

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*Inhumana crudelitas, perfidia plus quam  
Punica, nihil veri, nihil sanoti, nullus decorum  
metus, nullum iusjurandum, nulla religio.*

*Liv. 21, 4.*

LONDON

T. FISHER UNWIN, LTD.

**FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1915**

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Τσ

## OUR DEAD

Οὐδὲ τεθνήασι θανόντες, ἐπεὶ σφ' ἀρετὴ καθύπερθεν  
κυδαίνουσ' ἀνάγει δώματος ἐξ Ἀΐδew



## NOTE

IN April, 1915, I was invited to collect in a volume the various essays, letters, and appeals on the German Peril which I had made public in anticipation of the great War, and during its continuance. Some were in my published books, and to these I need only refer with short extracts. Others were in letters to the Press and in various reviews and periodicals which are now out of circulation. Some of these are here re-issued: in every case with acknowledgment to the courtesy of the publications in which they appeared. But several chapters, and in particular the Introduction and the first three chapters, and the eleventh—about half the book—have never been made public in any form.

BATH,

*May, 1915.*



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# THE GERMAN PERIL

## GENERAL INTRODUCTION

THIS book is a record of successive attempts over a period of fifty years to rouse the attention of our people to the ever-increasing German Peril, which has been so long the disturbance of Europe and now hangs over the existence of our country as a great free Power. The writer may claim, without boasting of any prescience, but in proven truthfulness, to be the oldest and most persistent of those politicians who warned our countrymen of what they had to meet. He happens to have known France and typical French families at home now for some seventy years; and for sixty years he has been in close touch with politicians, publicists, and thinkers of European reputation. He has known Germany since 1851, and has lived with Germans for months at a time in 1855, 1870, and 1899. And for many years in the present century his son served as correspondent of leading journals and of Reuter's Agency in Berlin and in other German cities, and he has published much on German politics.\* By these

\* The latest being "The Kaiser's War." Allen & Unwin. 1914.

means the present writer has had very unusual, almost unique, opportunities of judging the European crises over five decades. He now submits to the public his successive efforts to warn his countrymen of the greatest peril which Englishmen have known since they met the Norman at Hastings.

Two reasons urge him to put on record the successive appeals he has made to public opinion. The first is that it tends to prove that the tremendous efforts of the German Empire in 1914-1915—efforts in their vastness, their systematic and passionate character, beyond any other example in the history of man—are the result of long calculation and intense national concentration; that they are not the work of some Napoleon of dominant genius, or of some Frederick, or Peter, or Philip of autocratic ambition. There has been for half a century a perfectly regular and continuous chain of political design; and it is not the conspiracy of a Minister or a Sovereign, but essentially the national ideal of a people. There has been nothing fortuitous, or personal, or recent, in this terrific onslaught of a hundred millions of German race on their peaceful and too unsuspecting neighbours. This book will show how it has been the long, laboured, collective effort of these hundred millions of German race, tongue, and name to impose their *Kultur* on Europe by a vast collabora-

tion of infernal crimes. Bismarck, Moltke, Wilhelm, Treitschke, Bernhardt are but agents, mouthpieces, trumpeters of the hordes of Germanic barbarians, who, after more than a thousand years, have resolved to crush out old Europe and to construct a new Europe on a basis of Teutonic "blood and iron."

The second reason for collecting in one volume this series of warnings is to remind Englishmen how blindly Governments of different parties have neglected the signals of danger from European diplomacy, and have so often busied themselves with quite *petty or local interests when great changes in European relations were being made under their eyes*. The most crucial example of this is the ignorant inaction or indifference with which the Liberal Government of 1870-1871 accepted, almost with sympathy, the first great triumph of German Imperialism to seize the hegemony of the world. From time to time soldiers or seamen of great experience made their voices heard by the public in urgent warning of our unprepared state of defence on land, and even on occasions at sea. Nearly all these warnings fell on deaf ears, or were met only by trivial attempts to remedy the defects. Seamen and soldiers were too often regarded as raising alarm from personal anxieties about their special professions. It was obvious that neither soldiers nor

seamen could speak with complete systematic knowledge of the international relations of Europe.

And in this matter, where statesmen and Parliament were bound to have an intimate and first-hand knowledge, the politicians on both sides, and of all shades of policy, were absorbed in purely insular matters — sectarian jealousies, class animosities, economic reforms, fiscal trivialities, educational squabbles, and constitutional amendments of a more or less academic and sectional kind. All parties, all sections of parties, exhausted themselves in local, sectional, and personal rivalries, all equally closed their eyes to the mighty gathering avalanche which was rolling on in constantly increasing force—which, had the occasion been more opportune, would have swept away them and their works, just as a swarm of insects might be trodden under foot :

*“Hi motus animorum atque hæc certamina tanta  
Pulveris exigui jactu compressa quiescunt.”*

### AN INDEPENDENT POLITICIAN.

I have never been in any sense a party politician. I have rigidly refused to enter the House of Commons, where it would have been imperative to take a party side. I have carefully declined to engage myself in any party organ. I have always endeavoured to judge every political problem from the independent

point of view of an observer of European politics, entirely detached from the interests of any Government or of either party. It will be seen, and this book is the evidence of it, that for fifty years my public action has been animated with two directing principles—first, in international questions, the defence of nationalities and especially of the weaker nations attacked by the stronger ; secondly, in home affairs, care of the interest of the masses of labouring men and women and their social and political betterment. I remember that when my old Oxford contemporary, Lord Goschen, then First Lord of the Admiralty, asked me in 1895 what I and my friends would say to his proposals to increase the fleet, I replied : “ If you are to go on with all these transmarine and Imperial adventures, I should advise you to double the fleet *and to treble the army at home !* ”

These two directing principles of my public activity have brought me from time to time to oppose the Government of the day, whatever its party name—whether it was controlled by a Palmerston or a Derby ; by a Gladstone or a Beaconsfield ; by a Salisbury, by a Chamberlain or a Morley. Naturally enough, the party managers and the party organs on one side or on the other have described me as a democrat or a jingo, as a revolutionary and an Imperialist, as a turncoat, a reactionary, a little

Englander, an incendiary, a traitor, or a pacifist. I am so used to this language that it cannot draw from me even a smile. This book will show that in all international questions my one care has been the defence of nationalities. The party nicknames for those who defy the discipline of party are happily now for a time hushed and forgotten. To those who use them I feel inclined to say with Guizot: "You cannot rise to the level of my disdain!"

Certainly in this book I have no kind of party purpose in view. But I hold myself free to speak as I please of Ministers and their measures. I may say that on the terrible day when we first knew that the great War was upon us, and I was asked by a neighbour "what we ought to do?" I replied: "Send for Kitchener and make him dictator!" Up to a certain point this may have been done, but I almost wish that his appointment had not been limited to the Ministry of War. We have not had the complete concentration—which Germany has had, which France has had. The Prime Minister indeed has said everything that ought to be said. The financial problems have been faced with consummate skill by the Chancellor. But the whole problem of war by land and by sea, of defence and of attack, of munitions and supplies, is one composite problem, and ought to have been from the first hour under the

control of one dominant mind, as it was in the time of Chatham.

### THE GERMAN EMPIRE AS OUTLAW.

From the outset we have wholly failed to judge truly the monstrous criminality, and the limitless defiance of law and humanity, that was adopted on system by the German military and civil authorities. Those who had made a study of German diplomacy, of the attitude of German agents in the Conferences and Hague proceedings, who knew the official German War-book, and the writings, speeches, and decisions of Pan-German Leagues, must have seen that, when the long-threatened "Day" arrived, there would be no ordinary enemy to meet, no "laws of nations" to be observed, that we had against us a Power that mocked at Honour, and would use every weapon that demoniacal malignity could suggest. Certainly from the moment when German Ministers jeered at solemn treaties as "scraps of paper," when they began their atrocious system of "frightfulness" by massacring civil populations in Belgium, when the Kaiser personally broke his word to the King of Belgium, when he sent his own relations, his Ministers and his "experts" to act as spies to our Court, our Ministers, our factories, in time of peace under the show of friendship—when, in fact, he was proved to



be not the Sovereign of an equal nation but the chief of liars, swindlers, and assassins—from that hour we ought to have publicly proclaimed that we regarded the German Emperor as a criminal outside “the comity of nations,” and not as an honourable enemy.

The plain statement to our own people and to all neutral nations that German “frightfulness,” personally authorised by the German Kaiser, was an offence against humanity too deep to be forgiven would have worked its own effect. It would have made the German people understand that the Head to whom they had surrendered themselves was an “outlaw,” one with whom we could hold no terms, with whom we could never make a treaty of peace, whom we could never again treat as a friendly Power, whom we intended to bring to the court of the civilised world, and had resolved personally to exact from him condign punishment when we had him in our hands, as we trust and know that we shall have.

So important did it seem to me that this should be announced at first that I publicly proposed a formal degradation of the chief criminal who had wrought these incalculable enormities on Europe. Of course, silly sentimentalists cried out that this would be *retaliation*, which it was not, unless the punishment of a murderer and a felon is not justice,

—but retaliation. One of my mentors went the length of mixing personal malice with political controversy. But I utterly repudiate any kind of retaliation, or any infraction of the strictest law of humanity and civilised conduct. Heartily do I join with those who remind us that we have to set an example to the world of conduct unimpeachably honourable, humane, and modern, even under the most intense provocation from ruthless barbarism.

But it was folly and weakness to go on with a war surpassing everything yet heard of in bestial ferocity, as if there had been no blur cast by our enemy on the accepted rules of honourable war and the laws of nations. It was like observing the etiquette of polite society to a sanguinary madman who was engaged in murdering a neighbour's family. When I suggested formal trial of the authors of submarine murder of civilians occupied in innocent or even in charitable work I did not propose any punishment, much less execution by civil law. Of course, here again the stupid pedantry of lawyers and the silly sentimentality of reverend casuists protested against any special treatment of abnormal and unprecedented forms of public crime. I held, and I hold still, that the wanton slaughter of sleeping civilians engaged in civil employments is not a military crime, but a civil crime, and ought to be tried and con-

dénned by civil tribunals, and not by military courts-martial.

It is mere confusion of mind that argues these submarine murderers ought to be judged by the rules of imperative duty laid down in their own infernal "War-book," and not by English law and English practice and sense of right and wrong. In spite of juridical sophistry and sentimental gush, I hold that submarine murderers stand on a different moral and human standard from soldiers captured in fair fight—at least, before the atrocious resort to poisonous gas was introduced. How are we ever to put an end to this new devilry of submarine murder of merchantmen, fishermen, and hospital nurses unless we proclaim to the world by formal process the heinousness of this new outrage on the civilisation of our age. I call for no Retaliation, no executions. I only ask that these crimes shall be scathed by solemn, national, and judicial sentence.

Writing to-day (30th April) in deep anxiety—I have two sons serving in France—and in high hope, too, for the ultimate end, I foresee that a terrific strain and losses more cruel than any yet borne have still to be met. Let us not think that *words*, or any kind of agreement, or compromise, or mediation, can avail us in this the fiercest trial of our English blood. Nor let us vainly imagine that the enemy

will relax in his delirious trust in "frightfulness," or spare us one pang which he can inflict on us. Alas ! it is my firm belief that, when we have driven him back to his own land—and we shall drive him back : we must, unless we are to be for ever ruined—scenes of horror, almost of mutual extermination, will take place, exceeding anything that we have yet known in ferocity, destruction, and blood.

The use of poisonous gas and the poisoning and infecting the water supply by German scientific and military chiefs has at last opened the eyes of our countrymen to the real depths of our enemy's barbarism. It called out the following protest from the *Pall Mall Gazette* of 6th May :—

" These outrages can have but one effect upon the mind of the British nation. They make more firm our absolute determination to win and to punish. There will be no false sentimentalism as to the use we shall make of our victory, nor is there the slightest doubt that the practices to which the Germans have resorted will make that victory more final and complete. We are naturally a placable people. Had the Germans put up a fair and honourable fight and then sued for peace, the voice of those who appealed to us not to ' humiliate ' them would, very probably, have been heard, even to our

own hurt. But their persistent malpractices have given a new character to the war. Con-  
·dign punishment for the crimes they have com-  
·mitted has become a vital matter for the future  
security not only of our Allies and ourselves,  
but of the whole human race. It has become  
an imperative duty to vindicate the law of  
chivalry and mercy by inflicting the sternest  
punishment on those who are daily violating it  
by their fiendish devices. Otherwise, we and  
our descendants are doomed to live in a world  
from which public law has been banished.  
Everything for which the greatest, best, and  
noblest of men have striven will be destroyed  
and the earth once more be full of violence and  
cruel habitations. We are fighting against the  
beast in man, and you do not fight a beast with  
words." ..

## CHAPTER I ·

### ORIGIN OF BISMARCKISM : 1864

THE horrible Armageddon of nations in 1914-1915 has its origin far back in the nineteenth century—more or less spasmodically ever since the Congress of Vienna in 1815. But it began to be a systematic movement, at least half a century ago, about the rise of Bismarck and the policy we know as Bismarckism. The essence of the struggle is one between vast consolidated empires and historic and independent nations—large and small. All problems of nationalities are complicated by problems of race, religion, language, and tradition, as we see in Ireland, in the dual Empire of Austria, and most acutely in the Balkan peninsula, where race, language, religion, and tradition jostle each other in contiguous villages, between the rival Russian, Turkish, and Austrian Empires. Everywhere in Europe for fifty years the burning question has been—*Can the organised strong Power crush and absorb its weaker, smaller, less organic neighbour?* That is what Bismarckism means. It began war in 1864. In 1914 it broke out in the most tremendous war recorded in the history of man.

The short war of 1864, when Germany under Bismarck first entered on the warpath, gave Holstein and Schleswig to Prussia. Out of this war arose the six weeks war with Austria, which in 1866 practically consolidated Germany under Prussia. All this was but a preparation for the great war of 1870-1871, in which the new German Empire humiliated France, carried home the Five Millions, and tore Alsace and Lorraine from the new Republic! From that hour Bismarck and his imitators have worked with unceasing energy to establish by military ascendancy the dominant "control" of Europe, to absorb the smaller neighbours, to reduce France to the second rank, and, above all, to destroy and succeed to the imperial place of Britain. All the intermediate imbroglios of the European Powers from 1864 to 1914 have been leading up in a growing series to the grand catastrophe of civilisation that we witness to-day. How can British statesmen and our local party leaders have been so blind, so ignorant, so indifferent as not to have seen what was coming on them and to have made no adequate preparations? The answer is this. Confident in their insular security and absorbed in their transmarine Empire, statesmen and people took no heed of a growing power across the home waters which threatened the very heart of England.

The German attack on Denmark of 1863-1864 ought to have opened our eyes, even if we felt unwilling or unable to save Schleswig for the Danes. It is true that the claim of the Danish Crown to the three Duchies was complicated, and also the people of Lauenburg and Holstein were mainly German and not Danish. Our Whig Ministers were inclined to defend at least Schleswig for the Danes ; and our people were indignant at the fraud and violence with which a kindred nation was being attacked by the huge Germanic confederation. The French Emperor, having been rebuffed in his attempt to succour Poland from oppression, refused to join us in an attempt to succour Denmark. Nothing was done : the gallant Danes were defeated and despoiled—driven up into the north of their Jutland peninsula. It is inconceivable that our statesmen, our merchants, and our popular leaders could not see what was to come from Prussia becoming mistress of Holstein—really the key of the land between the Baltic and the Elbe. The canal from Kiel on the Baltic to the estuary of the Elbe gave Germany the most important naval position in Northern Europe—only second to that of the Golden Horn commanding the Black Sea and the Aegean.



## DENMARK AND POLAND : 1863-1864.

For my part, my conscience is clear. Having influence with the working classes through their trade unions, and writing constantly in the Labour organs, I did what I could to arouse public opinion at home to the moral evil and the material danger of our tamely witnessing the great military Powers crushing and absorbing the small historic nationalities. I heartily joined in the popular agitation to support France on behalf of Poland. I made vehement appeals in the *Beehive* of May, 1863. I said that the "Poles were part of the community of Western Europe, have a common civilisation with us, the religion, institutions, habits of Western Europe." Fifty years ago this could hardly have been said of Russia. It seemed to some of us that a combination of the Powers of Western Europe, under the leadership of France and England in alliance, as in the Crimean war, *could have secured at least Home Rule for Poland* without embarking in a new European war. I recalled what our statesmen of old had done—"How Elizabeth, Cromwell, William III., and Chatham had made the weight of England felt on the side of freedom and nationalities without involving our own country in any prolonged and ruinous war."

In July, 1863, there was a great meeting on behalf of Polish independence, which I attended and of which I wrote an account in the *Beehive* :

“The interest and the honour of England” (I wrote), “as a great European Power, were involved in the restoration of Poland. A great occasion existed to obtain that end by joint action with other European States. That end could be obtained by energy and wisdom without arms—but if arms must be used, then by arms. As France stands by her position and history in the front of this question—the restoration of Poland—the policy of England should be zealous and cordial co-operation with France. The States of Europe should be drawn into a common policy.”

That was the programme of the active Radicals in 1863.

“Poland” (I said) “for ninety years has been a great sore in European politics, causing wars, insurrections, and agitations; breaking up the relations of States and dislocating the policy of nations. Poland, we claim, has every character which has ever marked an integral nationality—institutions, laws, religion, unity. The insurrection of Poland in 1863 was no passing

disturbance. It must ever trouble the peace of Europe.. It must be settled one day."

A great opportunity existed, I wrote in 1863, to settle it once for all. More than fifty years have passed, and Poland is *still one of the essential factors of the great resettlement impending over Europe.*

#### PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA : 1866.

The six weeks war of 1866 in which Prussia defeated Austria and succeeded to the hegemony of Germany entirely recast the map of Europe and filled the statesmen of France with a new sense of peril, whilst it was looked on with complacency by British statesmen and with sympathy by English Liberals. Though I had no reason to regret the defeat of Austria—the abnormal and arbitrary career of which I had loathed from my Oxford days, when I followed Mazzini and Francis Newman—I did my best to show how grave a peril to France and to the peace of Europe had been founded in the decisive battle of Sadowa. In the essay on Foreign Policy in "Questions for the Reformed Parliament," 1867\* I summed up the critical situation caused by the new organisation of the German peoples under a Prussia led by Bismarck, a Moltke, and a Roon.

\* "Questions for a Reformed Parliament": Ten Essays by various authors. Macmillan & Co., 8vo, pp. 328 (1867).

“ The old struggle between Russia and Turkey simmers in the East. The confusion in the East tempts the European Powers to intervene ; and since they are inveterate rivals, their intervention breeds ever fresh quarrels. The enormous armies of Russia lead to a great development of German militarism ; and this again involves a similar defensive action in France.”

For this imbroglio (I wrote in April, 1867) there is but one sound solution—a *genuine alliance of England with France*—a defensive alliance to promote peace in Europe and the independence of the smaller nations and races. Such an alliance should be offered to France

“ because the sudden aggrandisement and the immense power of Prussia have deeply alarmed the French people, who see the new danger caused by the consolidation of all Northern Germany and by their own isolation in Europe.

“ We ought to guarantee our neighbours against German aggression, whilst we guarantee Germany and the smaller intervening States (Switzerland, Belgium, Holland) against aggression from France. Such an alliance with France on the basis of mutual insurance against attack, and to protect the smaller States, would supply

the condition of harmony and repose in Europe."

Such was the policy proposed just forty-eight years ago—one year after Sadowa, three years before Sedan. If we reflect upon the relative strength of France, Britain, and Germany in 1867, we shall agree that had this policy been followed in that year, the great war would not possibly have broken out in 1914.

In a previous essay, written in 1864, and published in "International Policy," 1866,\* I wrote :

"The only possible and rational basis of English policy is a close understanding with France. By this is meant not an alliance with France, or mere friendliness with France, much less approval of the Napoleonic régime, but agreement with the French nation on the main features of a common policy. The fact of a permanent alliance between England and France to maintain peace in Europe would alone achieve its end. Russia would turn from any design upon Western Europe. Prussia, that mock Russia of North Germany, would see that no fresh divisions between France and England would enable her to pursue her tortuous and arrogant career.

\* "International Policy": Seven Essays by various writers. Chapman and Hall, 8vo. (1866).

And the smaller nations would look for a real insurance against oppression and conquest."

Fifty years have passed since these words were written. The policy then recommended has now been heartily accepted by the whole nation amid the most tremendous trials to which our race has ever been exposed—not, as then advocated, to maintain the peace of Europe, but now, as the indispensable and only means by which our country can be saved from ruin, and indeed in which civilisation and liberty can be preserved in the modern world.

## CHAPTER II

### THE WAR WITH FRANCE, 1870-1871

WHEN in July, 1870, the French Emperor, deluded by his officers and his clerically-led wife, committed the stupendous folly of playing into the hands of Bismarck by a futile and theatrical invasion of German territory, like the mass of Englishmen I was heartily opposed to the French pretensions, and hoped that it would be the ruin of the empire. We did not know how skilfully, and with what fraud and actual forgery, the Prussian Chancellor had deceived both the enemy and neutrals. The whole plot has now been revealed by his own "Memoirs" and published papers. Bismarckism began in an elaborate system of falsification and mendacity, which for fifty years now German officialism and the German people have justified, applauded, and imitated.

I was abroad during August, September, and October, 1870, and I saw much of the war from the German side, having twice crossed the whole area of Western Germany, near enough to have talked to the prisoners of Sedan and to have seen the bombard-

ment of Strasburg. On returning to England and meeting English witnesses from France I learned the savage attacks on civilians ; the monstrous practice of seizing mayors and leading citizens as prisoners ; the placing non-combatants as a screen on their railways and on advancing lines to avoid attack ; the plundering, burning, and destroying villages for no military object, but simply by way of terrorism ; and the systematic slaughter of all armed men whom they chose to consider outside the regular army of France. So far as robbery, burning homes, and terrorism to civilians could go, the practice of 1870 was really the same as that of 1914, though it was on a much smaller scale, and then it stopped short (so far as we heard) of rape, the murder of women and children, the assassination and outraging of prisoners, and the universal devilry which has been the official code of war in Belgium and France of to-day.

But on a less extended area, and with less public effrontery, the same system of outrages against the rules of war and all dictates of humanity were practised by German invaders in France in 1870. Many of us did our best to rouse our country and our stolid Government to protest. The Whigs and Liberals were only ready to see the French Imperialism " get a lesson," and Mr. Gladstone was singing pæans to



“Happy England” and absorbed in the Russian dispute over the Dardanelles question.

#### APPEALS FOR INTERVENTION : 1870.

In December, 1870, I broke out in a series of letters in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, then edited by Frederick Greenwood, and in the *Fortnightly Review*, then edited by John Morley. I urged that four months of war, carried on by the ferocious methods hitherto unknown in Europe, had changed the character of the contest; and wise politicians should change their attitude towards it. The war at the end of December was a war to crush and dismember France, to despoil her of provinces, and to make her a vassal and break up her national cohesion.

“It is the French now” (I wrote) “who are the people in arms. It is the Germans who are fighting for military glory, *and are about to found a new empire on the sword*. A new and greater Brunswick is in arms to crush the third Republic.”

By that time it was clear that the object of Germany was to tear millions of Frenchmen from France and add them to Germany. Carlyle, Freeman, and some Teutonised men of letters were fond of inveighing against Louis XIV. and his wars, and babbled

about the ethnological anomalies which were about to be set right. Some eminent Liberals talked about "protecting Germany from France," giving her a better "strategic frontier." I reminded them of all the mischief that for generations had embroiled Europe, when the Congress of Vienna had set up "barriers" against France and constructed new "strategic frontiers" in defiance of the feelings of the people who lived in these very districts. I told them how "the record of Liberalism for generations had been the defence of national traditions and of nations, had denounced 'strategic frontiers' as mere pretexts for dynastic aggression. And as to the need of a better strategic frontier for Germany, is not their Rhine frontier, with its double and triple lines of fortresses, good enough? Does it not now threaten the heart and the capital of France? A new strategic frontier for Bismarckism is only German cant for a monstrous engine to keep France prostrate." And there were enlightened Liberals—apparently even in Mr. Gladstone's Government—who thought the annexation of French provinces was a "purely strategic question!"

Look back in 1915 at the complacent ineptitude of Liberal statesmen in 1870-1871, and recall the famous *mot* of the Swedish statesman—*quantilla prudentia regitur orbis*.

I asked serious men to consider which army now was serving the cause of military despotism. The German people, peasants and workmen, were powerless to affect their military tyrants whose work they were doing. They were dragged to the slaughter to make, if not to save, an Emperor—to die for the Hohenzollern legend. Why protest against Imperialism, if it is the name, not the thing, we abhor. Our pedantic historians talked big, even in 1870, of the restoration of the historic *Reich*. They used to tell us in 1870 that “the noble and free German people” would soon give the world a splendid specimen of “constitutional self-government.” So in 1870 our innocent historians were quite in a flutter to see *Geist* triumphant in its special home. Little did they then know what *Geist* and *Kultur* meant in the Prussian tongue. And how completely and how deeply the wars and intrigues of 1864, 1866, and 1870 had Prussianised Germany in all its local tribes and dukedoms from the Baltic down to the Bavarian mountains. Where is German Liberalism now? What has it done since Bismarck came to power?

Even in December, 1870, I spoke of the new German Empire as “an inevitable creation,” and I continued to show how little prospect there was in a new German Empire being anything but a Prussian autocracy of the calibre of that of their hero

Frederick II. "For 150 years the present Prussian dynasty has held the country in its grasp by a severe military despotism [the present Kaiser, William II., was then just eleven years old]; Prussia by this war and the war of 1866 had thrown the same military chains over all Germany. It would need more than the word of professors and historians, whether German or British, to convince us that Prussian dynasty and Prussian policy will ever be anything but what they have been for centuries; or that the meditative and artistic Germans of the south will ever be anything but what the Prussian dynasty ordains them to be." ~

#### LABOUR MEETING OF JANUARY, 1871.

My friends and myself at the crisis of the siege of Paris did not confine ourselves to Essays or to Letters to the Press. My article on "Bismarckism" of December, 1870, was translated and published in a French journal and widely circulated. I was asked to send the two articles of December, 1870, and of February, 1871, to the Duc de Broglie, then French Ambassador in London, and I received from him a letter of sympathy and gratitude which I have published ("Memoirs," II., 13). I was in close touch with the leading Trades Unionists, having recently served as their representative on the Royal

Commission of 1867-1869; and I and my friends had been writing constantly in the Labour organs. We found the whole working class hotly opposed to the Bismarckian Imperialism, and in warm sympathy with the new French Republic. We held a great meeting in St. James's Hall, 10th January, 1871, at our own cost, and without the aid of any member of Parliament. In 1911 I was asked to give some account of this meeting and its results, and I sent to a London journal the following letter:—

#### POPULAR SYMPATHY WITH FRANCE.

“ I certainly think the time has come for the publication of the letters sent to English Labour leaders by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic and by a Republican committee during the great Franco-German war in January, 1871. In that year, when France was in the last agony of the struggle, a great revulsion of sympathy took place in England; and large parts of the public not only felt deeply touched by the catastrophe to the young Republic, but recognised the danger to England and to civilisation from the military ascendancy of Bismarckism in Europe.

“ The old Republicans here, who had not forgotten '48 and '49, 1851, and the crimes of the

Napoleonic Empire, heartily sympathised with the third Republic in France. So, too, did the organised bodies of workmen of all trades led by Trades Union chiefs, who had won the reform of the suffrage. These were joined by many Radical politicians and by the leading Positivists, such as Dr. Congreve, Professor Beesly, and others, who had been their advocates in the Press and in the Trades Union Commission of 1867-1869, for the alleviation of oppressive Labour legislation. Large numbers of the general public were of the same mind, including the Army, the Navy, and the trained politicians. The old Whigs, the narrow commercial world, and the peace enthusiasts were stubbornly opposed to any expression of sympathy with either belligerent, and hotly opposed any idea of intervening on behalf of France. The Government of Mr. Gladstone offered a few benevolent platitudes—but did nothing.

“At this crisis the Labour leaders and their Radical friends determined to hold a public meeting in St. James’s Hall, with a view to stir up sympathy with the Republics. Professor Beesly presided, and Mr. Odger, Mr. Applegarth, Mr. Howell, Mr. Potter [then editor of the *Beehive*], Mr. Frederic Harrison, Mr. Shipton,

the late Sir William Marriott, Mr. Bradlaugh, and Admiral Maxse spoke to resolutions in favour of active intervention on behalf of France. These were carried almost without dissent, amidst a scene of intense enthusiasm. Further efforts to address the public were being prepared, when the capitulation of Paris and the hasty and ill-judged truce put a stop to all further action. In connection with this demonstration the English Committee put itself into communication with Jules Favre, then Foreign Minister of the Republic, and with a French committee, who were invited to join in common proceedings. Mr. Shipton, who acted as secretary of the Labour Committee, has retained the original papers.

“Forty years have now passed [1911]. But the fatal apathy of the Liberal Government and of the commercial classes in England brought on us the incubus of a German military autocracy, under which Europe still suffers. France has made a wonderful recovery from her disasters, and the Republic is now in its forty-second year of life. But it is not in assured security that the invasions and dismemberment of 1871 may not be repeated ere the twentieth century is far advanced. Labour leaders and far-sighted students of politics saw in 1871 that

it was not merely France, but England, that would be menaced by Bismarckism. In 1911 this same Bismarckism has only taken a new and less noisy form, but it is more powerful in the centre of Europe than it was then. The effect of it, the menace of it to England, is quite as great in 1911 as ever it was in 1871. Nay, it is really greater now."

The following is the letter of the French Minister to the invitation of the English Labour Committee to take common action in appealing to the public opinion of Europe. There would have been a vehement explosion of British opinion which the Government of Mr. Gladstone could not have withstood, had the French defence continued for three weeks more:—

JULES FAVRE ON THE WAR OF 1871.

" *Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cabinet).*

" The Vice-President of the Government of the National Defence, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the English Delegates.

" I am deeply touched by the measures you are taking to prove to me your generous sympathies for France. I recognise in this noble movement of your hearts the influence of the free institutions of your country and of your own characters of independence. I desire that



my country may more and more resemble yours, and may become penetrated with the ideas which have made your grandeur. Tell your fellow-Englishmen that France counts upon their opinion, and that, whatever may be the success of the methods of force, justice and legality must in the end be triumphant. I regret that my duties keep me here. I should have been proud to have been on Monday amongst you. I shall be with you in spirit, and when you shall speak of me to your free fellow-citizens, let my spirit inspire you to express my profound sense of gratitude and of patriotic affection. Tell your countrymen that we have always detested war, that we are friends with Germany, and that if she will only be just to us, if she will not seek to inflict humiliation and ruin upon us, she will find us ready to forget the animosities so fatally excited. When in the accomplishment of this great effort of reparation, the noble English people made themselves our intercessor, it will be in the true cause of humanity and civilisation.

“ I offer to the English delegates and their fellow-Englishmen my loyal feelings of esteem and enduring friendship.

“ JULES FAVRE.

“ PARIS, *Dec. 17th, 1870.*”

I have amply stated in my "Memoirs" (chaps. 20, 21, 22, 23) my intercourse with a variety of French statesmen, writers, and journalists between the years 1870 and 1910, and I need not recur to what I then saw, or learned and heard. With Guizot, Michelet, and Jules Simon I was in correspondence, and I had several interviews with Gambetta, Clemenceau, Louis Blanc, Ferry, Felix Faure, Renan, Scherer, and others. I was for two months correspondent of *The Times* in the provinces in the great struggle with Marshal MacMahon in 1877, and also in the Boulanger affair, 1888-1889. During these forty years I was in fact studying the European situation from the French side and from French and Italian politicians. But I spent some months in Germany in 1899 in the house of an eminent German man of science, and I had previously visited Berlin in 1898, whilst my son was correspondent of Reuter's Agency.

### CHAPTER III

#### ARTICLES IN "FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW": 1870-1871

THE articles which I wrote in the *Fortnightly Review*, December, 1870, and February, 1871, received the approval of the then editor, John Morley, and have been re-issued in my "National and Social Problems" (Macmillan & Co., 8vo, 1908). The first was entitled "Bismarckism: The Policy of Blood and Iron." It was written immediately after the surrender of Metz and Bazaine's army, and was devoted to show the inevitable consequences to the peace of Europe and to the safety of our own country by Bismarck's words that the consolidation of Germany must be brought about by *blood and iron*. In 1877 Princess Troubetzkoi told me, when I visited her in her château at Fontainebleau, that Bismarck had first used this phrase to her when he was on a visit to her, having just received the commands of King William to form a Ministry. I wrote: "this great struggle concerns the welfare of Europe and of England; it is our own future and peace that are at stake." I said we ought to ask ourselves "*what may not this contest be preparing for Europe?*"

I urged that the German invaders were tearing to

pieces the French provinces they occupied. "Did Tilly or Attila himself strip a people more utterly to the bone than they have stripped the people of the East of France?" It is an entire mistake to suppose that the enormities committed in 1914-1915 were a new outrage on the accepted laws of war and rules of humanity. On a smaller scale—and with less publicity and bravado, with less glorification by professors and journalists—these same crimes were committed in 1870. I wrote:

"These German fathers of families, model husbands, learned scholars (as they claim to be) can burn down villages on system, set fire to farmhouses with petroleum, massacre civilians in cold blood by 'superior order,' and use substantial citizens as buffers on their railway trains."

I showed that the German invaders had passed into a career of conquest—fighting for new territory, military glory, and the humiliation of France. "It is for this they are distracting Europe." Prussia was the only European State organised on a military basis, as completely as the old Roman republic. The whole social institutions of Prussia were built up for aggressive war. "Every Prussian," I said, "is a professional soldier: adopts the soldier's creed,

ideal and morality." If this was true forty-five years ago, how much truer is it now, how much more does it mean now, when every man, woman, and child utter their morning and evening prayer : " God curse England ? "

" What for the last generation has been the history of the monarchy of Frederick in its international relations ? Two wars of conquest against Denmark ; a war of conquest against South Germany ; bullying Switzerland ; bullying Holland ; oppression in Schleswig ; oppression in Posen ; oppression in Hanover, Saxony, Frankfort, Hamburg. We forget that the destruction of the old German confederation was a perfect tissue of violence and fraud. Spoliation more arrogant and chicanery more shameless have never been seen in Europe in modern times. In Prussian politics the very germ of international morality is wanting. This gospel of the sword has sunk deeper into the entire Prussian people than any other in Europe. The social system being that of an army, and each citizen drilled man by man, there is no sign of national conscience. The servile temper begotten by this eternal drill inclines a whole nation to repeat, as by word of command, and perhaps to believe, the convenient sophisms

which the chiefs of the staff put into their mouths."

As in 1870, so is it in 1915.

The Hohenzollern legend I showed to be a parody and an extension of the Napoleonic legend—the worship of a King who, even in his own eyes, is a sort of imitation Tsar. Scarcely an acre of the broad fields of Germany but has been soaked in the blood of one or other variety of what some people call "the mild, innocent, sentimental German." "The *lanzknecht* is transformed; but he stalks still beneath the *pickelhaube*." To-day, in 1915, all this is a commonplace, which is too obvious to be doubted even by our pacifist faddists. How few could I get to believe me in 1870!

And then I went on to describe the really comical Pharisaism of the modern German:

"A nation crazed with revenge and ambition keeps on thanking God for His mercy by platoons, the God which nine out of ten of their educated men openly or secretly ignore." "They call heaven to witness the immorality of France, whilst themselves waging the most savage of all modern wars, with inhuman cruelty and relentless hate. They cry out over the falseness of France, whilst their own chosen mouthpiece, Bismarck, is the most accomplished master of fraud in

- modern times ; whilst the official and literary utterances of the country form one system of organised falsehood ; and the whole people gives itself up to stereotyped cant."

The civilised world to-day in 1915 is repeating this judgment. But it was just as true when I pronounced it on the whole gospel of Bismarckism in 1870. And I insisted forty-five years ago that they were carrying on war with "inhuman cruelty ; war so savage, torture so steadily inflicted on a civil community, has never been seen for two generations in Europe—unless in Poland." I did not charge Germans individually with any love of cruelty as such. But they were quite ready to use cruelty to gain their ends, and that with a calm satisfaction and businesslike completeness which is more horrible than the excesses of passion. They had stripped to the bone one-third of France. They seized the villager's home, his cattle, the seed for next harvest ; they bombarded the civil parts of towns, they burned villages wholesale, plundered, robbed, and threatened death, massacred in cold blood irregular troops and villagers suspected of helping the defence. This was the murder of non-combatants or prisoners. In 1870 I denounced all this as "inhuman cruelty." And how slow are people to-day to believe that this was the regular practice of Bismarckism so much as

forty-five years ago. And we in our island looked on—some Liberals with actual sympathy, and most with cool indifference.

In the same essay I pointed out the debauchery of public opinion by the Prussian new practice of war, the sinking back of European morality to the worst of the old level. The war of 1870-1871 was being waged like the wars of extermination between two Indian tribes. On a scale ten times as vast, and many times more cruel, this is being done again before our eyes to-day. We warned the citizen at home that the evil to be dreaded was the destruction of international morality and the restoration of the worst military standard of the wars of religion in the sixteenth century. Europe would not enjoy a day of settled peace whilst the authors of this infernal code of conquest were triumphant and added Alsace and Lorraine to their already dominant position in Central Europe. I went on to show that Prussia, even in 1871, "aimed at maritime power, the command of the Baltic and the recovery of Heligoland."

Full of this peril, I called on our Government to check the progress of Prussian ambition—by diplomacy if possible, by arms if necessary. England might form a defensive confederacy of the smaller Powers. If that would not suffice, I said pour into France unlimited supplies, armaments, material, and



money ; send an army of 100,000, equipped with every munition of war, to be planted in some chosen ground on the coast of Brittany or Normandy, supplied and covered by the fleet, and entrenched in a new Torres Vedras. Encourage France to hold on, with all our moral and material help, until this enormous line of Prussian invasion from Magdeburg to the Loire could be broken. This was a policy we advocated in November, 1870, while Paris still held out and France had still large improvised armies in the field. It was a patriotic, a wise, a possible policy at the time. And writing now, in April, 1915, after forty-five years, I insist that had it been taken up by a great Minister of the calibre of Chatham, or even of his son, we should have been spared the horrors, the sufferings, and the appalling dangers to ourselves and to civilised Europe which we are witnessing to-day.

#### THE EFFACEMENT OF ENGLAND IN 1871.

In January, 1871, Paris being on the eve of capitulating by famine, and Gambetta striving to rouse France to a renewed struggle, I wrote a second article in the *Fortnightly Review* (February, 1871). The real question, I said, was this : *Is it for the interest of civilisation, or of England, that France should be trampled on and dismembered by Germany ?* By that

time, for 300 or 400 miles of France, every village had been the victim of "organised pillage"; cities had been sacked *on system*! citizens plundered, imprisoned, outraged, and killed. The civil population had been forced to serve the invading armies. "The richest and most industrious parts of Europe had been stripped, plunged into famine, solely that the invaders might make war cheaply." All the crimes against the practice of civilised nations and against human nature were practised then as now—not, I said, "by licence or passion, but by the calculated ferocity of scientific soldiers." Even in 1871 it was plain that the aim of Germany was to reduce France to a second or third rate Power. That was their avowed object in 1914. The aim of Bismarckism from first to last for fifty years has been the effort to place Germany without a rival, or an equal, in Europe. Even a peace, in the eyes of the German chiefs, would be nothing but a truce. The war of 1870-1871, I said, "was but the beginning of an epoch of war; *in fact, but a first campaign*. A new Polish question, a new Venetian province, is established on a larger scale in the centre of Europe."

What would be the condition of England at the close of the war? France would cease to be one of the Great Powers. The problem for our statesmen will be how to maintain our position in Europe when

France is not to be reckoned with. For thirty years or more the policy of England and France had run together—in the questions of Turkey, of Poland, of Italy, of Denmark. In all these Germany had been opposed to us both. France was with us, and with the right. Germany was against us, and for the wrong. In all four cases of international justice and of national independence Germany stood by the reactionary Empires of Russia and of Austria. “The new Empire of Germany is thus a menace to Europe—the enemy of human progress.” “The one thing which is now the dream of the North German is a great navy and power at sea—they say that the continental part of Denmark is a necessity for them.”

“With a power so tremendous, and an ambition so ruthless, as that which Prussia has exhibited, everything is possible, and no nation is safe. Our actual calamity is this:—the greatest shock of the nineteenth century has been given to the principle of national rights; the black flag of conquest has been unfurled by a dominant Power; one nation has gained a supremacy in arms which puts the security of every other nation at her sufferance, and that one nation is directed by a policy against which every free people is in permanent revolt.”

“It will be a dark day for Europe when any

one Power shall hold the rest in the hollow of its mailed hand. If it was a menace to Europe when the House of Hapsburg or the House of the Louis threatened to absorb half Europe, if it was a European calamity when Napoleon ruled from Berlin to Madrid, so it will be the knell of peace and liberty when the triumphant Empire of Germany bestrides the Continent without an equal. If it succeed in doing so it will be the act of England, which stands by trading and sermonising, selling arms but using none, *bellum cauponantes, non belligerantes*, droning out homilies and betraying every duty of a nation. It will be the crowning proof of the degradation of a party, which can make war for some supposed commercial interests, but have nothing to say to this, the greatest revolution in the State system of Europe, but a policy of absolute abnegation—a policy which thoughtful politicians know to be suicidal, and the mass of the people feel to be shameful; the policy which the new Master of the West told them with a gibe was the only policy that remained for them—the policy of effacement."

So in 1871 a Government representing essentially the industrial, urban, pacific Liberalism of the century patiently submitted to the effacement of our

nation as a great European Power. And now in 1915 we are threatened with the awful possibility that we may leave to the next generation not only a moral but a material effacement.

#### WARNING REPEATED IN 1908.

When I re-issued the two articles on Bismarckism in my "National and Social Problems" (Macmillan & Co., 1908), I wrote a new "Introduction" on the international problems of war and Imperialism. It inevitably opens, I said, with German Militarism, begun in 1862 by the statesman who had transformed the German people and recast the politics of Europe :

"Modern Imperialism" (I wrote) "and the militarising of nations dates from the accession of Prince Bismarck to power in 1862; and as he was the founder, so he is to East and West, from Japan to the United States, the great exemplar of Imperial expansion and the nation in arms. That is the key, the *crux*, the type of all the inmost problems of our age. All serious political studies must start from the central movement of all—German Militarism—which the Kaiser and his statesmen regard as a precious inheritance from the mighty founder of their Empire. *There is the centre of European disturbance.*"

I added that, even in 1870, I had warned our people of the Pan-German ambition to found a new sea power and to dispute with us our supremacy at sea. "I hold no one fit to argue a political problem who fails to see that the rulers and the people of Germany are bent on being able to meet Great Britain at sea on equal terms—not immediately, but within a decade or so of years (*i.e.*, 1918); this is an inevitable issue for German ascendancy: from the point of view of German patriotism, a perfectly legitimate ambition." Our case is not parallel. Germany, with a small and most defensible coast but few colonies, has no need of a great fleet, which can only be a costly luxury and can be used only for offence. Britain, with possessions all over the globe, and its food dependent on foreign trade, can exist only by having a predominant fleet. Our dispersed Empire is bound up with our naval supremacy. Ruin that, says the Pan-German Navy League, and you ruin their Empire. This is the conviction of German patriots, to whom it is an offence that any other nation should pretend to be their superiors in any arm or any product.

The inheritance of Bismarck to Germany means *to smash Britain at sea*. Not to-day, but in the future, and not whilst England has sure allies. Thus the key of international problems lay in 1908, I said, as it did in 1914, in the organisation, power, and

ambition of German Imperialism. In 1908, I urged that Bismarckism, which for forty years had been the menace and the trouble to the peace and progress of Europe, was "a far greater menace to the very existence of our country than it was when in 1870 our statesmen saw with tranquillity France overwhelmed under our eyes."

I quoted the famous programme to the Naval Law of January, 1900, when Wilhelm said his navy was "to stand on a level with his army," then acknowledged to be the first in the world. When this patriotic ambition was realised, the very existence of the British Empire was to await his signal to break it up.

In July, 1914, the Kiel Canal and its great extension was completed; the French ministerial and administrative confusion was at its height; our trade troubles and our Irish civil war seemed to be inevitable; and the Kaiser did give the signal to take the preliminary invasion of Belgium and of France, which he trusted Britain would be forced to accept with passive impotence. He now, we may hope, has come to see that he was somewhat premature, and that he had better have waited until the corruption of France had become more acute, until the British fleet was dispersed, and Ireland was in open civil war.

In sober truth, we were saved from disaster by the extraordinary perfection and concentration of our fleet, and by the no less extraordinary qualities of our small Expeditionary Force. All German scientific opinion, and most of the neutral observers, were confident that the German army would be before Paris in six weeks. The happy inspiration which kept the fleet undispersed and gave us absolute control of the sea, the heroic defence of Belgium, and the marvellous tenacity of our Expeditionary Force, together with the unexpected completeness and rapidity of our mobilisation, defeated all the elaborate calculations of the German Staff. Their first grand blunder was not to have recognised the British Expedition as being the only army in Europe that was thoroughly seasoned in war, perfect in each arm—the one truly veteran soldiery with experience of the new tactics. When they did discover their mistake, their fury turned on England, and Englishmen.



## CHAPTER IV

### FRANCE SEEN FROM WITHIN

DURING the interval between the war of 1870–1871 and 1914 I was frequently in France, and in close connection with politicians, journalists, and independent observers ; and I can bear witness that during these forty-three years France was speedily restoring her civil and military disasters and in strict defence awaiting the inevitable attack. I reissue a letter which I sent to the *Pall Mall Gazette*, 19th February, 1887, which described my impressions of the state of French opinion. It was the time of the Boulanger excitement, when Bismarck was trying to convince his own country and ours that France was preparing for a *revanche* under a new Napoleon. Nothing more ridiculously untrue was put forward even by the German reptile Press even in this year of war with us.

These were my impressions of France as I saw it in 1887 :—

#### “ PEACE OR WAR ?

“ I have been taking a short holiday ramble in the South of France, after stopping in Paris

for some talk with old friends. And as you ask me to give you my views on the question of the hour, I will just jot down the impressions I brought home. You must take them for what they are worth, as the passing glance of a man who in the last thirty years has tramped over many parts of France, and is familiar with all sorts and conditions of men to be met with in that form of travel. I did not frequent the lobbies or trouble politicians with interviews; and I can say nothing about the prospects of the Ministry or the political clubs. My immediate purpose was simply relaxation; but as, *pace* Mr. Labouchere, I was in excellent health and spirits, I rambled about in road and country, and used my eyes and my ears from morning till night. What I like in the French provinces is to take a stout stick and a map, make my way to the nearest old town or village, drop in to a roadside auberge for an omelette, or even take my coffee in a café-billard; get a lift in the country omnibus, fall in with the farmer on his way to market, and chat with the peasant and his wife in the heat of the afternoon. Thus, at the cost of much dust and some very bad tobacco, one finds some rare bits both of Nature and art, and withal one gets down to the inner

mind of a people, in a way which no reading of journals or listening to speeches entirely supplies. So much of personal explanation as to my means of observation.

“ My distinct impression, gathered from press, conversation, and all that goes on around, is this—that people in France are no more desiring war, expecting war, thinking of war, than are people in England. It is impossible to believe that such a country, where every one is going on quietly at work as usual, is within a few weeks of another 1870. I never heard, read, or observed one warlike word or act. If that be a country preparing for its last spring, the degree of secrecy with which it is being carried out is simply a miracle. I have read hundreds of journals, Parisian and local, big and small, and I never saw one Chauvinist sentence. I listened to talk by the hour in small town and countryside, and never heard one word about war as inevitable or imminent. I went to France with very great misgiving about the state of French temper, and the good sense of prominent politicians and the public Press. But I certainly found a self-control and a sense of security which I did not at all expect. As an old and keen politician said to me in Paris : ‘ No man, woman,

or child in France desires war. We shall not attack anybody under any circumstances. But if we are attacked, this time, be sure, we shall make a fight of it.' I must say that is the tone of everything I heard from the Pas de Calais to the Var.

"I am far from admiring the French Press, though perhaps we hear in England its worst side. But I am bound to say that the French Press, as a whole, has been exhibiting for the last month a dignity and self-control that are really astonishing when one thinks of the brutality of the provocation and the intemperance of French journalism. The tirades, insults, and challenges they receive from abroad are universally regarded as financial or political expedients, and are very little noticed, and but seldom answered. Prince Bismarck sets down the steadiness of the French Press under provocation to a *mot d'ordre* from Boulanger or Goblet. To a man who reads only five or six of the chief papers of Paris such an explanation does not seem impossible. But who is to give a *mot d'ordre* to the three or four thousand local prints of France, representing three or four hundred political groups and sections? What do they care for Boulanger, Goblet, Minister or deputy?

The *Petit Lyonnais*, the *Petit Marseillais*, *L'Echo du Var*, *Le Drapeau Rouge*, *l'Anarchiste*, and all the local and mutinous prints, red, white, and blue, care for nobody outside their own offices. The idea of their receiving a *mot d'ordre*, except to defy it, smacks all over of the 'reptile' Press and its ways. The French Press has hardly ever been unanimous before. But now there is no part of it which suggests war, and but a small part of it which even talks about war. To judge from smart paragraphs and growling articles, France is on fair neighbourly terms with Germany ; but not a little sore with Italy and England.

"But, if Boulanger can impose his *mot d'ordre* on the *Sentinelle du Midi*, I suppose the most powerful of Ministers never yet checked the French tongue. Now, in the last few weeks I have listened to, rather than joined in, scores of conversations in all sorts of places, and have heard no word about fighting. No one, I suppose, pretends to say that the French people are bent on war ; though many people think, and I confess I was formerly of the number, that they expect war. I certainly heard nothing to that effect. The face of my old friend in Paris was really a study when I told him that I had come

to take a last look at the city. Talk to the wine-grower, the commis, the farmer, the peasant, and bring the talk round to the probabilities of war, and he shrugs his shoulders, with, 'Eh ! pense pas—ce ne sera pas nous, mais——'

"I saw in many places, towns and villages, the levy of the new recruits under the Conscription Laws ; and it all passed off in the ordinary fashion. The lads, with their tickets in their hats, paraded and shouted a bit, the elders gave them a drink, and the women came out to give them a farewell smile. But it all passed off like a Guy Fawkes procession on November 5, or a May Day dance, in a quiet, easy way. It was impossible to imagine that lad or girl was thinking of imminent war. From one of the eastern garrisons I travelled with a group of cavalry officers, and I was curious to watch if the light of coming battle had touched their brains with its glow. I heard nothing to that effect. They talked by the hour about professional details and the common gossip of garrison life. But not one word reached me to show that they were conscious that anything was in the air. It may be that they had the *mot d'ordre* from Boulanger direct. But captain and cornet wearied me

considerably with their 'shop' about promotion, bets, and leave.

"By the way, how different is the relative bearing now of civilian and soldier from what it used to be just before 1870. Twenty years ago I can remember these same eastern garrisons, towards the waning years of the Empire. Then soldier and citizen were like cat and dog. I have been in public rooms, dinners, and cafés, where no *képi* ever spoke to *pékin*, and where looks of mutual hatred and contempt were barely suppressed. It was like Croats in Milan and Venice in the old days. After Sedan thousands of Napoleon's pet soldiers were far more eager to go in at their fellow-citizens than at the German enemy. The secret of the French collapse in 1870 was that France was at the time in veiled civil war; just as imminent civil war was the real cause of Napoleon's *coup de tête*. To-day the soldier in France is only the citizen in *pantalon garance*.

"About the numbers, arms, movements, or organisation of troops I know nothing. I strongly suspect that very few people indeed really do know, and those few keep their own counsel. But if anything like action, mobilisation, concentration, or the like is in train, I find

it difficult to believe that it should leave no trace, produce no effect on the public mind, and not be discovered by the bitterness of opposition. It must be remembered that France is covered by political and Anarchist groups, not singly very strong, but intensely active and utterly desperate. These groups are fanatical enemies of all war, all Governments, all armies, and loathe the very notion of national patriotism. To them the humbling of Boulanger, the army, even of political France as a national organism, is a holy and glorious mission. And I cannot but think, if *la revanche* ever became a serious purpose within measurable distance of execution with any political party or personage, but what the furious Intransigeants, incoherent as they are, would manage to discover it and prove it to the world.

“ There remains the belief, common enough in England, which Bismarck assiduously repeats, that, though the French people neither desire nor expect war, a man like General Boulanger can at a moment's notice plunge them into the gulf. It is not easy to argue with surmises and apprehensions; but it is not credible to me. The distance between the position of Napoleon in 1870 and of Boulanger in 1887 is enormous.



That a man without name, history, tradition, prestige, or any career whatever, can seize France by the throat and force her against her will into the field, does seem to me a wild vision. I know very little about Boulanger; but I am convinced that the mass of French citizens know less. Outside the Press of Berlin, London, and Paris, I do not find that Boulanger's is a name to conjure with. Bismarck, like Pharaoh in Genesis, 'has lifted up the head of the chief baker.' Our articles are full of Boulanger and his wonderful ascendancy; and of course Prince Bismarck's *réclame* is the biggest in the world. But in France, in the French provinces, one hears little or nothing of Boulanger and his doings. I cannot remember to have read his name in a single newspaper, except once in a very clever puff of the *pastille Giraudel*, which the ingenious chemist recommends the Minister of War to serve out as rations to the French army, if he really cares for the health of the young soldier.

"I have no means of making an analysis of the War Minister, but so far as I can learn he is a good administrator, with a true instinct for the soldier's wants, who has managed to impress the army and the people and Press of Paris with the

idea that he is a man of dash, resource, and purpose. So far as I could learn he lives quietly enough, without any means or else without any wish to impose himself on his countrymen. A sort of Randolph-Churchill-‘ devil ’ about him, sundry accidents, and Bismarck’s vociferation, have given him a certain vogue as the coming man. He may have stuff in him, and if Bismarck goes on in this line he may be forced to the top. But he is certainly not there yet. And to suppose that this lucky and adroit soldier is at present the master of Chamber, Cabinet, Senate, President, Army, Press, and thirty-seven millions of Frenchmen, seems to me mere midsummer madness.

“ I will not say the world is not likely to witness the awful calamity of a great war in Europe. As to that I say nothing. I will not believe that the German people, or their great statesman, design any such crime as a direct challenge to fight. \* But what if Prince Bismarck himself has a Boulanger of his own, even stronger and less known than the ‘ chief baker ’ of M. Goblet ? I trust not ; and if there be any such I trust Prince Bismarck to manage him. All I now say is, that I see no indication in France of preparation for war or any expectation of war. If war

there is to be, I believe it will have to be forced upon France by craft or violence from without. War, if it comes, will be something awful to watch. Both combatants are grown to be giants. I know not if the French army is equal in power to the German ; but I take the French army to be twice as strong now as it was in 1870—morally, intellectually, and materially. France is no longer in civil war, and she is as a nation enormously rich, active, and full of resource. I never traverse France from sea to sea without being anew impressed with her wonderful natural wealth, her geographical advantages, the industry, patience, ingenuity, and versatility of her people, her limitless resources, and the point to which her social and material organization has been carried. If Germany is going to humble such a country in the dust, she has still a big thing before her."

In the following year I was asked to go to Paris to study the question of *Boulangisme* which was filling the journals of Europe and stirring society at home. A certain reckless leader of London society very nearly entrapped Edward VII., then Prince of Wales, into having the conspirator General presented to him in a famous political salon in Grosvenor Square.

Our late King was not so easily caught, and he quitted the house in the hall without entering the drawing-room. It was certain that Toryism hoped that the hour had come to destroy the Republic. Boulanger combined several desperate and some wealthy factions — Royalists, Anarchists, financiers, and gamblers ; and his intrigue was dangerous. In my "Memoirs," pp. 60—62, I describe my part in the inquiry. My paper was published in *The Times*, 23rd May, 1888. It was as follows :—

" THE SITUATION IN FRANCE.

" (*From an Occasional Correspondent.*)

" During a recent visit to France I have had an opportunity of discussing the situation with many leading politicians in different parties, as well as with many of my own friends there who watch politics closely without belonging to any regular party. By common consent the present situation is regarded as one of the most difficult and obscure crises which have arisen since the Empire, as one in which those who know most are the least inclined to hazard positive forecasts. One of the keenest and most experienced politicians in France, a man who long worked at the right hand of Gambetta, said to me the

other day: 'You may well feel puzzled in England, when we who live in the midst of the struggle do not now pretend to understand it entirely, or to see our way clearly.'

"If I ventured to offer any suggestions towards a sound judgment of what is confessedly a very obscure crisis, I would ask people in England to be somewhat cautious in adopting any very sweeping assertion of any kind, to be doubtful about any sensational prophecy, not to give ear to any sort of scare, and, above all, not to imagine that any new policy has suddenly seized on France, or that any great drama is at all imminent. I confess that I went to France not a little under the influence of all the suggestions and alarms with which the European air has been filled, of wars and rumours of wars, of *coups d'Etat*, revolutions, and sensational adventures. I found France and Frenchmen very much as I found them last spring; very much cooler, more hopeful, more businesslike than their neighbours fancy them, seriously occupied by a very complex state of affairs, both at home and abroad, but by no means in a state of agitation, scare, or inflation. People in France do not seem to be hotter about M. Boulanger than people in England are about Mr.

Parnell. The idea of a national adventure is treated as a childish hoax. The idea of an imminent *coup d'Etat* is looked on as preposterous. And as to any war feeling, I admit I have observed no trace of it. France is not thinking more of war now than she has done any time of late years.

“ I do not mean to deny that the situation is really grave, that the Republic is on its trial, and that any careful observer will hesitate to make positive predictions of the issue. One of the stoutest champions of the present system said to me the other day : ‘ The situation is more serious than we any of us care to admit ; more serious than in the days of the 16th of May and the Marshal. We shall win, but we need energy and union.’ The situation is serious ; but I cannot perceive in it anything very new or anything imminent. The agitation of the day is rather a symptom than a malady. And the forces of resistance against any sudden movement, whether towards war, revolution, or any kind of *coup de main*, when carefully examined, do certainly appear to be ample and alert.

“ What, then, about Boulanger ? For that, after all, is the question which interests most the world outside France. After the election in the

Nord, after all the elections and demonstrations that have taken place in the last few months, he would be a bold man who should hold M. Boulanger too cheap. If M. Boulanger be not himself a very serious danger to the Republic, he serves to indicate the perils by which it is surrounded. For the time he would seem to be on the wane. And it is very far from clear that either he or his set have in them the stuff which alone makes emperors, dictators, autocrats, or even successful leaders of an *émeute*. M. Boulanger may possibly retire again to be the favourite of the green-room, the hero of the café, the figure-head of an advertising agency. But a man who can stir large provinces of France as no Minister can stir them may succeed in spite of all. And there is no security that, where Boulanger has come so near to success, someone else may not shortly succeed altogether.

“ In Paris itself it is difficult to take M. Boulanger seriously. On the Boulevards, in the cafés, in journals, in society, among politicians, *Boulangisme* is a huge joke. In a thousand different forms he appears as the General of Comic Opera. Every morning some fresh nickname for him is invented—the Grand Elector, the Man of Providence, the Mahdi, the

Redeemer, the modern Jeanne d'Arc, Badinguet the Fourth, George the First, have taken the place of the famous *mot* of the 'Music Hall Garibaldi.' The kiosks are covered with caricatures of *Boulange* (*sic*) and *Boulangistes*. It is the whim of the hour; and, like Jumbo, the big elephant, the *Mikado*, or Buffalo Bill, he supplies matter for the songs, the jests, the slang, and street humour of the day. He has already enriched the French language with a dozen words unknown to Littré—*Boulangisme*, *Boulangerie*, *Boulangistes*, *Anti-Boulangistes*, *Boulange*, etc. Never were the journals of Paris more amusing; the *verve*, the wit, the malice with which every morning a score of writers beshower the Pretender and his staff are very pleasant reading; and their merciless ingenuity exposes every trick in the Boulanger game before the cards are on the table. If ridicule killed in France, *Boulangisme* would be as dead as Volapük. But ridicule does not kill in France. As a friend of mine said, 'All this is not a tenth part of what Napoleon endured quietly for many years.' Besides which, Boulanger avowedly rests, not on Paris, but on the departments; not on towns, but on the country; not on the cultivated and thinking classes, but on the



ignorant and the needy. The millions of country voters never read a line of the Paris journals ; and nothing could recommend the General to them more than to hear that *ces messieurs de Paris* hated him and feared him.

“ In Paris almost every party and even section of a party, almost every journal of any weight, is opposed to *Boulangisme*. Three half-penny papers of the extreme type, and the officious and uncertain support of one or two Reactionary journals, are all that the movement can boast. *La Lanterne*, which has a good sale and some considerable influence, has taken up the General ; *L'Intransigeant*, M. Rochefort's organ, is without influence and incurably dull. *Boulangisme* has effected one surprise ; it has now made Rochefort, who has been everything else in his time, an insufferable bore. Then comes the *Cocarde*, the official organ of Boulanger, a very crude and noisy sheet. Besides this, *La France* and *Le Gaulois* give him a patronising hand from time to time. But the vast majority of the journals of Paris, of all shades and colour, *Temps*, *Débats*, *Figaro*, *République Française*, *Justice*, *Radical*, *Parti Ouvrier*, *Mot d'Ordre*, *Matin* — Republicans, Conservatives, Opportunists, Radicals, Socialists, Communards—

with one consent repudiate the Pretender and all his works. In the language of the students' song, *Conspuer Boulange* is the order of the day with all parties and groups. And still *Boulangisme* seems to grow *piano piano*, like Don Basilio's Calumny in the *Barber of Seville*.

"What, then, is *Boulangisme*? It does not represent a party, nor a principle, nor a policy of any kind; not even an ideal, a tradition, a popularity, or even a person. It is not a movement towards any definite end, political, social, or international. It has neither flag, creed, nor prestige. *Boulangisme* is simply a coalition of all the enemies of the Third Republic and the existing system, worked by a syndicate, precisely as the Channel Tunnel and the Panama Canal are worked, the chairman and engineer of the company being a very wily, keen, audacious soldier, who has had the good fortune to be once Minister of War. General Boulanger is the military version of Baron Lesseps, and is seeking to become in the world of politics what 'le grand Français' is in the world of engineering. The only difference is that M. de Lesseps has really made the Suez Canal; whereas M. Boulanger can only asseverate that he has made the French army. And a great many people, and especially

the *piou-piou*, the French private himself, believe that he has made the French army. General Boulanger has thus become 'the boss' of the French army and is indeed a sort of Jay Gould in *képi* and *pantalon garance*. He no more represents a policy than the monstrous Tour d'Eiffel which now overshadows half Paris represents a policy. Indeed, *Boulangisme* itself is a Tour d'Eiffel, or Tower of Babel, rising over the Republic—rising no man knows how, aspiring to some inscrutable end, a monstrous and ominous excrescence, which advertises itself by its own monstrosity, and which may be equally disastrous whether it succeeds or tumbles down. Curiously enough, for the moment *Boulangisme* and the Tour d'Eiffel seem both to hang fire in the air—both appear to be swinging dangerously and the builders of both are beginning to strike. But the *Tour de Boulanger* is not merely, like the Tour d'Eiffel, an eye-sore to the city, and a danger to two or three streets—if it goes much higher it will be a serious danger to France.

“General Boulanger himself is, no doubt, a thorough soldier, perfectly brave, master of his profession, with a strong sympathy for the needs and feelings of the lower ranks of the

army, and a natural turn for ingratiating himself with inferiors and superiors alike. As one of the best-known men in France told me—'He has quite a genius for seduction,' of men rather than of women. He is master of all those arts by which an ambitious man keeps himself before the public eye, earns the character of a patriot, poses as a man who has been wronged, and generally makes himself talked of as the coming man. He may be a great general, but he has never given the smallest proof of it. He may be a great statesman, but he has done nothing to show it. He may have a policy, but he studiously conceals it. He is neither a speaker, nor a writer, nor a thinker, nor a leader of any kind. His books, his manifestoes, his speeches, are notoriously made for him by a fluent barrister and a well-informed journalist. He has never put out a single political idea. He has never committed himself to any definite policy. Like a sporting prophet, his 'tips' may always be read in two or three senses. He talks all things to all men; but he has never said a word which can pin him to anything, to any party, or to any platform. He is always vague, as ambiguous as an oracle, and entirely personal. His noisy and colourless platitudes

are cautiously worded, like the advertisements of a big hotel, to suit all tastes, to tempt all classes, and to avoid any positive information. He appeals to the Republic and to the votes of Republicans, while his movement is an overt attack on the Republic and he appears in public surrounded by the enemies of the Republic. He talks about democracy and he has the support of M. Rochefort and of *La Lanterne* ; but there is nothing democratic about him when he appears as a candidate and is elected by Reactionary votes. He entirely repudiates both Empire and Dictatorship ; but the strength of his cause is avowedly in Bonapartist camps. He repudiates Royalism and all Royal causes ; but he takes very good care to conciliate Royalist votes. He says nothing about religion or Church, and he has on his inner staff many violent Voltairians and anti-Clericals ; but in every department where he stands the priests are his best election agents. He says nothing about war and never makes an inflammatory speech ; but he talks vaguely about the nation in arms, the honour of the flag, and the dignity of France—harmless phrases, which as phrases might be uttered by every man, woman, or child in the country ; but then the General is surrounded by

the small poets and small orators of *La Revanche*. M. Boulanger, in fact, carefully abstains from committing himself to any policy whatever. He coquets with all parties and vaguely appropriates every policy. It is nothing but 'Try my Boulanger pill, an infallible cure for all known ailments.'

"The mystery is how, in a great and intelligent people like the French, a movement which is rather a speculative enterprise than a political policy has attained such a size; how such a position has been won by a man who has neither tradition, nor reputation, nor eloquence, nor birth, nor wealth, nor influence, nor services—who represents neither a cause nor a policy. He certainly has a position. The journals, however hostile to him, have to devote daily two or three columns—often a quarter of their space—to *Boulangisme* and the various aspects of *boulangerie*. A leading editor told me that it was impossible to suppress it, as the public must have the news. M. Boulanger's coming and going excites far more stir than that of any Minister, or even the President himself. The Nord, which lately elected him with such overwhelming majorities, must be considered as the premier of the provincial constituencies, from its numbers, wealth, energy, the variety

and importance of its interests: There are many departments in the centre and the west of France where, it is admitted, he would now similarly sweep the board. His strength seems to be mainly along the north-east frontier, the Upper Seine, the Upper Loire, and the whole western country between the Loire and the Garonne — the old strongholds, in fact, of Bonapartism. In Paris and the great cities we are told that the General has the open support of the Bonapartists, the unavowed support of the Clerical party, the benevolent neutrality of the Royalists, the silent vote of the non-political *petite bourgeoisie*, which on purely trade principles was always more or less Imperialist, and a few unorganised groups of extreme Revolutionists and Socialists. The more powerful of the organised Socialists are everywhere against him, as are everywhere the Left Centre, the Opportunists, and the Radicals. In the country M. Boulanger can command the Clericals, the Reactionaries of all shades, the lower ranks of the army, and the dumb unknown masses of small cultivators who are always craving for a strong man to put down the phylloxera and to bring back good harvests. They are half inclined to try the Boulanger pill against the ravages of the

phylloxera and falling markets. M. Boulanger is in the meantime the managing director of a vast League of the Discontented, which, as occasion requires, presents itself as the League of Patriots, the League of Conservatives, the League of Right and Justice, or the League of Universal Prosperity.

“ Can such a League hold together, grow, and triumph ? Is such a possible success a danger to peace and to Europe ? These are precisely the questions which those in France who know most are the least inclined to answer. And I am not about to hazard a prophecy where the most competent prefer to be silent. I will only say this—that unless the League grows rather quickly and succeeds pretty soon it will be in great danger of breaking up and dying down. It is avowedly made up of desperate elements and irreconcilable parties and interests. One of the leading Republicans who support it told me that he was firmly resolved to make it a strictly Republican movement, that he was utterly opposed to dictators and emperors, and that he wanted only a strong executive authority. He was aware, he said, that the bulk of the League were Bonapartists, but he was confident that he and his friends could give it a Republican issue.



Naturally, the Imperialists, are equally confident that they can give it a Bonapartist form. And M. Rochefort and the writers of *La Lanterne* are no less sanguine that they can use it to inaugurate the Revolution. Like Romulus, M. Boulanger has opened on the Palatine Hill an asylum to adventurous spirits and the free lances of all factions, and he hopes for a similar success. But it is evident that, unless his walls are built pretty soon, the new Rome may never begin. Each party are hoping to use the League for their own ends. And, unless stirring things are shortly accomplished, the wild incompatibility of their ends must before long appear. It remains to be seen how long the priests will continue to work for a man who still calls himself a democratic Republican, and who has at his right hand M. Naquet, the author of the Divorce Law, M. Rochefort, and Père Hyacinthe. It must soon appear whether Bonapartists can continue to support a pretender who is surrounded by extreme Republicans, who repudiates the idea of empire, and who openly advocates democratic doctrines in the army.

“ On the other hand, almost every avenue to power seems firmly barricaded against the would-be dictator. They say he has but a dozen

deputies in the Chamber and only one in the Senate. He is no orator, no writer, no contriver of skilful manifestoes. Everything he says or puts forth has to be concocted by a board, like the prospectus of a new company. He can only be restored to the active army by an act of the Legislature, where he has not twenty votes. There is no known instance of a French force acting except by the orders of its own regular and legal commanders. All the superior officers are hostile to Boulanger and to the mutinous and democratic ideas which he offers to the army. All *coups d'Etat* must necessarily be made in Paris ; and all regular parties in Paris are against him. Hence it would seem as if the audacious General had arrayed against him a triple barrier of opponents. As to a *coup de main* of any kind there is no evidence at all that he has the requisite 'devil' for the purpose. What evidence there is looks rather the other way. Nor is there anything to suggest that the movement is tending towards war. 'In spite of all temptations to belong to different nations' M. Boulanger remains a Frenchman, very much of a Frenchman, and so forth. But he seems to find it would not answer to address to French electors anything remotely warlike in tone.

Nothing is more significant than the peaceful language which he uses as a candidate.

"It would be strange that in a great nation like France a movement which has neither man, principles, nor measures should spring up to confront the Republic, wholly without origin or cause. There is reason to believe that origin and cause exist, not in any desire for war, not in the spirit of revolution, much less in any revived belief in monarchy. It is probable that we are witnessing one of those crises to which great democracies are exposed, which are the inevitable result of prolonged revolution, and especially of the difficult problem of founding a solid Government in France on a purely parliamentary basis. Many sincere Republicans believe this to be impossible and *Boulangisme* to be its inevitable result. I trust on a future occasion to have the opportunity of discussing this interesting question."

A few months after this was written Constans, French Minister, took out a warrant for arrest of the General. He fled and escaped to Jersey, was condemned of high treason, *in absentia*, and shot himself on the grave of his mistress in September, 1891.

## CHAPTER V

### THE FUTILITY OF PACIFISM

I HAVE often had to explain to my Pacifist friends how futile is all talk about International Arbitration in the actual tone of national excitement, and how idle was the project to induce nations to settle differences in Congresses and by Diplomacy, until good faith and really friendly feelings can be established between rivals.

On the outbreak of the awkward Venezuela affair, and President Cleveland's high-handed Message of December, 1895, I wrote to the *Daily Chronicle* an essay in which I explained why I could not join in the Radical cry for an appeal to arbitration.

My paper was thus headed :—

“INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION.

“[By Frederic Harrison.]

“In common with all those who yearn for permanent peace and goodwill between nations, I look forward to the day when some form of arbitration may supersede war. But that day

is distant, and in order to arrive at any practical use of arbitration we ought carefully to consider what it involves in international jurisprudence. We should all be glad if any adequate arbitration could be found to dispose of the present dispute. But we shall do no good by talking in a loose way about 'referring the whole matter to arbitration,' as if it were a thing of no consequence—first, what were the terms of the reference, and next how the award was to be enforced.

"Anyone who studies the documents can satisfy himself that our country has never refused arbitration about the Guiana boundary line, does not now refuse it, would be only too glad to submit it to arbitration, as she has sought to do for fifty years past. It is only ignorance and prejudice which continue to assert that England refuses to settle the disputed boundary by arbitration. The only condition that England makes is this, that the arbitration must concern a *bonâ fide* boundary dispute. She refuses to submit a 'bogus' claim, originally put forward as mere 'bluff,' and persistently kept alive for purposes of prejudice. *Bona fides* is of the essence of arbitration, whether in municipal or in international law.

"To the layman it seems a simple thing to

say : ' If two citizens have a disputed claim, it is better to refer the matter to arbitration than to go to law.' And some most excellent people say : ' If two nations have a disputed claim, it is better to decide it by arbitration than by war.' So, indeed, we all say. But in practical application difficulties arise. The antecedent problem is to decide what is the precise matter to be referred to arbitration. The claim must be a real claim, made *bonâ fide* and with a sound *primâ facie* case. Want of good faith, uncertainty as to the points to be submitted, would in law set aside any attempted arbitration. If two neighbours quarrelled about the corner of a paddock abutting on their properties, it might be very right to refer the dispute to arbitration. But this could not be done if one of the litigants put in a claim to his neighbour's park or mansion, on the ground of something done during the Civil War of 1642. If a customer declined to pay his tailor for a new suit, it might fairly be arbitrated upon, unless the tailor chose to send in his bill for a thousand pounds, on the ground of the trouble it had cost him to make a good fit. Arbitration is impracticable without complete *bona fides* and precise agreement as to the matter to be referred to arbitration.

“ The same conditions apply to international arbitration, and are even more necessary there. If a man is prepared to bring his action for a claim, the presumption is that he holds it to be just; and is willing to risk an adverse verdict and costs. If a nation is prepared to fight for any claim, the presumption is that it holds it to be just. But many nations, especially the young and the weak nations, are very willing to make magnificent claims for which they have no intention of fighting, or even of risking a dollar. It costs them nothing to ask, and they quite take a pride in ‘pitching it high.’ Now, if every international claim is necessarily to be brought to arbitration, either by the pressure of public opinion, or by the menace of some mighty ally, ‘bogus’ claims would be the rule. To go into a court of arbitration costs nothing and risks nothing. It is a noble thing for a petty State to call into court a Great Power. And every young republic, in the halcyon days of Arbitration-all-Round, will gladly take its bill and set down *fifty* where it would be amply satisfied with *one*. ”

“ The claim which Venezuela proposes for arbitration is a claim to a very large tract of country which was never at any time in occupation of Venezuela, nor in any actual occupa-

tion by their predecessors of Spain. But it has been in virtual occupation by the British, and their predecessors the Dutch, for more than one hundred years. And this Venezuelan claim, devoid of any pretence of occupation, is founded on a theory of titular sovereignty by Spain in the last century—a theory which would equally give to Venezuela large territories, which are now in the peaceful possession of three other nations besides ourselves—France, Holland, and Brazil. It is obvious that a ‘claim’ of this kind is not made in good faith, and cannot be seriously referred to arbitration by any self-respecting Power. Greece no doubt has a claim to Macedonia, if not to the Balkan peninsula, as the representative of Philip and Alexander, and would like to claim the Troad, as representing Agamemnon and Achilles. If Venezuela made a claim to Jamaica, or Spain made a claim to Gibraltar, on the ground that both were once the dominions of the King of Spain, it would be idle to suppose that such a dispute could be quietly ‘settled by arbitration.’

“Arbitration is a blessed thing in principle ; but in many cases, as in this, the real difficulty is to settle what is to be the matter submitted



to arbitration. That is usually, as it is now, far more difficult than the arbitration itself. There is now a way in which our friends in the United States can bring this affair to arbitration at once. Let them persuade their Venezuelan young lions to submit to a *bond fide* boundary settlement, and to drop all swagger about Charles V. and Philip II. of Spain. Let them do this, and the boundary of British Guiana can be settled in a month ; and England is not going to make a fuss about a few thousand square miles of pathless forest. One thing more the Americans can do. They can insist that the award, when made, shall be enforced ; that Venezuela shall keep the terms of it faithfully ; pay up, if so ordered to do ; and abstain from raiding on her neighbour's soil. The grand difficulty about international arbitration is that there is no power to enforce any award made. In municipal law the courts remain behind to enforce any *bond fide* award. But the 'sanction' of international law is War. So that to enforce an international award, the only remedy is just that appeal to arms which arbitration was intended to avert. Unfortunately, our American friends have given us a very sinister illustration of this truth. Under the last international

arbitration a large sum has been admitted to be due from the United States to Great Britain. That sum has never yet been paid; and the American Legislature has practically told us to whistle for the money. That is a most discouraging way to inaugurate the rule of international arbitration; and it makes it rather indecorous on the other side of the Atlantic to use big words about 'submitting the whole dispute to arbitration.' In practice, England has found that international arbitration for her means paying enormous sums when the award is against her, and being unpaid herself when the award is in her favour. We are all for international arbitration in principle; but in practice it cannot be put higher than international law, which (as I have said) has no coercive power behind it but War. International arbitration by all means in this as in every other dispute. But its antecedent condition is *good faith* and, as Mr. Gladstone says, *common sense*."

When the editor of a publication called *Great Thoughts* asked me for my opinion on the question on which he was obtaining a variety of opinions, I replied thus:—

“ CAN RESORT TO WAR BE ABOLISHED ?

“ This, the root problem of the twentieth century, is a far more complex and fundamental question than perhaps any of the excellent Peace Reformers of the day have grasped. It goes deep down to the innermost foundations on which religion and social organisation rest. And for that very reason it is not insoluble, a hopeless dilemma for the human race—in the *ultimate future*. War between civilised races will cease, or become so rare as to be regarded as an outrage, as murder or sacrilege now are, when civilised nations really practise the dictates of the religion they profess, and when society has been radically regenerated on humane principles of new life. Arbitration Leagues, Peace Societies, Nobel Prizes, all are excellent in their way. They are gradually creating a new standard of international morality. The Peace Propaganda is in the air. But this is far too weak to curb the wild national passions. Nothing can curb them but a more vital sense of religion and new social institutions.

“ It is a sad thought how deeply religion has entered into modern wars, how often the ministers of religion have rather stimulated than

checked or softened wars. The great majority of the wars of the last fifty years have been waged between nations of different faiths, namely, by Christian nations against non-Christian. Almost every war undertaken since the Crimean war, either by Russia or by England, has been against a non-Christian people—Musulman, Buddhist, Polytheist, or Fetichist; Afghans, Zulus, Ashantis, Burmans, Circassians, Chinese, Japanese. In all of these the ministers and zealots of the Christian Churches have vehemently stimulated the war passion. We see to-day how the Russian priests bless the guns, consecrate every engine of destruction, and even carry miracle-working relics, crosses, and the host itself into the battlefield. The only exception out of some fifty wars waged by England in as many years was the Boer War. And we know how fiercely the Episcopal and Wesleyan connections denounced the Dutch Reformed Church of the Transvaal. In the last half-century the only war waged by France against a Christian Power was in 1870—against Protestants. The only instance of a war between nations of the same creed in fifty years was the Prusso-Danish war of 1862.

“ And all this time the religion professed by

these nations is the Religion of Peace. The teaching of Christ is one impassioned protest against wrath, violence, and fighting. The peculiar note of the Gospel is—Blessed are the meek ; Blessed are the merciful ; Blessed are the peacemakers. Jesus said : ‘ Put up thy sword ; all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword.’ There are priests of the Gospel to-day, as of the Russian State Church, who seem to say day and night : ‘ Draw thy sword ; they who do not draw the sword shall perish.’ I say it is a truly awful thought that an Archbishop should write the savage calumny that God ‘ made battles too ’ ; that a leading statesman on a Sunday afternoon should cite with approval to his people this sickening blasphemy. War will end when nations have learned a more humane spirit of religion, and strive to carry out the principles of their own Scriptures ; when peaceful industry is recognised as the natural task of civilised man, and privileges in creed and in society and the mediæval prestige of Militarism has been discarded as an evil dream—such as were once Piracy, Slavery, and Torture.

“ I would not belittle by one word the self-devoted labours of various Peace movements. I know of what heroic stuff many of them are

made, and how their efforts are now beginning to work in the atmosphere of Europe. But I say we must go to the root of the matter, which is Religion and Social Regeneration. The body of friends with whom I have now worked for some thirty years, in public and in private, have cried out in season and out of season :—If war is to be checked, the nations must amend their hearts and broaden their minds. What we all need is an inward sense of human religion and a solid social philosophy. Boards of Arbitration are excellent, but they come too late and are too weak.”

### THE GREAT DELUSION.

A few months before the outbreak of war the editor of that serio-comic journal called *War and Peace*, the organ of the Norman Angell Pacifists, somewhat indiscreetly begged me to send them for publication my opinion. I replied :—

“ Sir,—I reply to your request to receive my opinion, although you might know that in public and in private I have long ago described the policy of “ The Great Illusion ” and of *War and Peace* as not only a childish absurdity, but a mischievous and immoral sophism.

“ No man living has more earnestly de-

nounced the spirit of ' Militarism ' in its aggressive forms, or the retrograde craze of idealising war as the type of national glory. My religion itself is the Gospel of Peace. And for some fifty years I have continually protested against our wars of aggression in Asia and in Africa—and especially against the infamous war in South Africa in 1899–1902. At the same time, as a matter of political duty, I have warmly supported the war of the United States to free the Republic from the curse of slavery ; and I have advocated armed intervention to resist in Europe the tyrannical aggression of modern Bismarckism, which has been the danger of Europe for fifty years.

“ At present [March, 1914] I advocate an immense increase of our whole defensive resources, both by sea and by land, to resist the menace to the peace and civilisation of Europe, and even the existence of these kingdoms.

“ The invariable source of all wars is to be found in the ambition, the vanity, the hatreds, the passions of nations, races and sects. ~ When national jealousies, religious frenzy, and vicious standards of glory work together, they lead to wars, whatever the disasters and sufferings they produce to every material aspect of life. When

racial and religious passions meet, the result, as we saw in the Balkans, in Africa, North, South, and West, is hideous chaos and desolation. And we seem about to see the clash of racial and religious passion in Ireland. *The only real preventive of war is human religion. Defensive and protective war is often a noble national duty.* To preach a doctrine of Peace as if its main principle were financial and material interest is rank falsehood to all the lessons of history from the time of the Crusades to the Ulster Covenant, but is also a degrading distortion of the genuine sources of patriotic enthusiasm. Human nature however passionate and cruel, is not so mean.

“ *March, 1914.*”

#### THE DEVASTATION OF THE PALATINATE IN 1689.

This is how great Frenchmen, after 200 years, described the atrocities of their own War-Lord. During our own Boer War, I wrote this letter in the *Speaker*, reminding our rulers of the judgment of posterity on wars of devastation :—

“ *An Historical Parallel.*

“ One of the indelible blots upon the memory of Louis XIV. and on the name of France is the devastation of the Palatinate by Louvois, Tessé,



and Duras in 1689. This is how it is spoken of by Henri Martin, the eminently patriotic and impartial historian of France (Vol. XIV., pp. 104—106). I translate and abridge his account :—

“ ‘ The methods pursued in the campaign in Germany left an ineffaceable stain on the reign of Louis le Grand. Louvois counselled the King to destroy the towns which he could not hold, in order that posts which the Royal troops had to evacuate should not be used by anyone. Louis, after some hesitation, adopted this expedient, one worthy of Tartar conquerors ! They began by burning Ladenburg and Heidelberg, having removed the inhabitants with their families and goods. The executioner of this infernal work, Tessé (though he had been one of the leaders in the *dragonnades* !), could not bear to look on the ruin, and left with his men. Louvois, furious that Heidelberg had not been “ utterly destroyed and burnt,” ordered them not merely to burn Mannheim, but to destroy it stone by stone (March, 1689).

“ ‘ But as the enemies’ forces gathered on still, Marshal Duras proposed to the King and his Minister the following horrible scheme. This was to destroy not only the towns and villages which might assist in attacking Mayence, but all

the towns along the Rhine between Mayence and Philipsbourg. The fatal word uttered, Duras himself was filled with remorse and wished to go back from his own proposal. It was not so easy to tear Louvois from his prey ! Louvois caused the King to order the Marshal to complete the work ! Spire, Worms, Oppenheim, Frankenthal, Bingen, were consigned to the flames. The inhabitants were not suffered to take refuge in their own country. They were forced to emigrate into that of their conqueror. The order was monstrous ; the execution was worse. We can conceive all that the licence and greed of the soldiery added to these scenes of desolation. The famous cathedrals and their palaces were burnt. This fair country, which the middle ages had adorned with so many monuments, civil and religious, was now nothing but a heap of smoking ruins, as if a new Attila had swept over Gaul and Germany, a hundred thousand starving wretches, driven from their houses in flames, called for vengeance on Germany, on all Europe, and roused against the Great King an outburst of indignation even deeper than that caused by the Huguenot refugees. The populations along the Rhine, which Nature seemed to have attached to France, vowed against its Govern-

ment a long and implacable resentment, which never was appeased until the dynasty of Louis XIV. itself was extinguished. .

“ ‘ The point at the bottom of these horrors which stained our arms, in other ways so glorious in that century, was not simply the cruelty of Louvois or the arrogance of Louis XIV., but a false notion of what is permitted by the laws of war. They pretended that it authorised them to do all things which could injure the enemy. Even Louis himself did not dare to push this doctrine to its consequences. He claimed the right, *in order to injure the enemy*, to bombard inoffensive civilian populations, to blot out the very sites of the cities he destroyed, to turn whole provinces into a desert ; but he did not dare to employ the dagger of an assassin to murder his enemy’s chief, which *would have injured the enemy* far more. The laws of war, the rights of a civilised people, can only give the right to destroy that which directly participates in war. It gives no right to lay a town in ruins ; it gives no right to burn it.’ ”

“ Such is the verdict of history which has consigned to infamy the memory of Louvois, Tessé, and Duras, even in the pages of an ardent French Nationalist. To whom does the Rhine and the

Palatinate belong to-day ? Where are the conquests of Louis XIV. ; where is his dynasty ? ”

These are the damning judgments that German historians of a coming generation will record on the infamies of Kaiser Wilhelm in 1914-1915.

## CHAPTER VI

### ANNUAL ADDRESSES : 1899-1913

IN the address I gave at Newton Hall on 1st January, 1899, I heartily welcomed the attempt of the Tsar Nicholas to found a Peace Congress. I said : "The absolute lord of a military empire has been proclaiming a Homily of Peace." The appeal was in itself, I said, "a great and memorable event, whatever view we may take of the practical results to be achieved—it is a new and portentous departure in modern history." If the Tsar can teach the nations how to cast out the seven devils—national vain-glory, Imperial expansion, the passion to rob and crow over neighbours—he would have done something real. If he cannot do this, "he will only have shown how vain are the best intentions of rulers to cure the moral diseases of men." I showed how each nation would bar and refuse even to discuss its special problems—Germany would bar Alsace and Lorraine ; England would bar Cyprus and Egypt ; France would bar Tunis, Madagascar, and Siam ; Russia would bar Corea and the Black Sea ; Austria would bar Magyar and Czech nationali-

ties ; Italy would bar Eritrea and Rome ; the United States would bar Cuba and the Philippines. " The sovereigns of the earth are to greet one another with a brotherly embrace, *and leave* every source of hatred, envy, and fear exactly as they are to-day."

And so Peace Congresses and Hague Agreements have after sixteen years ended in petty local matters, and at last in " scraps of paper."

I have always declined to associate myself with various schemes to establish Arbitration, to inaugurate an era of Peace, and by international agreements to mitigate or to find substitutes for War. Whilst national passions are everywhere so deep, whilst envy, rivalry, scorn divide the nations, whilst their various creeds, rival Churches and sects add fury to the jealousies and ignorance which dehumanise men, it is trivial self-delusion to talk of Peace being a matter of agreement, or War being controlled by diplomatic congresses. The scientific soldiers of Germany laughed at these pedantries. " War is not a game," they said, " much less is it an action-at-law. It is a science—an art, our national ideal, in which laymen and civilians have no business to intrude."

In my annual addresses at Newton Hall and Essex Hall, and in papers in the *Positivist Review* and other organs of the Press, I continued from time to time

to call attention to the unstable equilibrium of Europe owing to the fears and the ambitions of Germany, Russia, and France, to the vulnerable condition of our vast Empire and the necessity for adequate land forces at home, whilst continental *Conscription* of the whole male population was impracticable for our foreign and tropical services. In May, 1904, I heartily supported the Anglo-French Settlement effected by Lord Lansdowne :—

“ One of the most statesmanlike achievements of our generation. It was a task of peculiar difficulty—very complicated, bristling with old jealousies, a task which had baffled the diplomacy of successive Ministries. No settlement so important has been made since the Treaty of Paris in 1856. It is the herald of Peace to Europe, and the token of a new era of conciliation and common sense.”

Indeed, this *Eirenicon* of 1904 was found to be the basis of the close alliance of 1914, on which the salvation of Europe and the hopes of Britain depend in this year 1915.

In January, 1905, I published an article entitled “ Thoughts on the Present Discontents ” in the *Fortnightly Review*, in which I again referred to this

Settlement of Lord Lansdowne and also to the diplomatic work of King Edward VII. The paper opened thus :—

“ It is many years since an independent observer of the political horizon at the opening of a new year could welcome the dawn of International Peace. And it is even many more years since he could see in this blessed prospect the personal work of a Constitutional King and a Conservative Minister. Ever since Edward VII.'s ‘ circumnavigation of peace and amity ’ in 1903 it has rained Treaties of Arbitration : the settlement of long-standing sources of estrangement. The most important of these was the comprehensive Settlement with France, just accepted by the French Legislature. Having regard to the immense area and the diverse conditions covered by this Settlement, it must be pronounced a masterpiece of diplomatic *do ut des*—the most important since the Treaty of Paris in 1856. It has removed all the burning problems between our countries, and some of them that seemed inveterate ; for the knotty question of the Newfoundland Fisheries has been an outstanding sore for centuries. The settlement has recast the whole scheme of European politics. It gives our statesmen a



free hand such as they have not had for a generation.

“The details and provisions of this great ‘omnibus’ Bill of Settlement between two nations were of course the work of Lord Lansdowne, and were by no means the work of a month or a year, but of long and arduous negotiations. The driving-power of the new Anglo-French *entente* was largely due to the tact and good sense of the King. One of the dominant signs of the age is the tendency towards some form of *personal* direction of affairs—be it by Sovereign, President, Chancellor, Secretary, or Favourite. It is the inevitable result of the impotence of Parliaments, Senates, or even of Cabinets, to work a complex *Executive* in times of stress with energy, rapidity, and scientific knowledge. The days, then, of parliamentary *Executives* are ended.

“We have just escaped also [December, 1904], by the tact and good sense of Edward VII. and of Lord Lansdowne, from a dangerous crisis, in which some hot-headed politicians and some mischievous journals were hoping to push the country into war with Russia—a war wherein we had nothing to gain and many possible entanglements to suffer. The provocation,

it must be admitted, was extreme. The sinking of our fishing ships off the Dogger Bank by the Russian fleet on its way to Japan was no doubt an international outrage. And it required on the part of our Ministers both nerve and judgment to face it without humiliation and to have it referred for compensation to an International Tribunal."

When, in 1906, the Morocco question broke out and the so-called Algeiras "Settlement" was made, I pointed out that, taking it as a whole, no serious settlement of the European problem had been effected. Nothing has been done except to show to the world the arrogant ambition of Kaiser Wilhelm to dominate Europe and to humiliate and belittle France. In the *Positivist Review*, May, 1906, I wrote the following article:—

#### "THE PAN-GERMANIC KAISER.

"Diplomatists, journalists, and the man-in-the-street are all now in high glee over the 'Settlement,' as they call it, of the Morocco question, and the pacification of the world. Compliments, crosses, and souvenirs commemorate a happy ending to an ugly dispute. The fact is, nothing is ended—rather a good deal

is begun. There was never any real Morocco question. The conference had nothing to settle, but a good deal to submit to.. The diplomatists have brought away nothing but empty compliments from their Sovereigns, and an uneasy sense of having been made to look small in the eyes of each other and of Europe.

“The truth is that this whole Morocco business—which ended, not with the effusive leave-takings at Algeciras, but with the Kaiser’s boisterous telegram to Austria—is a very sinister and serious outbreak of arrogant ambition. From first to last, it means nothing less than the desire of a great military power to domineer in Europe. In effect, the Kaiser, with his coarse, drill-sergeant voice, shouted out, ‘Look here ; I am the biggest and the strongest of you all. My will and my desires have to be respected by you. If you do this, I will be your friend. If you do not believe my words, you can put it to the test as soon as you like !’ The Powers of Europe had no wish to accept this challenge. They simply declared that they had no desire to thwart the Kaiser’s will or in any way to affect his interests. And they went home to see what he would do next.

“ No doubt he has not made up his mind what he will do next. But it is pretty clear what he is thinking of, and what he will try to do in certain events. He will not give Morocco another thought. It was a mere pretext, like the Hohenzollern candidate and the rebuff of Benedetti at Ems in Bismarck's time. The Morocco hubbub was simply a mode of showing the world that France would yield rather than fight. In that it has succeeded. France, no doubt, once expected to have her own way in Morocco—a policy which in this Review we strongly condemned, and regretted that England should seem to countenance. But it was on no ground of justice and morality that Germany barred the way. An incalculable source of trouble has been planted in the side of France. And a fruitful nest of European complications has been built up on the Mediterranean coast. And Germany says : ‘ If I choose to cause this mischief, who is going to stop me ? ’ So far, in the game of fishing in troubled waters and warning off all comers who would like to fish also, Germany has won points. It is true that the hope of detaching France from England, from Russia, from Italy, even from Austria—to which William in his headlong insolence certainly looked at first

—this has most egregiously failed. Germany is now conspicuously isolated—friendless, suspected, detested. The sinister game of alternate knavery and bullying has been played rather too openly. The professors and merchants in the Fatherland are getting uneasy when they see how the world unmask and fears the diplomatic arts of the Chancellor. It is perhaps a dangerous game to play: but the Kaiser himself seems proud of it, as one who should say, ‘ They may not like it, but they see I am master ! ’

“ What started him off in this career of brag and bully was the collapse of Russia ; and even now [1906] the recovery of Russia as a first-class Power is very doubtful. What is not doubtful is the recrudescence of troubles in the Balkans and desperate attempts to form fresh territorial conditions in Eastern Europe. And, what is perhaps even more imminent and ominous, the dissolution of the composite Austrian Empire. When that happens (and it is difficult to see what can prevent it within a very few years) the Germanic dominions of Francis Joseph must automatically sink into the German Empire—whether by intrigue, alliance, or force, or a judicious mixture of all these. When the dream of the Pan-Germans is realised,

and the Kaiser sits astride Central Europe from the Baltic to the Adriatic—from the Vosges to the Carpathians—with a population double that of France—the German Kaiser will be all that Napoleon hoped to be and, for a brief space, was. France will hold the same position with respect to him that Austria has done for years past—the obsequious ‘second in my duels,’ says William. Italy will be at his beck and call; and even Switzerland may begin to tremble at the Pan-German spectre. Even before that, Holland, by arrangement or terrorism, will be an appendage to the Empire. And when German fleets command the seaboard from Königsberg to Rotterdam, the Baltic and the North Seas are hers. If to this vast coast line of some 700 miles she adds the command of the North Adriatic (and possibly of the Aegean Sea also), the World-Empire of Kaiserdom will be a reality. Against this danger to civilisation there is but one barrier—a close alliance of mutual defence between England, France, and Russia—with Italy, Switzerland, Holland, and Belgium as benevolent neutrals.”

The Morocco imbroglio and the rapid expansion of the German Navy Law, the violent language of the Pan-German League, and the irrepressible anxieties of French politicians, had at last thoroughly roused

English opinion to realise that it was the British Empire and our command of the sea which was being directly menaced, whilst France was the immediate object of attack. The Admiralty was committed to the race of "Dreadnoughts" and the Government was revising the entire scheme of Naval Defence. I published in the *Positivist Review*, March, 1909, the following article on the general question of our requirements at sea and land to meet the now notorious challenge of the German Empire :—

"THE MINISTERIAL PROGRAMME OF 1909.

"By common consent, the dominant issue of the coming Session will be one of Finance, and the King's Speech, we are told, takes the unprecedented course of assigning the cause to be, first, Old Age Pensions and then National Defence.

"That a radical development of our whole financial system is now inevitable is plain to us all; and we trust the Budget will open new lines of a sound social taxation, without listening to the sham Tariff reform of a conspiracy of capitalists who hope still further to exploit the toiling masses.

"And when we are told by a Liberal Ministry,

pledged by all their traditions and their professions to Economy, that further taxation is needed to secure our country's defence, the problem is as grave as any that has arisen in our time.

" Our body has been now for nearly half a century the most earnest and consistent opponents of all forms of Militarism, Imperial aggrandisement, and increasing armaments by land or sea. And I, for one, am not likely in my old age to be false to the central principle of polity in the human faith.

" But we are neither faddists, nor idealogues, nor sentimentalists. We have to look at facts, and to probe to the bottom the enormous complication of international problems. And doing this, for my own part, I refuse to repeat with ignorant optimism the obsolete shibboleths—of Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform—to call out for reduction of all warlike expenditure and rehearse pathetic sermons on general disarmament.

" In short, after long and patient study, I have come to believe that our means of national defence will soon be proved to be utterly inadequate—indeed, that the very existence of England as a Great Power, much more of our



amorphous Empire, may be at stake within less than a decade of years.

“ This is no new opinion of mine—indeed, I have often in years past expressed the same thing. All that I have ever written or spoken about international questions, about the responsibilities of our Empire, about Peace and Justice—have been based on this settled belief of mine. It has no source in recent military and naval debates, and certainly no connection with the latest Leagues, scares, and Army reorganisation. All that has happened, so far as I am concerned, is this, that recent inquiries and discussions have called public attention to all the dangers which for years my friends and myself have urged were inevitable consequences of our international relations. And they have laid bare even, on official and expert authority, how utterly inadequate are our military and even our naval resources to guarantee for ever the enormous pretensions and the tempting opportunities that our marvellous Empire offers to our neighbours.

“ I shall not repeat what I have said so often and at large in my book on ‘ National and Social Problems ’ a year ago, that the claim of our island to be paramount Mistress of the Ocean

from East to West, North to South, must lead to a challenge which would test to its bases the existence of our country as a mighty Power. That challenge has been postponed now for forty or fifty years—first by the disastrous defeats suffered by Russia and France, by America's want of either navy or empire, and by the peaceable condition of India, China, and for a long time of Japan.

“ All this is now changed. Germany and the United States are acquiring transmarine dominions, and aspire to possess fleets on a scale analogous to our own. As I pointed out in my ‘ Bismarckism ’ of 1870, re-issued in 1908, the inevitable result of the new German Empire must be to challenge the British command of the ocean as the dominant world Power. In forty years that challenge has grown in loudness and in force. And at last Englishmen wake up to find that their root idea of ‘ Britain ruling the waves ’ is not accepted by foreign nations as a law of Nature and as the normal basis of international comity and peace.

“ In forty years Germany has grown to enormous strength, wealth, and to a military organisation such as the world has never seen since the age of the Cæsars and the Antonines. The con-

sciousness of this prodigious force has roused overweeping ambitions in a people as prone as any other to national self-esteem. The German soldier caste, which has prolonged into modern Europe the idea of feudal barons in the twelfth century, proud of an army which it believes can face any two-Power armies in Europe, is now bursting with the lust of domination such as filled the Court and marshals of Louis XIV. and of Napoleon. It makes them as much suspected and feared in Europe as ever were Louis or Napoleon. They see—and they are quite right—that even this dominant power on land is being constantly blocked and discounted, whilst a neighbouring island, with one-third less of population, claims to maintain on the wide seas a predominant mastery, far in excess even of what the German War-Lord ever pretended to have on land in his most arrogant allocutions.

“ Viewed with impartial judgment, it is true that Germany has a just right to a powerful fleet of her own ; and that the international prestige of her army itself is greatly neutralised, even for self-defence, by a foreign navy which meets her on every sea, not only as the strongest in the world, but as stronger than any probable combination. If Germans claimed such a mastery,

Englishmen would be the first to challenge it. And we have no right to complain now that Germans, in their systematic, scientific unflinching way, are straining their whole material and social system in order to challenge it.

“ No man is fit to argue on politics who doubts that it is the settled resolve of the German nation to challenge our naval supremacy—not at once, but in the course of years to come. To go on repeating commonplaces about German friendliness, diplomatic compliments, and our incomparable ‘ Dreadnoughts,’ to revive the obsolete maxims of Gladstone, Bright, and Cobden about economy, peace, and brotherhood of nations—all this is mere verbiage, unworthy of serious politicians and publicists. Let us get rid of stale shibboleths about Liberal principles and Radical retrenchment. The world changes; and things are for ever presenting us with new dilemmas such as the good and the wise men of the middle nineteenth century had not to face. We of the twentieth century have other crises to meet. And to-day the tremendous crisis is upon us—that the British mastery of the ocean, as a basic fact of international polity, cannot long remain without a desperate challenge to destroy it.

“ If that were all, Positivists would not be so

deeply concerned ; for to them it is not an article of faith, that the future of civilisation is bound up with the British mastery of the ocean ; and, even as to our vast transmarine Empire, we would be content to see it peacefully and gradually resolve itself into normal, self-governing, and independent communities. But the danger is not simply the loss of maritime dominion or even of foreign possessions. The danger with which we are now face to face is a national catastrophe within our own island shores. Whatever Power or combined Powers shall ever challenge our naval supremacy or covet our Empire will be bound by all the maxims of politics and of war to strike at the heart, and go straight to paralyse the seat of Government and the store-house of our infinite resources. It will be no desultory attack on outlying lands or in distant seas. It will be a terrific onslaught on our very life as a nation.

“ Now Positivists, who are not Anarchists, nor humanitarian idealogues, nor Indian nor Irish rebels, but are English patriots devoted to the splendid inheritance of our fatherland, cannot see, without a sickening sense of despair, rival parties in the State struggling for office, whilst treating the urgent problem of national existence

with blind optimism or futile palliatives. For the moment both parties in Parliament seem agreed that another 'Dreadnought' or two will satisfy all that can be needed for some years to come.

"What, then, is the root of the indispensable defence? The same reasoning which proves that the British command of the ocean cannot go on for ever without challenge suffices to prove that this island cannot indefinitely overtop all possible combinations of foreign navies by building—and manning—and equipping—'Dreadnoughts,' cruisers, and destroyers, at the rate in permanency of two-Power *plus* a percentage, against all comers the world over. Germany and the United States have magnificent fleets, ample and competent seamen, and unlimited ambition, and they are steadily catching us up in force. Austria is planning a noble fleet—eventually destined to be consort to the German. Russia and France, Japan, and Italy are friendly to-day; but fleets are not made in a day. And alliances come and go like summer clouds.

"For my own part, I should not quarrel with any naval programme that a responsible Government judges to be of absolute necessity. For the safety, the very existence of this country, depends at present on a navy of overwhelming

proportions. But this—'our sole defence'—cannot be continued for ever.

“The time has come at last when our international duties, our national existence, demand an adequate land force permanently organised for home defence. If we had that, we need have no ‘bloated armaments’ at sea, against which hard-shell Radicals declaim, no international panics and recriminations, nor need our allies fear that in the hour of their distress we should prove to be a benevolent neutral or a broken reed. On international, on practical, on economic, and on patriotic grounds, we now need an adequate land force permanently organised for home defence. With all my life-long aversion to Militarism, Imperialism, and national vain-glory, I sorrowfully admit that the time has come to revise and reorganise all our schemes of national defence.

“I do not pretend to enter upon any of the schemes at present before the country, nor can I venture to discuss the advantages or the weakness either of the Government’s Territorial scheme or that of the National Service League. I have studied both systems and the *pros* and *cons* of platform and Press as far as a layman with no practical experience can form a judg-

ment. All that I find indispensable is an adequate land force, scientifically trained, and permanently organised for home defence.

“ I feel bound to explain what these terms must imply. By *adequate* I mean ultimately a force of at least 400,000 or 500,000 grown men regularly trained to manœuvre and shoot, both foot, horse, and artillery. By scientific training I mean systematic drill in camp for several months (say six), with further service of some weeks for three years. By permanent organisation I mean the full equipment of a modern army capable of being put into the field—say within twenty-one days. Anything short of this, the experts seem to agree, is little more than playing at soldiering.

“ I offer no sort of opinion whether the present system of a Territorial Army can be enlarged or adapted in practice to meet these conditions. Nor do I presume to decide whether the scheme of the National Service League is practicable or impracticable. Still less do I venture to dogmatise as to whether any such adequate defence does not imply, or will not ultimately develop into, compulsory service on all able-bodied adults, without any discrimination of wealth or rank. My own matured belief is, that to



that we shall finally comè. And I should not be able to oppose it.

“ I am quite aware of all the objections to this scheme. First and foremost, any compulsory system involves a vast system of registration and personal inquiry foreign to all our habits and tastes. That we need only a percentage of the adults inscribed opens a wide door to favouritism, fraud, and abuse. The disturbance of our industrial life is a thing most difficult to calculate, and it might prove serious and embarrassing. The cost would be heavy, and it might amount to ten or twelve millions per annum. It is said that it might trench upon voluntary service in the army abroad and even in the navy. As I look to see both gradually reduced rather than increased, I could bear this last disadvantage without much anxiety.

“ But whatever the risks and evils of an adequate land force for home defence, I come to see that its advantages outbalance its evils and its dangers. The risk of suffering what France suffered in 1870–1871 is too tremendous to allow any doubts to weigh. If we were absolutely safe in these islands we should need no overwhelming navy, ready to meet any combination of Powers. No foreign Power could threaten any ally of ours,

if our whole regular army could be sent to their help, without leaving England exposed to attack. Lastly, the mad race to outbid each other in navies would be mitigated if no dream of a successful attack upon England could be entertained by the most ambitious of our rivals. The true way to arrest the indefinite increase of our navy is to build up an invincible line of home defence behind it."

## CHAPTER VII

### LETTERS TO "THE TIMES," 1909

THE article above reprinted was vehemently denounced by various Liberal and Radical friends of mine. And I was described in their Press as "a renegade," "a jingo," "an alarmist"—an enemy to all good principles, peaceful hopes, and prudent economy. It is almost impossible, as things are in party politics, to discuss any public question, or even to point to any national peril, without its being treated as a matter of party tactics—as an attempt to discredit a Minister and to undermine a Government. Having been all my life avowedly independent of all party allegiance, having supported or attacked both parties—indeed, any party, or any politician—whom I thought should be either supported or criticised without the least reference to divisions in the lobby or to debates in Parliament, I was too much used to the abuse of journalists and partisan censures to be disturbed by their writings or their words. And the organ in which I wrote was avowedly independent of party. Every number of our *Review* bore on its opening page the words that "It is not identified with any political party."

However, thinking it as well to make my case more widely known to the public, I sent to *The Times* the letters which follow, and they were published on the 18th March, 1909. This letter, at the urgent desire of the late Mr. Frederick Jackson, of Tarn Moor, Haslemere, a friend and keen supporter of Lord Roberts, by the courtesy of *The Times* was issued in a pamphlet published by the National Service League and entitled "HOME DEFENCE."

The pamphlet mainly consisted of speeches on Home Defence made by Lord Roberts in the House of Lords and elsewhere. The editor's preface stated that each of us was "responsible for no opinions except those expressed by himself." I was not then, nor have I ever been, a member of the National Service League, and in a postscript I added that, "as a civilian, I did not express any opinion as to the best practical means of obtaining an adequate home army, which I felt to be urgent."

#### HOME DEFENCE.

(*The Times*, March, 1909.)

- "As the paper which I addressed to the Positivist Society, now printed in the March number of their *Review*, has disconcerted some Liberal friends, I ask your leave to explain the grounds for my regarding this problem as vital and urgent.

“ My views were formed long before recent discussions, and quite apart from any scare of to-day. They have been forced on me by long study of European politics, and are such as I have often expressed, and set forth a year ago in a book on ‘National and Social Problems.’

“ They are trifling with a serious crisis who repeat platitudes about our friendly neighbours, our peaceable ideals, and our magnificent navy. Of course England desires to live at peace with all men, and does not nurse against any continental nation either jealousy or grudge. And we know that our navy to-day is amply competent to defend our island and our Empire against any maritime Power in the world. What more can we want? says the old-fashioned Radical intent on retrenchment, and the new-fashioned Labour man intent on social reform.

“ Well, let us come to the point, and speak plainly on certain facts. The sole ground for serious anxiety as to our national defences arises from what we see as we watch the feverish expansion of the German navy, combined with the domineering attitude of the German Government in Europe—*plus* the ambitious schemes asserted now for a whole generation by the German military and naval chiefs, fomenting

the natural aspirations of the great German race.

“ Absolutely free as I am from any sort of party allegiance, and equally free from ~~my~~ public responsibility, I can speak openly about things which official politicians and judicious publicists have to cover under conventional allusions. Our national existence, I make bold to say, may be in peril, within less than a generation, from the tremendous navy now being hurried on in Germany, from the domineering ambition of the German chiefs, the aspirations and the increase of the German race.

“ I say the German race, because the Near Eastern crisis [Bosnian crisis of 1909] can mean nothing less than the eventual amalgamation, or the practical control by one hand, of the entire German-speaking peoples of Central Europe.

“ The signal service to Austria rendered by Germany, not without risk to herself, in this Balkan imbroglio must involve that within a few years Europe will be face to face with a hundred millions of Germans trained to war and *practically under one military headship*. And if to that were ever added the virtual control over the Low-German people of Holland, with her seaports and marine population, a single War

Lord ruling from Stettin to the mouths of the Rhine and from the Baltic to the Adriatic—then Europe will see a Power she has not known since Napoleon and Louis XIV.

“There is no doubt about the domineering ambition of German diplomacy, for this is the key that explains the course of history in Europe for the last twenty years. The desperate plunge of Austria into the Balkans was made with the connivance, if not at the suggestion, of Berlin. And, in any case, it is destined to redound to the ultimate advancement of Germany more than of Austria. The aspirations of the German people and the schemes of their chiefs are perfectly natural, given the general situation and the history of the new German Empire. They need cause in us neither surprise nor indignation.

“They are facts which all who study the German Press, the utterances of their Navy League, the tone of military and civil authorities, and the whole Pan-Germanic movement must recognise as real. Radical and labour politicians do not study this movement. Indeed, one needs to be in close touch with German thought and writing to judge its force. The Pan-Germanic ideal and its aim at hegemony is an obvious result of the European situation and

of the history of Germany since the rise of Bismarck in 1864.

“Neither I nor my friends have any anti-German prejudice. I have nothing but admiration for the high qualities of the German intellect and character. Since 1851 I have often visited Germany; I have spent months in the country, conversing with Germans and reading their publications. I have good German friends; and two of my sons in their professional careers have been trained in Germany and have made Germany their home. I have known Berlin fifty years ago in its provincial early state, as well as recently in its triumphal state; and I do honour to the grand patriotism and the administrative genius which have given the empire its proud position in the world.

“The danger of collision lies, not in any hostile disposition of the German people, but in the manifest tendency of the two dominant factors in world-politics—the military ascendancy and resources of the German Empire face to face with the British Empire based on command of the sea.

“When we reflect on the meteoric aggrandisement of Prussia in the last sixty years, on her great military caste, of which Western



Europe has no parallel, on the pride and (we may add) the self-consciousness of the German people, coupled with an inborn spirit of patriotism and of discipline, we see before us a nation of magnificent endowments and resources, inspired with a faith in its destiny as a dominant world Power. History tells us of more than one such national ambition and what came of it; and our own history has some record of the issue.

“ If this were all, as England has not the least desire to dispute the Prussian hegemony in soldiership, much less to discredit it, neither seeks to humiliate nor to weaken the German Empire—if this were all, there need be no antagonism between Germany and Britain. But there is something more than Britain. There is the British Empire; and the British Empire, by the very law of its existence, postulates dominion of the seas, a maritime ascendancy more sweeping than that of Germany on land, and inevitably causing friction by its ubiquitous contact.

“ For my part, I can feel sympathy with the German patriot, who, proud as he is of his nation's history and might, finds his redundant population shut out from all the most desirable possessions of the planet. And on every sea,

and in every port, he is confronted with a maritime power which not only is paramount there, but claims that it always must remain predominant; that, for its own security, it must be permanently recognised as mistress of the ocean. We are all in the habit of assuming Britain's rule of the waves to be the foundation of international comity, and we forget that other nations do not accept it either as a law of Nature nor as a necessary postulate of the *Jus Gentium*.

"France and Russia, to say nothing of smaller States, have no longer the wish or the power to dispute our secular claim, which, so far as the *interests* of other nations go, does them no sort of injury; and, so long as we retain the policy of the 'open door,' brings them obvious advantages. But nations are not led solely, nor always, by their interests. As we see to-day, they are led not seldom by their pride, their jealousies, or their aspirations. In the Far West a great nation is now aspiring to have there a paramount navy, and in the Far East another nation is aspiring to be mistress at least in her own waters. In Europe, over against our own ports, the great German Empire has striven for twenty years to show the world that if she cannot be first at sea, as she is on land,

she will be a good second to-day, and some day and in certain contingencies might be our equal in North European waters.

“Herein are all the elements of a contest quite natural in the ultimate evolution of national destinies, international morality remaining as it is. Not to-day, nor to-morrow—but, with the normal growth of mighty nations, it may well come within the actual generation. It is an antagonism like that between Athens and Sparta, Rome and Carthage, Spain and Britain, Germany and France, one which seems to be independent of persons, even of the will of peoples, to be borne on by the elemental springs of national destinies.

“Unless a new war or a reform of international morality should intervene, it seems inevitable that our supremacy at sea will be met by a determined challenge within measurable time—more probably by a combination of Powers, and no doubt under the stress of urgent pressure in some part of our scattered possessions. No power on earth will ever challenge our Navy for years to come—and even then not without an ally, nor unless in the midst of some great crisis which has called our forces to the other side of the globe.

"But if within ten or fifteen years such a catastrophe should befall us, and we in this island remain as we are to-day, with the smallest standing army of any Great Power in Europe—who will guarantee our triumph over such a challenge?"

"For my part, I have never been an expansion Imperialist. I have ever regarded the Empire as an overwhelming responsibility—a *damposa hereditas*, or perilous inheritance—to be ultimately resolved into self-governing communities, not as being a permanent and coherent nationality, which it never was and never can be. And, if the coming challenge to our maritime supremacy were to threaten simply the diminution or the loss of some overseas dependencies, I for one should not regard this as tantamount to national ruin.

"But, if ever our Empire or our dominion of the seas is challenged, we now see that it will be by no desultory attack in distant waters, not on India, South Africa, nor Australasia, but by direct plunge at the heart of the Empire—on our arsenals, our ports, and the capital. The German navy is not built for distant voyages. It is built to act only as the spearhead of a magnificent army. This army, as we know, has been

trained for sudden transmarine descent on a coast ; and for this end every road, well, bridge, and smithy in the east of England and Scotland has been docketed in the German War Office.

“ No ! whenever our Empire and maritime ascendancy are challenged, it will be by such an invasion in force as was once designed by Philip and Parma, and again by Napoleon. It is this certainty which compels me to modify the anti-militarist policy which I have consistently maintained for forty years past. The conditions are now changed ; new risks involve fresh precautions. The mechanical as well as the political circumstances are quite different from what they were in the day of Wellington, or even of Palmerston and Gladstone. To me now it is no question of loss of prestige—no question of the shrinkage of the Empire ; it is our *existence as a foremost European Power, and even as a thriving nation.*

“ To talk of friendly relations with Germany and the domestic virtues of the Fatherland is childish. Who in 1860 knew that Prussia was to be the dominant Power in Europe ? Who in 1864 imagined that she was to defeat Austria ? Who in 1868 foresaw that in two years she would be in Paris ? Who in 1888

dreamed that she would be our rival at sea? And what impelled the cultured realm of the Hohenzollerns to break out in 'blood and iron' to smash Denmark, to humiliate Austria, to overwhelm France, to defy England on the sea? What was the motive, or the cause? What but the thirst of national glory?

"If ever our naval defence were broken through, our navy overwhelmed or even dispersed for a season, and a military occupation of our arsenals, docks, and capital were effected, the ruin would be such as modern history cannot parallel. It would not be the Empire, but Britain, that would be destroyed. Napoleon's invasions of Italy, Spain, Austria, Germany, or Russia offer no true analogy. Nor does the German occupation of France and the entry into Paris in 1870-1871 offer more than a faint parallel. France, Germany, Austria, Russia were vast countries having unexhausted resources even after all defeats. Nor did Napoleon nor Bismarck ever strike home into their enemies' vitals.

"The occupation by a foreign invader of our arsenals, docks, cities, and capital would be to the Empire what the bursting of the boilers would be to a 'Dreadnought.' Capital would dis-

appear with the destruction of crédit. Famine, social anarchy, incalculable chaos in the industrial and financial world would be the inevitable result. Britain might live on, as Holland lives on. But before she began to live freely again she would have to lose half her population, which she could not feed, and all her overseas Empire, which she could no longer defend.

“A catastrophe so appalling cannot be left to chance, even if the probabilities against its occurring were 50 to 1. But the odds are not 50 to 1. No high authority ventures to assert that a successful invasion of our country is absolutely impossible, if it were assisted by extraordinary conditions. And a successful invasion would mean to us the total collapse of our Empire, our trade, and, with trade, the means of feeding forty millions in these islands. If it is asked, Why does invasion threaten more terrible consequences to us than it does to our neighbours? the answer is that the British Empire is an anomalous structure, without any real parallel in modern history, except in the history of Portugal, Venice, and Holland, and in ancient history Athens and Carthage. Our Empire presents special conditions both for attack and for destruction. And

its destruction by an enemy seated on the Thames would have consequences so awful to contemplate that it cannot be left to be safeguarded by one sole line of defence, however good and for the present hour however adequate.

"The continuous strain of maintaining a two-Power standard against nations far more populous and increasing more rapidly must in the long run break down. It seems that it has already broken down. Even if we could go on building more ships than Germany and America put together, could we be certain of manning them? And in any case, whilst the defence of the Empire forces us to keep parts of our navy in the Mediterranean, in the Indian, Chinese, Atlantic, and Pacific seas, can we rest at ease if a few years hence we were to find our home fleet no longer the strongest, even in the seas which wash our own shores?

"There is but one issue—the formation of an adequate land defence at home. It would abate the fierce race of armaments and bring the issue to manageable limits. What this land defence should be—whether by an expansion and stiffening of the new Territorial Army, or by compulsory general service—I do not touch. Soldiers of experience tell us that they prefer



volunteers, if adequately trained. And few soldiers realise the enormous difficulties of the police organisation it involves, and the violence it does to all our free habits of civil life. This is quite apart from actual service, for it implies registration, passports, restriction on movement, and police supervision up to middle age, as in Germany or France.

“This is no question to be left to experts of any sort. It is not to be settled for us by soldiers alone, or by seamen alone, or by professors of tactics. It is a mixed and complex problem of politics, history, constitutional law, military and naval experience. Like all our national problems, it has to be settled ultimately by civilian statesmen. It is an urgent problem which concerns all politicians, indeed all citizens of every class and of any school.

“For more than forty years I have raised my voice against every form of aggression, of Imperial expansion, and Continental Militarism. Few men have more earnestly protested against postponing social reforms and the well-being of the people to Imperial conquests and Asiatic and African adventures. I do not go back on a word that I have ever uttered thereon. But how hollow is all talk about industrial re-

organisation until we have secured our country against a catastrophe that would involve untold destitution and misery on the people in the mass—which would paralyse industry and raise food to famine prices, whilst closing our factories and our yards! How idle are fine words about Retrenchment, Peace, and Brotherhood, whilst we lie open to the risk of unutterable ruin, to a deadly fight for national existence, and to war in its most destructive and most cruel form!

*" Postscript.*

*" 1st July, 1909.*

" On re-reading my letter of March last, I do not withdraw or modify a single word. On the contrary, a mass of information which has reached me since, and recent events and discussions, confirm and deepen my convictions. And I have reason to know that they are shared by public authorities specially qualified to judge the situation.

" Believing that an adequate Home Army is urgent, I consent to the re-issue of my letter of 18th March; but, as a civilian, I do not express any opinion as to the best practical means of attaining that end"—F H

Finding myself vehemently attacked by such organs as *The Nation*, and by Liberal, Radical, and socialist journals, I wrote to *The Times* a second letter as follows :—

“ May I beg leave to correct some strange misconceptions as to the origin and purport of my letter on this subject published on Thursday, the 18th inst ?

“ My letter was written before any statement by the Government as to naval policy, without any communication with Lord Rosebery, of whose views I am still ignorant, and without reference to any political person, party, or debate.

“ I emphatically deny that I advocated or desire any diminution in our navy or maritime defences. My letter of the 18th was an amplification of the article it cited, written before the meeting of Parliament. Writing early in February, I said : ‘ The safety, the very existence, of this country depends at present on a navy of overwhelming proportions.’ I added that I should ‘ not quarrel with any naval programme that a responsible Government judges to be of absolute necessity.’ So much for the fiction, or untruth, that I am advocating a little navy, or even a reduced navy, or have taken any part

in recent and pending debates as to 'Dread-noughts.'

"It is equally untrue that I have changed my opinion as to Continental 'Militarism,' as to Imperialism, and a policy of peace. An imminent danger, which I have long seen to be preparing abroad, forces upon me the necessity of a defensive system which a few years ago would have been needless and mischievous.

"For many years I have been urging that our vast and growing Empire was involving us in tremendous responsibilities and risks, and that our maritime supremacy was soon to be challenged by Germany. I said nothing in my last letter which had not been in substance contained in my volume on 'National Problems' published a year ago. The same danger led Professor Beesly in January last to write that, unless we would consent to withdraw our army from India, we must resort to a system of enforced service. And, Mr. Hyndman and his party, extreme Socialists and colleagues of the German Democrats as they are, say the same thing.

"I have, of course, fully considered the opinion of the extreme Blue-water School, that any land defence is useless, because an enemy,

once in command of the sea, would starve us into surrender in a few weeks without landing a man. This is both nonsense and cowardice. The enormous coast-line of these islands makes any strict and continuous blockade impossible by all the navies of the world. And the incredible profits open to the blockade runners of neutrals in such a case confirm the impossibility. Those who have studied the history of naval strategy and the conditions of blockade (and I have had to do this as Professor of International Law and for my histories of Chatham, Cromwell, and William the Silent) well know that to talk of a navy of 'Dreadnoughts,' however big, but with no equal strength of cruisers, effectively closing the whole of these islands against the introduction of food is utterly fantastic. More than that, to talk of surrender thereon is unworthy of Englishmen.

"No, Sir, the temporary disablement or dispersion of our fleet would be, no doubt, a ghastly disaster. It is not an impossibility. But to take it lying down, and to tell us that, if it does come, we have nothing left but to welcome the conqueror in London, and hand over to him Portsmouth, Plymouth, the Mersey, and the Tyne—this is a base counsel of folly and despair.

"My own view is perfectly plain. As things stand, a predominant fleet is a matter of national existence. I receive daily fresh information as to the imminence of our peril. It is a peril which I have long foreseen and urged my countrymen to provide means to resist. I have changed no opinion as to the evils of warlike institutions and dreams. But the new form of our national peril does compel me to see that a second defence—a territorial army of some kind—is now absolutely essential to our peace and our honour as a living nation. If our people were prepared to withdraw our armies from overseas, as the Roman Empire did when the Goths pressed in on it, we should be perfectly safe with our regular army at home. Short of that solution, we need not only a powerful navy, but a well-trained army here as a second line. I listen carefully to what the experts tell us, but I do not pretend to discuss its form.

"Whatever I have said is independent of parties, debates, or programmes. I write only as an Englishman who for years has been trying to warn the public of a peril which most cool observers now admit to be no idle scare."

## CHAPTER VIII

### INCREASING GERMAN MENACE: 1910-1914

As both parties in the State declined to undertake the duty of forming an adequate army for the inevitable Foreign War, and even for due Home Defence, I continued during the four years previous to the invasion of Belgium and France to utter successive warnings in the public Press.

### THE PROBLEM OF TURKEY.

Having long been interested in the political future of Greece, the Balkan States, and Turkey, and having made two visits to Constantinople, where I had resident friends, I accepted in July, 1909, the presidency of the Eastern Question Association just vacated by my friend, now Viscount Bryce. I stated my views in my address cited in my "Memoirs," II., pp. 181-188. I was in close touch with Mr. Ameer Ali, a Member of the Committee of the Privy Council, and Ahmed Riza Bey, late President of the Turkish Chamber of Deputies. And I was in correspondence with the late venerable Kiamil Pasha, senator, and ex-Grand Vizier of Turkey.

I foresaw the dangerous excesses of the violent section of the "Young Turk" party. I resigned my office in 1910. And when the Pan-Ottoman faction began to drive their country to ruin, at the request of Kiamil, then leader of the Moderates, I addressed to him the following public letter, dated 27th September, 1911, which was one year before the outbreak of the Balkan war of 1912:—

27th September, 1911.

"My Dear Senator,—Although it is impossible for me to visit Constantinople during the autumn, I am sincerely grateful to my friends for their kind invitation, and beg that your Excellency will express to them my regrets. I entirely share your anxiety at the unsatisfactory state of affairs in Europe and Asia, and I am moved to say a few words respecting the future of Turkey.

"Along with so many other well-wishers for the prosperity and independence of the Ottoman Empire in its integrity and the maintenance of all its sovereign rights, I have been deeply grieved by the reports of disunion and strife to which we can no longer be deaf, or believe to arise from local or sectarian exaggeration. You know how completely free I am from any trace



of national or religious bias in forming my judgment on the unity of races and creeds within the dominions of the Sultan. For twenty years I have been a visitor to Turkey and the friend of eminent Mussulman chiefs. To the Sheikh-ul-Djuma at El-Azhar University I had the honour of explaining the share taken by me in commemorating the 1,400th anniversary of the Founder of Islam. For fifty years I and my friends have protested against every form of international aggression and race oppression, whether under the pretext of superior civilisation or religion. We have insisted on each nation and each creed working out its own future without foreign interference. So that, if I venture to address you on the public interests of your country, it is as an old man of eighty years, long retired from active affairs, whose whole life has been a protest against race ambitions and national oppression.

We see now, with grief and disappointment, that the splendid prospects of a new era to the Ottoman Empire are being imperilled by internal strife, local and tribal insurrection and violent acts of repression by a military autocracy. I will not attempt to offer any kind of advice as to the policy that should be pursued in these

local troubles and racial rivalries. But as one who has studied the history of your Empire, I know that the task before your statesmen is one of extraordinary difficulty and complication. The vast historic empire of the Sultan is made up of many different nations and races, all of which cherish ancient national traditions, having rights and privileges for centuries guaranteed by Imperial firmans. These local and national traditions must be respected, and ruin will face the Government which attempts to crush them by force. Our own mighty British Empire would be a chaos to-morrow if Great Britain attempted to defy the national traditions of Canadians, Australians, South Africans, Hindoos and Mussulmans, or even to infringe on any antique rights of Catholics, Moslems, or Jews. Our vast Indian Empire would not last a day if a Viceroy interfered with the laws, habits or ceremonies, schools and temples of either followers of Mahomet, of Buddha, or of Menu.

"Your statesmen cannot forget that with all the splendid traditions of the dominant nation in your composite Empire, it is the most recent of all, and not at all indigenous in Europe or even in Western Asia. The Greek kingdom, the Armenian, the Serb, the Bulgarian, the

Albanian and other Balkan peoples were once powerful independent nations. And it is only blind arrogance that can believe that they do not still nurse both memories and hopes. Seek to crush them to one uniform Turkish level—and nothing to the Ottoman Empire is the inevitable end. We who know history and love liberty and patriotic pride, we desire the maintenance of the rule of the Padishah under a constitutional régime. But we know that this can only be secured by conciliating local and national pride, by recognising all antique privileges and tribal habits—and above all by abstaining from imitating the arts and the cruelties of the fallen tyrant.

“Your old friend,

“F. H.”

I warmly supported in the *Morning Post* the letter of Mr. Hyndman entitled “The German Menace” and I wrote on the 22nd January, 1912, to the *Morning Post* as follows:—

I am much struck by the able letter of Mr. H. M. Hyndman of the 19th inst., with which I entirely agree. Neither he nor I belong to any official party, but we have both watched the European peril for forty years, and we

have never seen it more menacing than to-day. Mr. Hyndman is quite right in warning politicians of every party that the success of the Socialists in the German elections increases rather than diminishes the danger of preparing for a year of profound and of complicated strife. He speaks with knowledge of Socialist opinion here and abroad. I may claim to have watched with close attention and independent judgment the course of foreign politics ever since the Crimean war of 1853.

"Ever since the rise to power of Bismarck, just fifty years ago, I have continually warned statesmen that a new condition of European affairs was established in which to be weak was to invite spoliation. Never has that been more so than at present, now that the successors of Prince Bismarck and his old master are far less able and without any settled policy except that of using in some way or other their tremendous resources for war. I have myself known Germany all my life, I have German friends and correspondents, and I greatly admire the German people and the splendid German qualities and intellect. But I know, as well as does Mr. Hyndman, that as yet the German people are utterly powerless to control, or even to

modify, the Imperial policy: and for some years to come they must be entirely ruled out of account, so far as concerns economic or international concerns.

"I have letters from one of the most able and influential leaders of opinion in Germany, a professor in a Southern University, who tells me that his countrymen are seething with bitterness against England as the implacable enemy of their country, whose hostility they must at any cost overcome. Public opinion in Germany is blinded, poisoned, and perverted by official misrepresentation and preposterous calumnies, which, alas! can mean only one thing. I tell my friend that I despair when I find such a man as he is so deluded. The ideal of our own Labour men that the success of the German Socialist must lead to peace is a silly sophism. Its direct effect for the time must be to drive the Junkertum to violent devices. The ideal of fossil Radicalism that soft words can dispel the Teuton wrath is childish ignorance of real facts. If Radicalism and Labour combined could succeed in reducing our national defences, they will be preparing a rude awakening from their dreams of a peaceable advance towards a new avatar of trade and universal social progress."

## CHAPTER IX

1913

*In November, 1912, I wrote a forecast of the coming year, which was published on the 1st January, 1913, in the English Review. The first Balkan War with Turkey was just ended and the whole political situation was in a critical condition :—*

“ The year 1913 opens a new era. The whole international system has to be recast. And our own foreign relations, our policy, even our tactics, have at least to be overhauled, reconsidered, revised. Our internal system is alike under resettlement ; but we have first to look to the most urgent question, which is international.

“ It is, of course, merely fanciful, and no one can regard it seriously, that 1913 should mark a great recasting of the European State system, just as 1813 marked the downfall of Napoleon's Imperial ambition ; just as 1713, by the peace of Utrecht, marked the collapse of the ascendancy of Louis Quatorze. Early

in 1818 the European kingdoms had closed in upon France, and Napoleonnism was in its last throes. In 1713, by the Treaties of Utrecht, Northern Europe had finally shaken off the tyranny of the Bourbons. A new century, *plus* luminous *thirteen*, seems to have

perforce might suggest that the fact that a combination of four very small States has overthrown an effete oppression which has long been regarded as moribund, was not so important a change that it could unsettle the relations of the Great Powers, having more than ten times the resources and the population of the Balkan kinglets. That is plausible, but unsound.

The history of the Turkish Empire for more than a hundred years, its extraordinary combination of races, and, above all, its wonderful geographical position astride the Eastern Mediterranean, have always made its condition and its relations to be of prime importance to the European Powers. Its fall as a great European Power inevitably affects them all.

"But that is only the first point. Next comes the intricate interlacing of the Balkan

States (five, when we include Rumania) ; each with three forms of Christian religion, all usually jealous and hostile to each other, to say nothing of two non-Christian races, Musulman and Jewish, and even gipsies and born desperadoes. Nowhere else are race ambition, race hatred, and bloodthirsty vendettas more intense. These petty kingdoms, these turbulent races, touch the frontiers of Russia, of Austria, and of Italy, and even stir the kindred races within these greater Powers by wild hopes and ferocious passions. Study a race map of Eastern Europe and see how Rumania, with a Hohenzollern dynasty and a very miscellaneous Vlach race, impinges on Russia and on Austria ; how Bulgaria, with a Coburg Tsar, jostles Rumania and Serbia ; how Bulgaria and Serbia lie along and control the lower Danube ; how Greece claims and is embedded in Macedonia ; how Serbia ranges with the Austro-Hungarian frontier ; how Rumania, Bulgaria, and Serbia all rouse intense enthusiasms and racial jealousies among kindred or hostile races within the dominions of Russia, Hungary, and Austria. These three nations for generations have been kept in periodical ferment by the restless



populations of the same race across their frontiers. How can Russia, Austria, Hungary remain unmoved, when the physical, material, and moral *status* of their Balkan neighbours is utterly transformed ?

“Add to this that Russia’s very existence may be staked on its defending a Slavonic nationality ; that Germany, by treaty and in self-defence, is pledged to defend its Austrian ally ; whilst France, for the same reasons, is bound to defend her Russian ally. And, again, add the fact that England, as the great trading and Mediterranean Power, and France and Italy as hardly second to England in trade and Mediterranean interests, are all three deeply concerned in the issue of this war.

“Thus, to Russia the defence of Slavonian interests, the freedom of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, is what sea power is to England. To the Germans of Austria, to the Magyars of Hungary, the predominance of the Slav races is their deposition as ascendant peoples. To Germany, to allow the Germans of Austria to be deposed from empire is an intolerable blow to Pan-Germanic dreams. To Magyars, to have the despised Serbians prospering and advancing, whilst they are pinned between Germans, Poles,

Russians, and Rumanians, is a sorry prospect for a proud race. To England it is of vital importance that the Black Sea, the Bosphorus, the Hellespont, and the Aegean coasts and islands should not be in hostile hands. To France and to Italy this is nearly as vital. Could the Powers of Europe, great and small, be knotted up together in a more intricate entanglement—a series of vicious circles more insoluble?

“It is vain for worthy people, absorbed in the future of International Arbitration and Social Reform, to tell us that the Balkan settlement is nothing to us—only a petty local squabble; that Turkey has only herself to thank; that England has nothing to lose or to gain in Eastern Europe. Let us get on here, they say, with our land reform and insurance benefits. That is the cry of ignorant faddism, of hidebound blindness.

“It may be that Serbia itself is nothing to us, and we may not care if her pigs are sent to the Adriatic or to the Aegean ports. But if the aggrandisement of Serbia means dissolution and anarchy to Austria-Hungary, if an Austrian attack on Serbia would shake the very dynasty of the Romanoffs to its base, if the gigantic armies of Germany were called out to defend

Austria, if France could not risk the catastrophe or endure the shame of allowing Russia to be crushed, if England could not stand aside and potter over Land Bills and several Home Rule Bills whilst the Triple Alliance made itself masters of Europe—well, then, is that nothing to a democratic House of Commons, with universal, or, it may be, adult suffrage? Is all this nothing to us? Yet all this we might possibly see in this year of grace—or year of fate—1913.

“Whatever may be the arrangements made at the close of this sensational war, *they can be but temporary at best, and may only lay down the material for a struggle even more desperate and for changes even greater than those of this re-settlement of international relations.* What 1912 seems to have effected is a vast aggrandisement of the Slavonic races in their secular struggle against the Teutonic races. Even a local and temporary triumph of Austria over Serbia cannot cancel the fact that henceforth the way south-east to the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea is being barred to the German.

“Across the extreme south-east corner of Europe, and on the highway to Asia Minor, Syria, and the Nile, henceforth there will lie

Slavonic races of surprising energy and ambition; and the natural and inevitable head of these races, by religion, tradition, and origin, is the enormous Russian Empire of 164,000,000. Until a few weeks ago the Teuton had a predominant prestige, a working *entente*, and immense interests from the Upper Danube, the Oder, and the Elbe, right away to the Marmora, the Aegean, and the Upper Euphrates. The *prestige*, the *entente* are gone. And across the path there now lies a big, warlike, adventurous Slavonic Confederacy, looking to the Russian Tsar as its natural protector and head. This vast increment to the Slav world and decrement to the Teutonic world has taken place in a few weeks, without a shot being fired or a diplomatic *ultimatum* sent by any of the greater Powers. It seems automatic—a decree of Providence.

“To Austria, to Germany, this may well seem to be an interest touching their national future. To England, or France, or Italy, it is hardly a vital concern, though it is of real importance to each of them, which is to be the Power that controls the Aegean Sea, its islands and shores, and the two straits which open on it from the north. For more than a century it has

been the dream of the Russian to be master of all this; and for more than a century Western Europe has barred him back. He is not there yet. But how much more near to his dream—and your Slav is the most dreamy and most long-memoried soul in Europe—has the year 1912 brought him at last?

“But will the Teuton see all this patiently and unmoved? No! How can he? We have seen how the Hapsburg Emperor deals with his petty Serbian neighbour, whose two or three millions of people, even with a few miles of coast, can hardly *per se* trouble the Austro-Hungarian Empire. And we have seen how the Hohenzollern Emperor tells the world in plain terms: ‘Who attacks Austria, attacks me.’ We cannot say that this is criminal—however terrible may be the consequences. It is not even unreasonable. Given the circumstances *as they are*, and apart from any question of responsibility for those circumstances, the warning seems such as the average German patriot, *with the ideas now dominant*, can hardly refuse to back. And yet withal, if we remember how passionate is the Russian’s pride in his Slav race, how the Russian alliance is for the average Frenchman a necessity of national existence, *we*

*cannot shut our eyes to the awful prospect of conflict between the Triple Alliance and the Double Alliance to which all this seems to bring us face to face.*

“Here we are up against the hard root of the whole international problem ever since the coming of Bismarck some fifty years ago. The key of European politics is the magnificent organisation of Germany for war, industry, and science—its central position in mid-Europe abutting on seven different States—its poor access to the sea and its expanding population, hidebound on every side by hostile and suspicious neighbours, and, to crown all, its *limitless pride, ambition, and thirst for dominion*. A mighty nation of 65,000,000, with such superb resources both for peace and war, and such overweening pride in its own superiority and might, finds itself closed up in a ring-fence too narrow for its fecundity as for its pretensions, constructed more by history, geography, and circumstances than by design—a fence maintained by the fears rather than the hostility of its weaker neighbours. That is the rumbling subterranean volcano on which the European State system rests.

“If the German Empire consisted entirely of its peaceful and laborious peasants, of its

ingenious and indefatigable workers in a thousand industries—still more if its Socialist workmen could control, or modify, or check her external policy—or even if the Kaiser could always, at all times, insist on doing nothing but what he judged to be both prudent and wise—if all this were so, the enormous strength of the German Empire would cause no uneasiness to its neighbours.

“But we know that this *if* never can be verified in our time. Over and above its sixty millions of peaceable industrious people there are many millions of ambitious and fighting patriots who nurse visions of aggrandisement, battle, and glory. There are hundreds of thousands of proud and fierce Samurai (the sole survivors in Europe of its feudal chivalry) who live only for war and are bred for war, and have no profession or career but arms. This immense hereditary caste, which has every quality befitting a dominant order, has in effect permanent control of the whole civil and military organisation of the empire. Associated with it is an intellectual order, even more arrogant, but not so pugnacious, which holds control over literature and education.

“The Kaiser is the official organ of this

mighty bureaucracy ; and in ordinary seasons and for business purposes he is its master, and can and does control and use it. But under a storm of patriotic delirium in the warrior and bureaucratic caste, voiced by professors, journalists, plutocrats, and speculators, there is little hope that the War Lord could resist the pressure to give the signal for war—at least, as Bismarck and his successors prefer to do—to take some step which implies war.

“ We know all that is so often urged on us to the contrary. We are weary of hearing of international visits, of royal and academic courtesies, of the peaceful virtues of German tradesmen, of the friendly professions of official Germany, of the aversion to war in the whole middle class and Socialist mass. No one denies this. We all know that for some years yet peace is almost a condition of German development both military and commercial, and especially in the marine. We concede all this as proved, axiomatic, common ground. Ninety per cent. of the German people ardently desire to be at peace—*so long as German interests are not affected*. The whole Government machine works for peace—at present. The Kaiser is honestly doing his best to remove all appre-



hension from his neighbours' minds—*until some crisis compels him to speak*. And all the while the predominant 10 per cent. of the nation are pushing on their countrymen to take a course of which war is the almost inevitable consequence.

“It is inevitable but that a nation with the magnificent resources of the German, hemmed in a territory so inadequate to their needs and pretensions, and dominated by a soldier, bureaucratic, and literary caste, all deeply imbued with the Bismarckian doctrine, should thirst to expand their dominions and their power at any sacrifice—of life, of wealth, and of justice. One must take facts as they are, and it is idle to be blind to facts, or to rail against them. It is as silly to gloss over manifest perils as it is to preach moralities about them. There they are.

“Now, such is the geographical situation of the German Empire, so late has it been in consolidation, so recent its great accession to power and of pretensions—only half a century, and therefore at least a century later than England, France, Austria, and Russia—that it seems a hopeless dilemma to see in what quarter outside Europe the burning ambition—we may almost say the natural ambition—

of New Germany can be met. There is no district on earth available for an adequate transmarine empire, or even colony. And the desperate efforts made by Germans for a generation to find some suitable outlet for their population and their ambitions, whether territorial or industrial, only arouse opposition and apprehension—which Germans regard as hostility. One after another the adventures in the Pacific, in South America, in the West Indies, in Morocco, in South-West Africa, in Central Africa, seem to have brought nothing but disappointment to themselves and fresh alarm to their neighbours. And now the latest and perhaps most practicable of all these schemes, *i.e.*, in Asiatic Turkey, seems to be finally barred, and by their secular rivals, the Slavs.

“ This collapse of Turkey, this aggrandisement of the Balkan kingdoms, is a rude disillusion and a fatal setback to Pan-German ideals, whether in Austria or in the Reich. Nothing outside Europe is now open to them. Asia, India, China, Australasia, Africa, America—north and south, all are closed—practically inaccessible and impregnable. And now the Bosphorus, the Aegean, and Asia Minor are equally closed. But, alas! Europe is open—

and within touch—and, even if 'occupied, offers magnificent fields for enterprise of all kinds. It is therefore inevitable that the mighty German Empire, swollen perhaps by the German part of Austria, will seek 'compensation' for its exclusion from places 'in the sun' within Europe itself. It has won 'compensations' and accessions' thrice before—in 1864, in 1866, in 1870; and four or five times since by demanding fresh 'compensations,' it has brought Europe to the brink of war. We have to see what are the compensations it demands in 1913.

“No man with a trained eye for politics need trouble himself with those who dispute all this. Party scribes, keen about their Liberal Bills; Radicals with stale watchwords for Economy, Sex-Equality, and Universal Peace; Cosmopolitan Financiers who are welcomed at foreign courts; 'Able Editors' who pore over the division lists; all those who have close ties with the Germans, whether by family connections, by trade interests, by academic intercourse—all such are wont to vaunt the sweet reasonableness of all German classes, the enormous commercial disasters which war would cause—above all, the English

sympathies and the pacific temper of His Majesty the Kaiser.

“All this may be true—but it is entirely beside the point. These well-meaning ‘pacifists,’ as they are called, may have excellent relatives, friends, correspondents and partners in Germany, but they are not politicians themselves, and they know nothing of the true German politicians who have power. It is waste of time to answer this stuff.

“For my part, I have been an active politician for quite fifty years, and all that time in close touch with leading politicians and publicists in all parts of Europe. No man with deep political interests has been more entirely detached from any party allegiance. For fifty years I have publicly contended for raising the conditions and wages of the labouring masses. For fifty years I have resisted every attempt at national expansion, aggression on weaker races, and every form of war-like adventure. Every interest I have, every principle I have maintained, is now against anything like antagonism, or even rivalry, towards a foreign nation ; is, indeed, strongly on the side of international harmony, goodwill, and peace. I do not now budge one inch from that ground. And yet,

I say it deliberately and sorrowfully to-day, *England, Europe, civilisation is in imminent peril from German expansion.*

“ In what quarter is the peril probable, and in which way is it to be met? Now, more than ever, it is to be looked for in Europe, after the great changes made, and others imminent, in South-East Europe. With our fleet in the highest state of development, anything like an attack upon it, or on these islands, may be reasonably put aside. It is not indeed impossible, especially under the new conditions of aerial machines. And due preparation must be made to meet it. But the far more imminent risk is that Belgium, Northern France, Holland, either one or all, may be the object of assault; or in the case of the Low Countries, of practical control without actual war. We know that systematic preparation for this has long been made. From the point of view of the Navy League and the Bernhardt strategists, the control of the lands drained by the Ems, the Rhiné, the Meuse, and the Scheldt is vital to an expanding Germany. To be able to use these ports and railways for military purposes, even without annexation, would be to Germany a new empire—would be what the Bosphorus,

the Marmora and the Dardanelles would be to Russia. The temptation to a mighty Power, shut out from east and from south on the planet, is quite dazzling. A Pan-German who resists the bait may well 'wonder at his own moderation,' as Clive said.

"Now, even the 'control' of any parts of Belgium and of Holland—obtained by diplomacy or extorted by pressure—would be, *under present circumstances*, so formidable a menace to France that she could not submit to it without a strenuous effort. Could England submit to it, or refuse to join her efforts with France; and much more so if annexation or complete alliance were in question, rather than 'control'? This—not invasion or maritime war—is the practical peril to which the *entente* is exposed. *We might some day see the lands between the Helder and the Somme in effect dominated by our great rival on the sea.*

"Granted, that it would be a most tremendous adventure even for Germany; that Belgians and Dutch would resist as far as they could; that William II. is convinced of the need of present peace, and has his fleet still to complete. Granted, that for some years yet no such scheme could be attempted. Germany is not ready;

the mass of the German people 'is not willing ; the Kaiser, who is no Charles X. of Sweden, would not listen to it. Still, this is what the effective leaders of German policy are maturing to-day, and within five, seven, ten years may be able to force upon their Emperor and their nation, in spite of all obstacles, of the awful sacrifices involved, and the solid aversion to war of the admirable German people. .

“How is such an attempt to be met ? Of course, I make no pretence to offer any opinion on purely military or naval problems. But armaments depend on policy ; and in this country politicians have the ultimate decision of all matters of defence. I can speak only as a veteran politician and historian. And in a few pages I can only roughly state the heads. With all practical men, I assume that our navy is in a splendid condition, that it is prepared to guarantee these islands against invasion. Whether it is strong enough to guarantee the whole of our vast Imperial dominions is another thing. To keep from any interruption our wide trade routes ; to defend the diverse lines along which our food arrives ; to protect our American, West Indian, Australian possessions ; to be dominant in the Mediterranean ; to hold

Gibraltar; Malta, Cyprus, Alexandria, Suez, Aden, the Canal, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, Bombay, Calcutta, Hong Kong, Chinese and Japanese waters, and all the spots dotted red on the world's map; to say that our fleet can for ever guarantee all this, in face of the perpetual increase of the German and Austrian navies; all this is to me ignorant, almost insane, delusion. To me this incalculable task would demand a fleet 50 per cent. stronger than ours; and if we built such a fleet, we could not man it.

“ No man of ordinary good sense can read the masterly statement of the Admiralty (Cd. 6513, 1912), just presented to Canada—and to the Empire—without seeing that, as our navy *now stands*, it is a meagre resource for its enormous responsibilities all over the planet; and that, *at its present rate of development*, it will be utterly inadequate for its liabilities, and even far too weak to defend these islands in the year 1920. In seven years then, by the official estimate of the Admiralty, our island will be at the mercy of continental navies, *if our own remains on its actual scheme*. To this the answer of those who cling to the idiotic drivel known as the ‘ Great Illusion ’ is that our good and peaceful friends will not be so wicked as to disturb us ;



indeed, they would lose money if they did ! Can any man of sense study this official forecast, the German Navy Laws and the programmes of their Navy League and their Bernhardi warriors, and still hold to this ? The Peace Conferences of 1913 over the Balkan questions may open their eyes.

“ In any case, a predominant fleet, the largest that we can man, is the condition of existence of the Empire ; and destruction of the Empire by war would mean starvation, ruin, chaos within these islands. An immense and continuous increase to our navy, for some years to come, is a matter of life and death to our people. The Radical and Labour pedants who seek to reduce it are guilty of an attempt on our country's life. Like the Jews who shouted for Barabbas and delivered Christ to death, they seem to cry out : ‘ The blood be on us, and on our children ! ’

“ I assume that our Home Defence, adequately developed on the lines promised by the Government, and further enlarged in the ways I presently explain, *with an enlarged fleet*, will make us tolerably secure in these islands. But the whole purpose of this paper is to urge that *what we want now is a fully trained, fully equipped, expeditionary army to support our*

*friends across the Channel and prevent the shores of it being held by an enemy.*

“This is no question of meeting any of the great continental armies in battle alone, but of forming a striking head to the navy and causing a diversion for an ally. It is absurd to deny that some 250,000 British troops in well-equipped army corps, a landing force from the fleet, and supported by it—say at Flushing, Antwerp, Calais, or Havre—would not be of prime importance to any nation attacked from the east. It is not serious to talk about a navy being sufficient by itself. Our country has never pretended to take part in any European question without a land army. Even in Cromwell’s time the Ironsides landed on the Continent; so we did in the time of Marlborough, of Chatham, and of Wellington. All main national issues must be decided on land, as the Japanese soon found. A fleet can prepare the ground, but an army only can bring to fruition the final result. The problem to-day is not Home Defence, but domination in Europe. And the battle has to be fought on land. An island which obstinately condemns itself to be nothing but an island, limits itself to the second or third rank in the European

State system and chooses to remain simply a pawn.

“ The burning question of Compulsory National Service is thus not raised at all in this paper. For the immediate purpose in hand it lies entirely outside discussion. And that for two reasons :—

“ (1) For immediate use it is impracticable.

“ (2) It does not give us what we now want.

“ (1) It is impracticable because it is evident that, short of a fierce civil war, neither party could at present venture to impose it by law on the labouring masses. If politicians would only take the measure of the passionate denunciations by the Labour leaders, and also of the official renunciation of it by the present Government, it must be clear that, for the next ten years at least, it is not a practical question—not more within reasonable distance of law than the single tax, Nationalisation of Railways, or Abolition of Property in Land.

“ (2) But the essential point is that the scheme or schemes of National Service (and they are constantly being varied or developed) do not

propose what is a vital necessity of the hour. Before the year 1918—at latest the year 1920—the great stress will come. I say this because neither Germany nor any continental Power can maintain the awful strain upon their manhood and their industry for many years more. It may be soon—it must be well within a decade—that *England will need to have ready a strong, seasoned, equipped expeditionary force*. It may be called for within three years; and, to be of use, within a fortnight after open war. The idea of troops learning to shoot in the six months after war is begun may pair off with the Great Delusion that war is a perfectly useless waste of good money! Now, to train growing lads for a month or two may be an excellent thing, and in a generation might be an invaluable reserve. But it cannot give us *within the next few years an army fit to serve abroad*.

“The party in power has now formally staked itself to the Voluntary principle of Service. For the present we must accept that. For they who think that any party, any possible Government, can, *within the next few years*, pass a Compulsory Service, are like the ‘Mad Hatters’ who babble about carrying Tariff Reform without an election victory *ad hoc*.

Let us be serious. Politics, alas! are beset with idle dreams. And those who are awake know that Compulsion cannot be carried either in this or in the next Parliament. But *now* is the accepted time, *now* is the day of salvation! At present we must do what we can with a Voluntary system.

"It is too true that the Voluntary system, as it stands, is utterly insufficient. We want more seamen, more soldiers, more Territorials—above all, we want more trained officers—more well-seasoned non-coms., more professional subalterns, more scientific tacticians. We want what Germany has.

"Let us begin with the latter. The worst and most ominous breakdown in our military system is the growing dearth of army officers. Under the old stereotyped system, with only some 10,000 officers on active service, with almost no real scientific training, and all drawn from the landed, wealthy and professional classes, we got along with their pluck, their private income, their social *prestige*. If only a percentage of them made soldiering a real profession, their own high qualities and popularity enabled them to do their work. And when the bulk of these gallant gentlemen

retired to their estates and their pleasant retreats, there were plenty of fine fellows ready to take their places. It was a service of rich men, of leisured men of good breeding who lived with rich men, and had rich wives and rich relatives. It was an honourable career, and there were good men enough to fill it.

"All that is changed. The landed and professional classes, who had the monopoly of army service, are now very much poorer. They are not rich enough to send their sons into a career which is not a living profession. The monstrous, scandalous extravagance and luxury of the cavalry and some other branches excludes all but those who are too rich and comfortable to stick to it as a profession. Commands are restricted by tradition to a limited order which is rapidly becoming too poor to serve for their lives at their own cost.

"Above all, the imperative need of a severe scientific training scares away the leisured men who used to love arms. The examination mill—the hard intellectual work in any case indispensable—drives away thousands of fine fellows who have neither brains nor patience for systematic study. The German Junker caste has an unlimited supply of splendid young men who

yearn for a military profession, and will give it their whole lives and inexhaustible hard work. Our Junker caste is now too poor, or too prone to leisure, pleasure, and ignorance to fill the service. All that must go. The army must be open to all Englishmen, even if neither well born nor well bred.

“The non-coms. are capital fellows; but we have not enough of them; and the service does not offer inducements to able and ambitious men. If officers, as in Germany and France, had to serve in the ranks and rise gradually from corporals to generals, and were all adequately paid to make it a real profession, we could get all we want. We know the old idea of our army being officered exclusively by ‘gentlemen.’ But gentlemen will not now serve in the numbers we need; and many ‘gentlemen’ would be of little use if they did serve. Privates, non-coms., subalterns, must be got to make the army their profession, and in order to do so they must be paid enough to make it a profession. “We have just raised the pay of the navy; the doctors are still on strike for better pay. The army must be better paid—better paid all round, at least up to colonels, and open to all Englishmen who can fit themselves

for command. To do this we must get rid of the wanton habits of extravagance, not only encouraged, but imposed in 'crack' regiments, the silly, sham, aristocratic tone of most regiments, and the vulgar prejudice that every officer must be a 'gentleman-born,' or at least passed from a 'public school.' It was the want of officers of the lower ranks, and the miserable ignorance of those they had, which has just ruined the Turks and led tens of thousands of fine soldiers to death and shame. It would be monstrous if the British Army is to be starved and undermanned by the insufferable snobbery of Smart Society, which expects its captains to keep a team of blood horses and to be useful at its house-parties.

"There are plenty of men willing to serve, if they can only see their way to a decent living and a settled career. Officers of all ranks ought to begin in the ranks and work their way up by good service, and be well paid whilst they serve. There are enough men to fill the army, the reserve, and the territorials, if only they were offered an open career and adequate pay. It is a matter of money. If all territorials could earn good money by weeks and months of really hard work at the butts and



in camp, and also had special inducements to serve, the establishment would be filled even on the present basis. Every man who had satisfied his commanding officers might be allowed to wear an arm badge even in civil life.

“ But apart from any compulsion, a very effective method of pressure might be brought to bear. ‘ Make it a rule that no appointment in the entire civil service staff, from F.O. clerks down to office messengers and postal employees, should be made unless the applicant had a good badge for some form of army service. Great companies and private trade houses would follow suit. If a personal mark of honour, solid pocket-money and outfit, and hundreds or thousands of places in all ranks were offered to men who had served the country, the territorials would overflow without any need of forcing unwilling men by Act of Parliament.

“ It will need many Parliaments and fierce struggles ere Universal Service is made law. We do not want now, in 1913, a Citizen Army of one or two millions, and we could not organise or officer them if we had them. We do want a navy at least 30 per cent. more than we have, even with all the colonial offers and the ‘ dark ’ Indian project, over which the Press is so jubi-

lant. We want a European Army of at least 250,000 long-service men, and about twice that number of reserve and territorials. And above all we want more competent officers, from sergeants up to colonels.

“ Oh ! but this is awful—impossible, they will say—worse than a new Lloyd George Budget ! Yes, impossible *as things are*. But I do deliberately advocate a new *War Loan* of at least 150 millions, to be spent freely at once—say 100 millions on the navy and 50 millions on the army. The problem is really one of money. And I quite agree that even the heroic methods of our Chancellor could not raise such a sum to be spent in five or seven years. Why stick at a War Loan any more than our fathers did in Napoleon’s time ? The mere offer of such a loan would be covered five times over ; and would make even the Bernhardis bite their moustaches. Lord Haldane, who, as all agree, has done all that man could do *with the limits and conditions imposed on his party*, has told us that it is a matter of money, that he could not better the army without taking money from the navy, and *vice versâ*. That is quite true, with *our actual taxation*. Our fathers had a 10 per cent. income tax all round. If we

cannot stand that, the answer is : resort, as they did also, to a big War Loan.

“ I am quite prepared for the outcry which this would meet in the world of fossil Radicalism and Labour Socialism. Nor am I at all satisfied that even these heroic efforts would save the Empire in its present monstrous dimensions. But there are other steps much easier to work, perhaps even more heroic, but, as we Positivists hold, both more just and quite indispensable. I mean to concentrate our defence on our home and vital national interests. The huge, disconnected anomalous units scattered over the planet and nicknamed Empire may be held provisionally, provided its very existence, our navy, our neighbours, and our very life were not being challenged by a formidable rival. But, in the actual condition of the European Powers, and the policy they systematically pursue, it is a wild delusion to hope that this island, even with its colonies on the other side of the earth, can undertake such enormous, such unlimited, such incalculable responsibilities.

“ Let us concentrate, let us draw in this Empire, whilst there is yet time, even as Rome did when the Romans-born no longer filled her legions, when the provinces could bear no further

taxes, and when masses of her workers cared little for War or for Empire. Our case is not wholly dissimilar. Goths, Vandals, Teutons, Huns are gathered in millions around us. Our outlying provinces and conquests, however tempting, are no longer within our power to defend. The Mediterranean is now a mere trap. It is idle to think that one, or even two, army corps—with a battle squadron—could be spared out there on African coasts, if we had to defend our island and our food supplies. And it is idle to suppose that such a moderate force could suffice against a really great attack from the Mediterranean Powers; and who knows how soon German armies may be at Trieste?

“The Mediterranean must be given up, stock and block, and with it, yes, even Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, and, of course, Egypt. For thirty years I have maintained that Egypt will be our death-trap—Egypt and that absurd African ‘Empire’ south of it—it will be our grave if we seek to leave there 10,000, 20,000, even 30,000 good men, whilst we are fighting for our lives in Europe. It cannot be done, if our island has to be fed. Of course, to withdraw from Egypt—a criminal adventure into which we were dragged by financiers, Indian soldiers,

and Bismarck—means that we must look to reach India round the Cape. No rational politician or soldier could trust the Canal, or ever has trusted the Canal, in a great war. India itself is now not menaced ; and we have much still to do in India before we leave it. But we must gradually prepare to hand over its defence to Indian Chiefs and troops, and withdraw by degrees our European soldiers.

“ We might well bring home 40,000 good, seasoned men. We may soon want them at home. South Africa, Australia, Canada, can well defend themselves. It is little we can do for them—for Canada absolutely nothing, if attacked by the Great Republic—and it is little that any of them can spare for us. The boast that Transatlantic and Transequatorial or Far Eastern possessions are going to save the Old Country if attacked by great European Powers is mere Yellow Press swagger.

“ In bitterness and sadness I foresee an imminent peril which I shall not live to witness. I am neither alarmist nor faint of heart. I am an ardent lover of our Fatherland and full of confidence in her sons' courage and strength. For forty years now I have foretold the German peril and have denounced the Imperial adven-

tures into which we have been misled. And I challenge my critics to show a point in which, in forty years, I have been false to our principles, or where my forecasts have proved to be wrong.

“ A tremendous crisis is before us. And they who are blind to it or refuse to meet it may be guilty of one of the most awful catastrophes in history. The violent destruction of our Empire by enemies implies the destruction of our whole financial and industrial system. That means ruin to commerce, trade, manufactures ; starvation, want, and chaos to our whole Labour world. All my life I have fought for Labour causes, and I hold fast still to all measures of social reform. May I not live to see Labour and Reform in sheer ignorance and class-egotism bring about its own irrevocable ruin.”

## CHAPTER X.

### ADDRESSES TO PUBLIC SOCIETIES : 1913-1914

As ex-President of the Positivist Society I gave in Essex Hall the annual address on New Year's Day, 1913. And on 28th June, 1914, I gave an address to the Société Positiviste in Paris in French, being in part the address to the International Sociological Society, of which the secretariat is in Paris, being myself President of that society for 1914-1915.

These two addresses were as follows.

In my annual (indeed, my final) address to our Society on 1st January, 1913, I spoke as follows. It was published separately with the title :—

“ A CRITICAL YEAR.

“ (*The Annual Address, Delivered at Essex Hall, 1st January, 1913, by Frederic Harrison.*)

“ To-day we open a year that may prove to be one of the most momentous in modern history. We are surrounded with portentous changes—in things mechanical, political, spiritual alike—in the relations of States, in the conditions

of industry, in the habits of life, in moral standards, in the functions of the two sexes, in the authority of the Churches, above all, in the prescriptive immutability of religious beliefs.

“ The map of Europe has been shattered and is being recast. We have witnessed the collapse, almost within a few weeks, of an imposing domination that has endured for nearly five centuries. Turkey has been struck down after one of the most rapid, most bloody, and most savage wars in modern history. We wait with anxiety to learn how this collapse of an empire—how this rise of new nations—are to react upon the State system of Europe. *React and recast the policy of States it must. And the issue in any case must deeply affect this country—must force us to review our national relations, our duties to our neighbours, our national perils, and our methods of defence.*

“ This war—or rather this crusade, this invasion of races in internecine hatred that recalls the savage migrations of the middle ages—this war of weeks has shown how a kingdom with more than half the population of Britain, counted as able to muster more than one million of brave soldiers, has been ruined by utter disorganisation, apathy, and blind



self-assurance. It has been a startling blow to the Teutonic peoples, and an intoxicating enlargement to the Slav peoples. It affects the very foundations of the composite and shaky Dual Monarchy; and with that and the rôle forced upon Italy by a new Balkan confederacy *it almost knocks the bottom out of the Triple Alliance*. Has the Alliance, with its head of bronze and iron, only a trunk and feet of clay or sand, for all the trumpeting of its throat of brass?

“Europe waits to see the issue. And the issue, even to England and its Empire, may be a matter almost of life and death. It is recognised by all that there is now a definite division in the States of Europe. Does this form a stable Balance of Power—does it make for Peace and Progress? Are we any nearer to a United States of Europe? The year 1913 will assuredly enable us to answer this question.

“There is another vast problem which may affect the progress and the relations of most nations on the earth by reason of its far-reaching effects. The year is to see the opening of the Panama Canal. No man can be sure what commercial, industrial, international results the canal may introduce. Everyone must admit that

in the future they are certain to be enormous. It has already led to an intricate—but let us trust not very serious—dispute between European, and especially English interests, and those of the United States. I will not presume to suggest even in outline what effects on the world, and on Britain, the canal may ultimately cause. I will only say that this stupendous victory of man over Nature must ultimately give an incalculable stimulus to the industry, population, wealth and opportunities of the whole American continent—the south as well as the north and centre of that vast land—and must make it bulk larger than ever in the affairs of our planet. The earth has been closing up at a marvellous rate in my own memory. It has to close up yet much more as one common habitation of man. Would that the closing up into one common fellowship of man were advancing at equal rate—in spite of the antagonism of race, skin, and religious belief.

“Our own Empire is witnessing profound changes. For the first time since Alexander the Great—or perhaps since Godfrey de Bouillon—a European King has been formally enthroned as a ruler in Asia. The Indian capital, the organisation of that great heterogeneous country

is being recast, and *our Indian fellow-citizens are to take, it is said, a new hand in defence of the Empire.*

“The great white colonies, even far distant Asiatic settlements, are vieing with each other in offers of ships and men. And politicians and the Press hail these offers with ecstatic joy as the forecast of a vast Imperial Federation. For my part, I am not clear that any such tremendous results are to follow. It is still rather too much like the ‘boom’ about the maharajahs’ twenty-five millions sterling. The consolidation of a world-wide Imperial army and navy may be practicable and effective enough at a coronation. But for a great war of life and death in Europe, as against a European Power of the first class, possibly with some Transatlantic Power not a friendly watcher, the dominions have too small populations, are too far from us and from each other to make a very important contribution to our own naval and military strength.

“Let us remember that the British Empire is totally different from the Roman Empire in the age of Augustus and Trajan. It is scattered over the earth in disparate units. Each section has its own paramount interests, its own life

and pretensions ; and these do not at all permanently coincide. They will—they must—work out their own salvation and develop their own resources, which have nothing whatever to do with the European State system and its struggles. The Australasian, Asian, and African dominions of the King have far less interest in European problems, far less to fear from European ambition, than even the great American Commonwealth. And this (to parody the Roman poet), ‘ If Europe were to break up with a crash, would contemplate the ruin without panic.’ Yes ! Imperial Federation—for purposes not spectacular or diplomatic, but in what is fancifully called the War of Armageddon—would be far less readily organised than a Balkan Federation which was consolidated out of contiguous States, having one common interest and a passionate faith ; and perhaps it would prove to be less able to stand the strain of conflicting interests.

“ To England, an overpowering hostile army and fleet posted at Rotterdam, Antwerp, Calais, or Havre, or at Ceuta, Tripoli, the Levantine coast, would be, *as things now are*, a matter of national existence. Would it touch these Transequatorial, African, and Asiatic people

as it would touch Englishmen ? These Imperial Federation fleets and armies are matters of pageant—not of serious politics.

“ The Empire is a truly marvellous construction, and is magnificent enough to intoxicate even sober minds. And by heroic efforts it is still being administered with the same energy, courage, and Imperial qualities as those by which it was built up. Whilst it is on friendly terms with all its neighbours, as happily it is to-day in most striking degree, its vast resources and the vigour of its chiefs have been adequate to defend it. But it is criminal folly to shut our eyes to this, *that its existence—or rather the very life of our crowded island—is now challenged by as mighty a coalition as ever existed in modern history.* Neither Philip II., nor Louis XIV., nor Napoleon controlled a power more formidable than that of the Triple Alliance, or more soaring than the ambition of the able strategists who control that power—a power that soon will equal or even surpass our own at sea, and on land already surpasses it ten times over. That ambition cannot be satisfied unless by imperilling the security of our huge dominions and even the daily food of this island.

“ Day by day our best strategists warn us that

our methods of defence are insufficient.' The air rings with various plans for improving them. I shall not discuss them. Politicians with various Bills of their own tell us not to mind what soldiers and sailors say. But when I look round the enormous liabilities of our Empire, and then at the enormous powers by which it is challenged, I hold that we are living in a fool's paradise if we neglect what our most experienced strategists call out to us day by day. I am not about to advocate any one of the various schemes of National Defence. I will only say this—that when I weigh the vehement belief of some of our best authorities in the Voluntary principle, when I review the legal and administrative obstacles to forcing compulsion on a nation which in its long history has never known it, above all, when I face the passionate denunciation of all forms of compulsory soldiering by the recognised leaders of the workmen, whether inside or out of Parliament, then I come to the conclusion that no political party could force on the masses compulsory service in arms, except at the cost of a Civil War.

“ But there is a far more simple, speedy, but heroic, way out of the dilemma. Now it is obvious that if the 100,000 British soldiers—seasoned, trained, well-equipped men—who are

now serving abroad were all in these islands no question could arise as to our complete security at home, and little need to be anxious as to our food and trade routes across the seas. I am well aware that an immediate recall of these 100,000 men is not practicable. But I see one recent addition to our overseas tasks which is full of peril. The army in Egypt is there by sheer invasion, utterly unable to defend itself—even if enlarged to a whole army corps—against the hundreds of thousands which continental Powers can command.

“From international problems I turn to national problems; and let us remember how deeply our class divisions at home—labour unrest in all its forms—affects even international questions. If our British and Irish people were all animated with the fervid loyalty and patriotism—say of Japanese or Serbians, into which no trace of any internal antagonism could enter—Foreign Policy and National Defence would be easier problems. But in these times of class war, passive resisters, dogmatic pacifists, fanatical democrats, socialists, nihilists, anarchists, it is not so simple a thing to maintain a consistent international policy or to organise an efficient system of National Defence.

Large—at least very vehement—sections of democrats are pressing to reduce or to handicap even our present most inadequate means of defence. To some very audible politicians war is an obsolete folly like duelling, about which we need no longer trouble ourselves to think. Men who at least represent millions of voters cry out that no increased armaments by sea or land shall become law.

“ In France, where the anti-Service and Anarchist parties, I fear, are very strong indeed, we are told that a great percentage of citizens called up to serve still refuse to appear, or are too unruly to be safe, and yet no Government can venture to punish them. There is profound, but secret, anxiety in the army, and still more in the navy, of our good friends abroad. Are those who advocate high Imperial programmes and the ‘ nation in arms ’ at home quite sure that England may not be troubled also with passive resisters, mutineers, rebels ?

“ Resistance — hardly passive — mutiny, strikes, and even talk of rebellion, has been in the air for some months or years. For generations there has not been labour unrest, resistance to law and order, class and sectional conflicts, so hot and on a scale so big. About Ireland I



need say nothing here. We have been warm advocates of the demand of the Irish nation to control their own home affairs—and that ten years before the first Home Rule Bill. For my part, I was not satisfied by all the points in the first or second Home Rule Bill, nor am I satisfied by some features of the pending Home Rule Bill. I confess to being still full of anxiety and misgiving ; and if I am a Nationalist in principle, I am certainly no democrat of the irreconcilable factions.

“ With regard to the industrial questions, I can only say that it has been a fundamental doctrine of Positivism to call aloud for the full incorporation of the industrial masses into all the opportunities, advantages, and culture of society—to press for better conditions, for lighter labour, for better profits for its entire working order in every department. For my part, now for exactly fifty years I have taken public part in every attempt to secure better conditions of labour, and especially to enfranchise and develop all forms of labour institutions, trades unions, benefit, co-operation, educational societies. I do not go back on anything I have ever said or done in that sacred cause.

“ But I must speak my mind freely. I do

not pretend to speak on this matter as representing any collective opinion of Positivists. I may find some of my oldest colleagues against me. I am speaking for myself alone—not for any others. In these fifty years an immense change has come over the whole trades union field. I do not dispute that in some ways it has developed well, and it has certainly gained some great successes. But trades unionism, as I knew it, as it was in the days of the leaders whom I knew and honoured—as a mutual benefit movement to improve wages, conditions of labour, mutual protection—this trades unionism has ceased to exist. Its leaders do not lead, hardly even advise; its officials give general orders according to the rules, but are flouted and disowned; its authorised agents make contracts which are broken and thrown aside; riot, outrages, tyranny too often break loose; and the public duty of maintaining order and defending property and life and limb is resisted by force and then denounced as political crime.

“Trades unions, as mutual societies to gain better wages, better conditions, to make contracts with employers, keeping close to law, order, and good faith, are rapidly tending to

become political clubs devoted to wringing from the Legislature measures that are often pure Socialism. No one can complain of any political club which is open, free, and avowedly political. But to divert the invaluable insurance, benefit, protective bodies to which men have subscribed for years into a kind of caucus to extract legislative nostrums which are often mere quackery and mischief is to my mind a disaster to labour and industry."

Being elected President of the International Sociological Society for the year 1914-1915, I prepared an address which was translated into French by Paul Descours. Parts of this were spoken by me to the Positivist Society in Paris on the 28th June, 1914, the day of the assassination of the Austrian heir and his wife. The English form was published in the *Positivist Review* of August, 1914, almost on the day of the Declaration of War.

" THE TASK OF THE NEW CENTURY.

" (*Address to the International Sociological Society,*  
by FREDERIC HARRISON, *President*, 1914.)

" Though, owing to my age and my retirement from public activity, I am unable to meet our

members in Vienna, I wish to thank them in our *Review* for the honour they have done me, and I will add a few words upon the pressing problems of our time, in what can be only the last thoughts of one whose memory records the vast national and social changes of three generations. This autumn I enter on my eighty-fourth year of life, and I have been a keen politician in the great international movements since the revolution of 1848-1849. Four problems seem to me to await solution in the twentieth century—which surpass others in their vast range and urgent appeal.

“ These are as follows :—

“ I. The burden of armaments and the race between the great Powers to assert their military supremacy.

“ II. The struggle between vast Imperial aggregates on one side and the practical independence of subordinate nationalities on the other side.

“ III. The tendency to abolish the separate provinces of (a) executive, (b) legislative, and (c) judicial authorities, and to concentrate all three in a single unwieldy, democratic chamber.

“ IV. The growth of Socialism and the

claims of the proletariat to control political and economic action in the name of Labour.

“ There are many other problems, but these four seem to me the largest and most pressing ; and some, such as the questions of State religion, independent Churches and schools, the claims of sex disabilities, of matrimonial and family rights and duties, may be grouped under the foregoing heads.

“ Of course, I do not pretend to discuss these problems ; I only desire to point out that they have one common character, and there is behind them one common postulate as the condition of their solution.

“ What I mean by this is, that all these four problems depend on the whole body of social and moral interests of men, and affect human nature in its selfish and its altruistic passions altogether. In consequence, no solution which is simply political, or social, or economic can radically affect them. They are bound up with the aggregate of human passions and emotions.

“ I. Consider the enormous sacrifices and efforts which the growing armaments impose upon citizens everywhere, and the awful risks which hang over populations. Yet the pride

of nations, the duty of patriotism, the passion of military glory, and the agony and shame of military defeat, are so paramount that nations submit almost without a murmur. Christian priests, benevolent moralists, practical economists, enthusiastic pacifists, appeal to deaf ears. The passion of military ascendancy, the duty of patriotic defence, are so overwhelmingly potent that politicians, economists, and ecclesiastics are overborne. But this means that the Armaments problem touches human nature so deeply and so keenly in its most imperious passions and sentiments that no special interest either as to profit or loss, or as to material or moral injury, can affect men's action. Nothing can change their present way of increasing their armies and their navies, except some idea which will give them a new soul as men and citizens, as sons of their common fatherland.

“ II. Pass to the second point—the struggle waged between Imperial aggregates which seek to crush local independence, and the passionate craving of nationalities, however weak and small, to assert their local liberty and their historic life. International politics are made up of this incessant conflict between Empires and Provinces, between Nationalities and Races.

“Here again the same truth applies. The pride of Empire is so fierce a passion with the strong, the traditions of local freedom are so imperishable, that this secular quarrel lies far too deep to be touched either by political interests or material profit or injury. Imperialists will continue to domineer, and the smaller nations and provinces will fight for free life. Nothing can bring peace to this inevitable fight between Dominion and Liberty until some new spirit arises to transform human nature itself.

“III. On the third problem—the separate authority for (a) executive government, (b) permanent legislation and taxation, (c) judicial organisations—I will speak more fully. The history of successful States, the concurrence of the best publicists, the original constitution of almost all modern States, join in establishing this triple division of authority in a more or less complete form. I am myself deeply convinced that this separation is permanent, organic, and indispensable for any well-ordered community, large or small. Now, the tendency of recent politics is for a large democratic Legislature to encroach on both the other powers, whilst in many modern States, under pressure of War or Revolution, it is the execu-

tive power which is arrogating to itself legislative, fiscal, and even judicial authority. The evils of both aberrations are only too manifest to-day.

“ In Russia, in Germany, in Turkey we see Monarchy, in preparation for war or in defence against revolution, reducing the legislative and financial authority, and even tampering with the judicial authority. It is true that this is done in very different degrees. Whilst in Turkey the so-called Grand Vizier and his nominees are quite independent of any elective Chamber and treat the judges as subordinate officials with the autocratic power of any Sultan of Turkey or Morocco; in Russia, there is still some vitality left in a Duma; nor are the Russian Courts as servile as those of Turkey. The military bureaucracy of Germany is certainly not so dominant; but the Reichstag cannot, in practice, pass any law against the will of the Monarchy, and can hardly refuse any taxes which the Monarchy insists on imposing. And even the learned and brilliant judiciary of Germany cannot hold its own, in cases of *lèse-majesté*, or of military and bureaucratic prestige. Practically, and at present, the Austrian Empire is in the same case as the German Empire—*mutatis mutandis*.



“ Where, as in Russia, Germany, and Turkey, the Monarchy, *i.e.*, the legitimate executive power, still retains its independent force, by means of religious, historic and traditional prestige, not only is the Executive a real power, but it can at will dominate the elective Chambers and more or less directly bend the judiciary. Where, as in England, Italy, Scandinavia, Belgium, Holland, and Spain, Monarchy is in effect a social and historic survival, with no true independent authority whatever, there the democratic Chambers, under more or less honourable forms, exercise the real power. In these countries there are not three co-ordinate authorities. Practically, and except for some occasional crisis or some eminent personality on the throne, in these States there are but two authorities, and of these two the elective bodies are obviously almost complete masters.

“ In such Monarchies as those of Italy, and still more so of Spain and Belgium, where Catholic and aristocratic elements still retain traditional influence, the Royal conclaves, more or less invisibly, do continue to exercise executive authority from time to time ; but, in general, the elective chambers and those whom they choose to support have effective control of

administration. In England, in the three Scandinavian kingdoms and in Holland, where Monarchy has little more than a ceremonial and occasional influence, the elective Chambers are dominant.

“ England presents a truly unique character in two respects—first, in the almost absolute autocracy of its House of Commons ; secondly, in the absolute independence of its judiciary. The Monarchy in England, with its unbroken descent of more than a thousand years, is far the most ancient and historic in existence ; but the King has no remnant of power, except of the formal and ceremonial kind, alas ! not even as the ‘ fountain of honour.’ Though all administrative and judicial proceedings take place in the name of the King, in effect every act of the Executive, every nomination to office, spiritual, judicial or ceremonial, is made by the Minister who controls the House of Commons. And the authority of this Minister depends from day to day on his maintaining an adequate majority of votes in a huge assembly made up of parties quite disparate, antagonistic, and joining only in temporary combinations. An English Prime Minister is a despot, waiting day by day on the votes of a tumultuous public

meeting. No vizier in the 'Arabian Nights' has more unlimited power, subject only to this—that at any moment his master, *i.e.*, the elected Chamber, may dismiss him.

“ On the other hand, the judiciary in England, both higher and lower in grade, is absolutely independent of any pressure from without. Neither King, nor Minister, nor Parliament can exert the slightest influence over it, or modify, hasten or delay either its procedure or its judgments. English judges are never so dogmatic as when they condemn some act of the Executive, or some statute of the Legislature. The English judiciary is the most inflexible, not to say the most arrogant, in its pride of legality in all history. Whilst the bureaucracies of Russia, Germany, Spain, or Italy can exert influence on the Courts of Law, whilst excited public opinion can exert such influence in France and America, and public suspicion would even say more than this, the judges in England take pride in flouting the interests of the Executive and the blunders made by legislators, and in defying public opinion, as that of an ignorant and excited mob.

“ It is true that at times, and formerly, English Courts of Law pressed harshly on work-

men and on trade combinations and offences against property. But this was not done by any straining of the law, or by any unjust prejudice or class interest to which the judges gave way. The fault was in the law, in the traditional spirit of English law in defence of property, and in defence of freedom of trade. Much of the older law was unfair as between rich and poor, and capital and labour. The whole tendency of English law was, and still is, conservative. All English lawyers were bred up in conservative ideas. They rigidly carried out conservative, and thus often harsh and inequitable, laws—not because they corruptly gave way to their personal prejudices, but because they strictly expounded the laws as they had been taught them. The purity and rigid independence of the English judiciary is one of the most signal facts in modern history, and a conspicuous example which this country gives to the world of immense importance for the healthy organisation of States.

“We often hear in England, as in France or in America, complaints of the autocratic power exercised by Ministers over the Chamber. It is the fashion in England to inveigh against the arbitrary conduct of the Cabinet, which is

said to deprive the House of Commons of its freedom and to reduce members of Parliament to mere items in a voting machine. This, however, is not at all a case of the Executive usurping the rights of the Legislature. The arbitrary action of the Ministers is only an apparent infraction of the independence of the Chamber. 'A majority won by a few discontented individuals, and that on a petty question, can at any hour, and even by a stratagem, throw out the Ministry. This only expresses the will of the majority of the Chamber; and the resistance of the minority and their complaints when they are outvoted simply represent the effect of deciding by votes in any assembly of any kind.

"In those States which are not Monarchies, but Republics with a President, the President usually possesses far more real executive power than a Sovereign in any of the mediatised Monarchies such as England or Holland. This is conspicuously the case in the United States, where by the Constitution the President nominates his own Ministers who control the Executive, but are not directly or immediately responsible to Congress, much less to the Lower elective Chamber. The United States is thus

a true example of a Presidential rather than a Parliamentary Constitution. In my opinion a Presidential State, as understood by Oliver Cromwell, by George Washington, and the founders of the United States, is far the best form of modern State systems. It is far more stable and just than any Monarchy which either tends to autocracy, as in Germany, or to mere ceremonial, as in England.

“The United States has now far the best established Constitution—that of a real Presidential Republic. The three elements—executive, legislative and financial, and judiciary—are more fairly balanced and are more definitely distinct than in any other modern State. Its weakness consists in the instability of the judiciary, and the detestable vice of elected judges, in the excessive frequency of elections and changes in officials, and also in the abnormal interference of the Senate with the Executive. Still, with all its defects, the State system of the United States is the best and most stable of any existing Constitution.

“France also is a Presidential Republic, though by the Constitution and by tradition the executive power of the President is far less

normal and less effective than in the United States. Switzerland, and now Portugal, may be ranked as Presidential Republics, though perhaps the executive independence of their Presidents is even less than in France.

“ The retention of Monarchy in States which have reduced the Sovereign to impotence results in destroying all executive independence and in handing over executive power to a democratic assembly. Those spurious Monarchies which are disguised Republics are thus far more democratic and unstable than States which have become frankly Republics with an organic written constitution. Our British State system is now almost as ultra-democratic and as unstable as was that of Athens in the age of Pericles and Cleon, when thousands of citizens meeting to hear speeches in the Pnyx made decrees from day to day according to the proposal of the favourite orator. Britain presents to the world one of the worst examples of a democratic Executive exercised by a miscellaneous Chamber, and also one of the best examples of an incorruptible and proudly independent judiciary.

“ What are the reasons which make this tripartite division of authority so essential to

the well-being of States? An entire volume would not suffice to expound them. I only here state a few of the more obvious reasons.

“(1) The marvellous complexity of modern administration, and its reaction upon the life of the public, demands in the Executive a concentration, a stability, a rapidity, even a secrecy, which are impossible where every executive act has to be done in the eye of the public, and under the control of a huge Chamber, which in many affairs of State is as ignorant as a child. A British Minister of War has to stand up nightly to answer questions as to his strategic plans as if he were a reluctant defendant in a case of fraudulent bankruptcy. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has to shuffle out prevaricating replies to impertinent busybodies who seek to pry into the debates of an International Conference.

“(2) The very function of a Legislature is to be representative of all varieties of class, interest, and industry in the nation. It must be large, though if it exceeds 500 it is unwieldy, and 300 is an adequate number. But to be representative, it must come from different localities, and must be as heterogeneous as the interests to be represented. But such a body is the most



incompetent to be entrusted with executive authority. Its merits as a financial and legislative authority make it impotent and mischievous when it pretends to be an executive authority. Ultimately, of course, finance, that is, the resources of the State by taxation, does control policy. If the Executive can control taxation, the result is tyranny. If a Chamber having 'power of the purse' attempts directly to control the Executive, the result is feebleness, instability, and cross-purpose.

"(3) It is needless to enlarge on the indispensable necessity in a State to keep its judicial system independent, incorruptible, and jealous of any outside interference. It is in vain to make laws, unless they are executed with justice and impartial legality. If the Executive can put pressure on the Courts of Justice, then legislation is in vain, and the result is tyranny. An incorruptible and inflexible judiciary is as vital as are a concentrated and free Executive, or a real, independent, and varied representation. Britain, which has the least independent of all Executives, the most autocratic of all representative bodies, has the proudest and most inflexible of all judicial systems in ancient or in modern history.

“ IV. As to the fourth problem, the growth of Socialism, it is needless to enlarge until it is laid down what Socialism means. At present it covers many things, both definite and vague. There is a wise and beneficial kind of Socialism, and a Utopian and mischievous Socialism. Few of those who use the terms ever ask themselves what precise object they mean. Laws and schemes of public utility are often called Socialistic. And wild nightmares to abolish Property, Family, Law, and Government are also called Socialism. But the Socialism which means the devotion of all the resources of the State and of all citizens within it to promote the true interests and moral progress of Society—understanding by Society the whole of the population, its men, its women, its children—for a true civilisation, this is not only the most powerful and vital movement of the age, but it is also the inevitable task that awaits the ages to come.

“ It is obvious that a Social Future which is to perform this vast, all-pervading regeneration of Society will have to deal with every one of the moving passions and forces of human nature—with the deepest convictions about the World and about Man, with our family instincts,

with our activity, with all that men think, love, desire, do, and feel. But that is the function of Philosophy, Ethics, Religion. No political, no economic, no industrial solution of the problem can be more than a temporary palliative or petty instalment. And the same reasoning applies to each of the other three problems discussed before—Armaments: Nationalism: Democracy. All of these appeal to such a complex body of human interests and passions that they cannot be touched by any sectional measure. Sociology, therefore, is really the practical embodiment of Philosophy, Ethics, and Religion. By Religion I mean nothing theological, supernatural, metaphysical—but a real, scientific, and human object of enthusiasm and devotion. I use the term Religion in the general sense in which we may say that the Republic was the religion of a Scipio, or France was the religion of a Danton.

“Our failures to solve the great problems of society all rise out of our blindness to think that this or that new law, or new institution, or special movement is a panacea to solve them. Sociology is mere pedantry and quackery if it pretends to dispose of independent social problems by sectional remedies. All social problems

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are general, and concern society in its entire organism. And every social movement must deal with society organically, synthetically, as a living being. In a word, to repeat my aphorism, Sociology is the application to social life of the correlated conclusions of Philosophy, Ethics, and Religion."

## CHAPTER XI

EXTRACTED FROM DIARY: JULY, 1914

### BEFORE THE WAR IN JULY.

*AFTER spending some time in June in Paris, and conversing with politicians, editors, and critics, I passed July in Switzerland in view of the Savoy Alps. There, as was my custom when away from home, I occupied my leisure in continuing my Diary of "Thoughts"—not intended for publication, but to leave as private meditations to my descendants to deal with as occasion should serve. This was dated 15th July, 1914, and was written at Lausanne.*

With regard to the European situation, the peril is this: Can these enormous armies, amounting in the whole, active and reserved, to at least 10,000,000, weighting each country with nearly 50 per cent. of its total taxation and imposing on its industry a burden of perhaps 10 per cent., be quietly disbanded until they have fought out the issue? I cannot hope for it. No one is fit to be listened to in international politics who fails to see that the real centre of disturbance lies in the deep-seated passion of the German aristocracy and

bureaucracy for supremacy in Europe. Silly Liberal sentimentalists and Socialist Labourmen, caring for nothing but material trade interests, prate about the peaceful, industrious, domestic German people, or they point to the growing power of the German democracy. For political and Imperial purposes these excellent, cultivated, and laborious people do not count.

The initiative in Germany rests with its aristocratic and bureaucratic order. The German Empire, including the German part of Austria—and they will ere long be practically one people—contains far the largest and most energetic aristocracy still extant in Western Europe. It is an aristocracy in the true sense of that word, being a very large order of men claiming privileges of birth, of hereditary possessions, of their class loyalty to King, of their prerogatives to all superior commands in military and in civil office. They are a genuine relic of feudal times, retaining much of the personal and caste pride of the old knights, and their ideals of war, honour, and adventure. Unlike other remnants of aristocratic orders in Europe of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they are neither ignorant, indolent, nor effete. On the contrary, for their own chosen profession of war and public service, they are eminently capable and endowed with a high scientific

education. They form the whole of what we should call the "Upper Ten or Twenty Thousand," perhaps numbering altogether fifty or a hundred thousand. For military and political purposes they have in fact all the qualities which they claim as giving them the right to be the hereditary chiefs of the country in peace and in war. They have most of the anti-social and retrograde passions and prejudices of their ancestors, to which they have added for practical purposes a high education in modern science, especially in all the arts of war on land and on sea.

This immensely large, united, and powerful order are the real masters of Germany. They completely dominate the great laborious, highly educated German people, who from childhood are trained to military obedience. The Kaiser is really a sort of incarnation of Junkertum; and though, as in the prodigious creation of the navy, he can at times give them a real lead, he is practically little but their mouthpiece and organ, and can easily be brought to be their agent. William II. is impulsive, restless, and unstable. The order is solid, imperturbable, and unbending. William II. is keen enough to realise all the dangers of a great European adventure; and it is true that he holds on to peaceful counsels, knowing that war might not

cover him with glory, if he took the first place, or might bring up dangerous rivals to his sovereign majesty if the glory passed to others. This goes to say that to-day (Midsummer, 1914) both Emperor and the mass of the German people honestly desire peace, and are bent on preserving it as far as they can both at home and in Europe.

Nevertheless, the great German Junkertum incessantly works to prove to the world that the German is destined to be supreme in Europe materially and intellectually. He does not believe that this supremacy can be achieved unless by war, nor even that it would be to his honour to attempt it except by war. He is bent on terminating the secular rivalry with France, by reducing her to a second-rate Power, such as Spain, or even to making France a submissive neighbour, as are Denmark, Holland, and Belgium. If the northern coast of France could be conquered, or even neutralised like Belgium, say as far as the mouth of the Seine, not only would France be humbled, but the British naval supremacy would be at an end. With a German fleet even temporarily at Flushing, Calais, Dieppe, and Havre, England would be forced to maintain a home army of 300,000 and a great fleet on her trade routes.

The new international problem of the twentieth century is the German resolve to contest the supre-



macy of the seas with England. Englishmen are so accustomed to believe this to be a dogma of European orthodoxy, like the old dogma of the balance of power, that they habitually shut their ears to the monstrous nature of such a claim in the minds of foreign nations. In reality, the British dominion of the seas is so preposterous and so anti-social a claim that, like all other claims to national supremacy, it cannot be permanently maintained in the face of a dozen neighbours, three of whom are more numerous and more fully equipped. It is true that now for two generations the food of Britain depends on the protection of distant trade routes. Englishmen to-day are so much alive to this that it seems to them a matter of course to assume that their sea-borne corn necessities makes it a law of Nature that their navies should be strong enough to defeat all comers in any part of the world. But we must remember that the claim of "Britannia ruling the waves" arose a century before there was any need of imported food. It was for the two centuries between Blake and Charles Napier a rank claim of national pride. And even to-day, since the growth of imported food, the British claim of material necessity as the ground of maritime supremacy is no argument to foreign rivals. They say: "You have no right to swagger about as our

masters on the high seas, just because you have chosen to turn your own rich country into a manufacturing island, dependent for food on foreign and distant countries. Live that way, if you please, but, because you choose to spin shirts for Hindoos rather than grow corn for your own sons, that is no ground for our admitting your dominion of the seas."

As I pointed out in a republished article of my own written in 1870, one of the inevitable consequences of the triumph of Germany in the great French war would be that she would soon begin to challenge the supremacy of England at sea. After forty-four years we see in 1914 how that has grown in two generations, under the unceasing pressure of the great Junker ambitions and the special impetus of William II. Germany has over Britain three very powerful elements of superiority:—

(1) A far larger population, which, with the inevitable addition of Austrian Germany and its own rapid growth, will in a few years be *double* that of Britain.

(2) Unity and stability of central government under an able and industrious dictator contrasted with the shifting and drifting policy of parliamentary groups, torn by rivalries and Irish and Labour disaffection.

(3) For greater general scientific education, and greater perseverance and tenacity in the entire governing machine.

The example of the Romans in the later Punic wars, as well as that of the Byzantine Empire in the tenth century, proves that a nation with high aptitudes for land war can in a generation elaborate an equally successful maritime force. Twenty years ago no one suspected that Germany would have created a magnificent mercantile and war fleet quite a match individually for our own. Our Labour and our Irish troubles—perhaps some day our bloody Labour and Irish campaigns—will leave Britain enfeebled and divided. I regard it as inevitable that—say by 1920—Germany will be in a position to contest with us the supremacy of the seas.

I must also record my firm conviction that the contest will give Germany success—not perhaps immediately, nor directly, and not in any triumphant or permanent way, but her *delenda est Carthago* will have a modified and temporary satisfaction. The way in which I look for it to come about is this. The condition of France, both for defence and civil government, at this moment is one of utter confusion verging on anarchy and civil war. There is no government in France, and no signs of any power to restore or create government. The ever-

dissolving Ministries clutch at their portfolios in desperate attempts to buy off the opposition of rival groups. The deputies grasp at their seats by screwing out of distracted Ministers the personal wants of their constituents. And a strong and united body of Socialists (*i.e.*, Anarchists), led by an eloquent fanatic, make any government almost impossible in the name of Labour.\* France has not been in so perilous state since the last year of the Empire (July, 1914).

All this is well understood in Germany, and it is easy to see how impatient the war-like strategists are to begin the attack. But very strong counter-reasons hold back the Kaiser and the cooler heads of the nation. First, the alliance of France with Russia was never more pronounced, nor for ten years has Russia ever been in a more menacing form. So, too, the *entente* with England has been made more pronounced than ever. Again, the critical condition of Austria and the explosive condition of Eastern Europe may make any statesman pause. If Germany were to make an unprovoked attack on France, Russia would certainly discharge her millions upon Germany, and England would probably have to join in the struggle. Now if, at once, the English fleet took part, William could hardly with honour allow his grand new fleet to lie

idle in secure docks behind fortresses. He *must* try conclusions at sea ; and he knows the risk of having his new creation wiped out and possibly so crushed that the German people would long hesitate to rebuild such another. The strategists believe that within one month they could sweep away the defences of France, occupy Paris, reduce France to utter anarchy and paralysis, and seize a large slice on the north coast and extend their own frontier beyond Belfort, Nancy, and Laon—and achieve all this before Russia could get her armies on the field or Britain had done more than demonstrate in the Baltic.

Such is the view of the fiery strategists. But it is plainly a chance. I think myself it is not very far from an even chance. But it would be a tremendous stake to play. *If* France could prolong the defence for three or even six months, or *if* she happened to possess a soldier of genius, or the Germans made a few disastrous blunders, then in that case Russia might have placed two to three millions of men in Germany, and the British fleet might have annihilated the German; in which case by the end of another year the German Empire might find itself back again in the Prussia of ante-Bismarckian times. The chances are so doubtful, and the risks so tremendous, that William II. and his cool-headed advisers

and people may well hesitate to take the plunge. But things are still on the simmer (July, 1914).

The way in which the great struggle in Europe may begin might be this. The anarchy and babel of parties in France will in a few years reduce that unhappy country to a state of weakness which will be too tempting for the Prussian stratocracy to delay any longer their pre-arranged attack. Russia, with her enormous frontier on north, west, and south in Europe, on the Levant and Black Sea, and in Asia having borders with Persia, China, Japan, Turkey, etc., etc., may be too much occupied by troubles in the Balkans, in Asia Minor, or in Asia as far as Japan, to be free to exert all her strength against Germany. Britain may be too much distracted by her Irish, economic, and Indian and Egyptian troubles to be very free to engage in European war. Then, suddenly on some pretext, the *German hosts will hold or paralyse Holland and Belgium, and perhaps through Belgium and Luxembourg pour into Northern France.*

Before Russia can put her armies on the German frontier or her fleets in the Baltic, perhaps even the Germans will deliberately choose the early winter in order to paralyse Russian or British fleets in the Baltic, the German two millions will be before Paris, and may overrun France say from Colmar to Havre. What may be the issue of such a war who can say,

but it is more probable that before Russia can move—and to be in great force would require two months—before England could see its way to act in strength, which would be three or rather six months, the distracted Government of France, or such party leaders as please to call themselves “a Government,” under the furious hostilities of the Socialist fanatics, may have made a surrender, involving a crushing war tax and the virtual surrender of provinces on the northern coast.

With France reduced to a second-rate Power and Germany with a fleet hardly inferior to our own, and by its concentration in the North Seas even superior to ours in these home waters, with Germany in practical command of the Dutch ports and having annexed a long slice off Northern France, perhaps even Havre, the condition of England would be one of a struggle for her very existence. The first act would be to drill and arm the younger population to get at least half a million ready to meet an invader. Why not? It would be necessary to organise an immense submarine and aeroplane fleet and to keep a home fleet equal to the German. All this would be indispensable to resist an invasion (July, 1914).

This was my rather pessimistic and strictly private prognostic exactly a fortnight before the outbreak of war. From the disasters I feared we and Europe

were saved—first, by the truly heroic self-devotion of the Belgian King, army, and people ; next, by the wonderful uprising of the entire population of France, throwing aside all their domestic disputes and divisions ; and lastly—and perhaps this was the dominant fact from the 15th August to the 15th September—the unexpected mobilisation of the British Expedition, and the magnificent behaviour of that army—amazing the German chiefs and proving itself to be, for its numbers, the finest fighting force in Europe. .



## CHAPTER XII

### DURING THE WAR : 1914-1915

I REACHED home a few days before the Declaration of War by Germany, passing through Paris, then in extreme agitation. I continued to issue pamphlets, letters to the Press, and various proposals, and as a citizen of Bath, now my home, I accepted appeals to me to give public lectures and speeches.

### THE MEANING OF THE WAR : FOR LABOUR—FREEDOM—COUNTRY.

*When the War was in full course I was asked to write a pamphlet for the Victoria League, which I offered as a contribution. It was published in September, 1914, by Messrs. Macmillan, and with their permission and that of the Victoria League is now reissued :—*

“ Why—for whom—for what are we at war ? We are fighting first for our existence as a great nation—then to do our bounden duty to our Allies—lastly to rescue Europe from submission to a despot.

“ It has come now to this, that our very existence as a great and prosperous nation is at stake. The *immediate occasion* of our engaging

in war was the call of honour to help a friendly people to whom we were pledged by treaties of old standing. We were bound to save a small nation which faces our shore from absorption by a ruthless conqueror. But the *final necessity* for our fighting now to the last man is this—that if the German hosts do in the end crush the Allies, then Britain will cease to be a free, proud, thriving nation. She would sink through incalculable sufferings to ruin, starvation, and subjection.

“For nine centuries we Englishmen have never known what is meant by conquest. We cannot believe that an enemy could ever trample over our lands, bombard our open towns, burn our homes, shoot peaceful citizens, and put us under a monstrous tribute of money, men, and ships. That perhaps is not near us even now. We mock at their threats of invasion. Yet, nevertheless, defeat of the Allies in the present war would mean to these islands ruin beyond imagination for generations to come. There are still some who say—‘Oh! we shall worry through all right! No Germans can cross the Channel!’ I will try to show them how the ruin may come even though our shores be unassailed. And I say that, since the years

just before Trafalgar, Britain has never been so near a tremendous catastrophe as it is this day.

“ If we are fighting across the seas, as we did in Spain and in Belgium a hundred years ago, it is quite as much for ourselves as it is for France or for Belgium—and so it was then. To-day the freedom and prosperity of Britain is bound up with that of France. If we suffered France to be crushed before our eyes, the German, who has sworn to blot France out of Europe, would tear away her colonies, her ships, her Channel ports, her coast and seaboard land—say from the mouth of the Seine to the Rhine. With that, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, if not formally annexed, would be for aggressive uses under German control.

“ When the mighty German Empire, soon to be increased to a population double our own, is master of the whole seaboard of North Europe from Havre to Hamburg—a coast more fitted for navies than is our own coast between Dover and Aberdeen—when their aeroplane and Zeppelin stations look across the Channel from a dozen headlands, and the mouths of great tidal rivers gape upon our shores, and behind these fortresses and docks there lies in wait a mighty nation having a fleet then larger than ours, and armies

of three or four millions of men—would the flag of Britain float quietly at ease?

“ Even then we would hope to keep the invader from our shores. Yes! but where would be our overseas Empire—our commercial credit, our world-wide trade, our food imported from distant regions? We should be fighting for our lives at home with a gigantic enemy who had made himself master of Europe from the Baltic to the Adriatic. We might still be what Holland has become ever since she lost command of the sea. But Great Britain such as we know it to-day would be but thrilling pages of ancient history.

“ I will try to show why defeat in a great war with a ruthless rival would be more fatal to Britain than it would be to Germany herself, to Russia, or even to France.

“ When Germany is defeated, she will still remain a great country, whatever the sufferings of her sorely-tried people. She will still hold a grand Fatherland, a most industrious, brave, and able race, well gifted to restore her as it did after Jena. She can practically supply her own food; she has all the resources of a mighty nation within herself. All this is true of Russia, and, in a way, is true of France. It is impossible

that Germany, or Russia, or France could be reduced from being a great nation to be a small nation.

“ But this might happen to Britain if she were crushed by an overwhelming rival, even without invading our soil. Our food, our industries, our commerce, our credit, our whole national existence rest upon the world outside. They cannot live or thrive within the narrow limits of these islands. Our small acres cannot feed our overgrown population; and we cannot buy foreign foodstuff unless we can sell our products overseas. To an enemy triumphant and dominant in Europe, there would pass our command of the seas, for our navies must be concentrated to protect our coast. Our imported food would be heavily taxed, hindered, and reduced. Our manufactures would pass to alien markets. Our financial primacy would pass to Berlin or New York. Our trade would shrink to home waters. Over our whole industry would lie the burden of a war indemnity—say thrice the amount of our own National Debt. Great Britain would subside into the exhaustion of Venice and of Holland when their overseas empires were torn from them.

“ Let those who used to gibe at diplomacy and cry out against armaments consider how our

manufacturing population is to be employed when half our exports are gone—how our crowded cities are to be fed when ten millions of our workmen are out of work and the quatern loaf is at a shilling—how our industries are to be started when the banks are bankrupt and the Exchequer has to find interest on a war indemnity of two thousand million\* sterling. This assuredly will be the fate of this small island if the huge German Alliance can establish the domination it seeks from the North Sea to the Mediterranean across all Central Europe.

“For a hundred years now, since the first Napoleon, in spite of many a quarrel, we have had peace with France and have enjoyed immense advantages from the genius, the inspiration, the republican life of our gallant neighbour. With France crushed under the hoof of the Uhlan’s horse, not only should we be confronted with the visible peril of sharing her fate, but we should lose all that is most close to our heart in the progressive life of Europe—in its science, its art, its literature, and its ideals. We should exchange for it the Satanic Gospel of ‘military necessity,’ ‘the dominion of the strongest.’ Can we suffer the social fraternity of French and British Labour to be crushed down to the servile

discipline of the Prussian drill-sergeant, until republican freedom be absorbed in 'Blood and Iron'?

"In this tremendous battle of the Future against the Past—and for forty years I have been calling out to our people to be prepared for it—my main thought is for the interest of the masses who labour. To them, the overthrow of our maritime and military system in a gigantic war in Europe must bring ruin as awful as anything recorded in the history of the world. Let no one of the industrial order, be he capitalist or workman, fancy that this is like our too many wars beyond seas, even the Crimean war of sixty years ago. It is war at home, under our eyes, in our most vital parts. To Labour especially, it means all that is most terrible in human misery. We are at war to-day for our honour, for our homes, for the future of civilisation, freedom, and peace.

"These are words that no serious politician will lightly use; but they are used now by Ministers who in all our modern history have gone farthest in a desire to satisfy popular aims and wants. For myself, my whole public life for fifty years has been devoted to the popular cause. In spite of abuse, all these years I have

fought against Militarism, Imperialist aggression, and international adventures. I may claim to have been in the front line of the Old Guard who stood for Peace instead of Glory, for Social Progress against territorial expansion. But now that the crisis so long foreseen is upon us I say to the workmen, to the young, to the strong, to the true-hearted all round—Arm, toil, endure, fight if you care to save our country from an unutterable catastrophe.

“ Remember, this is the most awful orgy of destruction that has occurred in the history of the world. It is no war of rival Kings, of ambitious Ministers trusting to snatch a province or two from a neighbouring State. It is no war of weeks, or even of months, to be settled in a friendly way by a fair treaty of peace and compromise. It is a war to decide if Europe—if modern civilisation—shall be ruled by Brute Force or by the enlightened will of free peoples. The war began with a series of insolent summonses to three small nations to submit or suffer the extremities of conquest. It was defended in the German Parliament as a frank defiance of morality, treaties, and the Laws of Nations. It has been waged with ruthless savagery such as Europe has not seen since



the Dark Ages, by every form of mendacity, treachery, and terrorism. It avows mendacity, treachery, and terrorism to be its systematic engines of warfare. Its codés of 'military necessity' are the old watchwords of banditti and pirates. It is seeking to impose on humanity a new Gospel in the maxim—*Might is Right*.

“Do not think it impossible that a noble people, as are the Germans still, could be so perverted and poisoned. It is too true that their Sovereign, and a host of his military and civil officers, have drummed it into them as a duty of loyalty and patriotism, and have taught it to them and proclaimed it in speeches, books, and journals for years past. Good people at home would not believe it to be serious, even when the Kaiser told his soldiers in war to behave like Huns, and a famous general wrote books to prove that war was the school of all the virtues and the business of a great nation. The docile German has been misled by the dynasty and that caste of military nobles whom they have too long endured. Trust to us who know Germans at home, who speak their tongue, read their writings, and have friends, even relatives, amongst them. We know them. And we know that their magnificent courage, resources,

intellect are being called up once for all, not merely to win victories, to carry home more millions—but to destroy the British Empire, to win from it the command of the seas, our colonies, our trade, to domineer as masters of Europe, and, what is worst of all, to establish the new Gospel that the kingdom of this world shall belong as of right, by a law of Nature, to the strongest and the most unscrupulous.

“It is the most tremendous and the most inhuman undertaking ever attempted in Europe, for even Napoleon’s Empire had some appeal to Liberty against Feudalism, and brought in real elements of popular advancement. The war of Pan-German ambition is more like the flood of barbarous hordes which in Asia and in Europe brought desolation over prosperous and peaceful lands. In any case, it is a world struggle of Civilisation against Reaction.

“It will not—it cannot—it shall not succeed. But the effort to defeat it will be terrible, sanguinary, cruel, and prolonged. Still, we foresee victory—and much that is to come after victory. The nations which have been despoiled in these last fifty years, the peoples who have been torn from their own race, shall have free voice to decide under what rule they prefer to

live. Alsace, Lorraine, will vote on their own destinies. The Danes of Schleswig-Holstein shall be free to return to their fatherland if they wish it. The Tsar has pledged himself to restore Poland as a Home Rule land, and Europe must see that he keeps this pledge. The monstrous slave-State called the Austrian Dual Empire will dissolve into its national units. The Near East will be freed from the greed of huge empires, and the Far East will become Asiatic again. If the military crew which has seized power in Constantinople ventures to throw in its lot with its evil spirit in Berlin, the Turk will for ever quit Europe, and indeed the Levantine coasts. Heligoland and the Kiel Canal will never again threaten Britain and force us to maintain an immense and unneeded fleet. And, if the armies of Germany, of Austria, of Russia, and of France are by international conventions and European law reduced to moderate proportions, the blood tax will be taken off the nations of the world. The peaceful union of a European confederation may begin to be a reality, and at last the progress of civilisation may advance in security, free from the nightmare of perpetual expectation of War.

“ It is a prospect, certain, blessed, real, but

far from near us as yet. To reach it to-day we must be ready for every sacrifice—to offer up our last youth, our last shilling, every thought of rest. I shall not live to see it, but I shall die in the conviction that it is to come.”

#### LET THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME.

When in September, 1914, the full measure of the enormities of the Kaiser's war in Belgium was known, I wrote to *The Times* as follows:—

“ These abominable crimes against humanity and civilisation call for condign reprobation in the face of the civilised world. The whole German military and civil order are responsible for this poisoning of the moral sense of their nation. We know that nine-tenths of the German people accept their leadership and adopt their infernal code that ‘might is right.’ Under this inverted doctrine of right and wrong the German millions are now committing enormities as horrible as those of Dahomey and African savages of old. Let us hear no more whining about German ‘culture.’ But let us make it known that we will make the world ring with our sense of horror. The whole Junker caste and the Hohenzollern dynasty are the head and front of these infamies.

It is for the German people to deal with the race which has ruined them and brought their name to shame. For ourselves, be it understood, that when the Allies have finally crushed this monstrous brood, the Kaiser—if, indeed, he choose to survive—shall be submitted to public degradation. And if he lives through it, St. Helena might be his prison and his grave. The German people will then understand what the civilised world feels about the modern Attila—the new “Scourge of God.”

This proposal of mine was in no sense meant as a futile menace by way of Retaliation, but as a formal method of showing Neutrals and our own people that we hold the German chiefs as degraded outlaws and not as honourable foes. Sanctimonious purists and hypocritical pretenders to the “higher morality” attacked me with personal bitterness. My reply was this:—

“The world in Europe will never again be the same thing to the present generation. It will either be better or it will be much worse. The public law of nations is a thing of shreds and tatters. What used to be called the ‘Comity of Nations’ is ancient history. The

sensè of friendly intercourse between peoples who respect each other is no more. Treaties, alliances, guarantees, on which the whole State system of Europe was based are mocked as 'scraps of paper.' The two Central Empires with populations larger by thirty millions than those of England and France together, with armies more than double, have burst in upon peaceful neighbours, proclaiming that they tear up treaties, ignore the accepted laws of war, and deal with civilians or soldiers by what they call 'military necessity'—that is, with every form of atrocity known to ancient warfare or barbarous hordes, unless it stop short of poisoning water and actual torture of captives; and even these enormities are alleged.

"There is now overwhelming evidence of these atrocities, and also that the mass of German-speaking peoples, except a percentage of disaffected workmen, accept all this as the modern code of 'culture.' A few academic dupes and cynical wiseacres may still ask for further evidence and may listen to the blasphemous hypocrisy of the German theologians who charge these infamies on their victims. This they have been taught by their Kaiser, who seems to have 'put a lying spirit in the

mouth of all 'these prophets,' and who will be known in history as the 'Father of Lies.' "

When the submarines of the Germans systematically destroyed mercantile ships, fishing boats, and even neutral traders and hospital Red Cross vessels, deliberately murdering civilians without warning, even slaying them whilst drowning, I proposed in a letter to *The Times* that prisoners captured by us on these submarines should be tried by a Civil Court for Piracy and Murder, and if found guilty should be reserved for actual sentence. This proposal was criticised by lawyers and by sentimentalists as bad in law, good sense, and morality. I hold that what used to be called the "Law of Nations" has been destroyed by the enemy, that a new condition has arisen, and English Common Law has always been ready to meet new conditions by new judgments, based, not exclusively on precedents, but on the spirit of our jurisprudence.

My reply to my legal critics was sent to *The Times*, and was to this effect :—

" I have proposed a real, not a sham, prosecution, and sentence deferred whilst our courts consider if they are absolutely bound by the opinions of Bynkershoek and Sir Harry Poland. The urgent danger is this. International law, at

least so far as it affects civilians, shipping, and neutrals, has been created by judicial decisions, and not by courts-martial. Neither army nor navy can make law. Judicial decisions for ages have been based on custom and practice. If in this crisis, when the entire custom and practice of the civilised world has been trampled on by two Great Powers, and entirely new customs and practices have been enforced by the sword from the Vistula to the Channel—and all the time British Courts declare that they have nothing to say to the contrary—then, at the close of the war, some new German Grotius will arise to prove that all these modern atrocities have been incorporated into an amended Law of Nations.”

“ The letter of Sir Herbert Stephen will warm the heart of Herr Dernburg and the German Professors, when they find an English lawyer to maintain that the ‘ U’s ’ are doing nothing contrary to English law. He does not even suggest that they are doing anything contrary to the laws of war or the custom of the sea in civilised nations. He says ‘ he could argue for hours ’ on either side of the question ; and he exhibits his forensic habits in your columns. According to Sir Herbert, ‘ piracy ’ is no longer a crime



during a state of war—‘*inter arma silent leges.*’ To ask that submarine crews should be tried by a civil court, he says, is ‘exaggerated denunciation.’ Now, I did not propose that prisoners from submarines should be shot or hung. I proposed that the question whether they are guilty of piracy and murder should be tried by a regular court of justice before a civil judge and a jury. From the words used by the Prime Minister and statesmen in Parliament, by yourself and the rest of the Press, I considered there was a case to go to a jury. Sir Herbert says ‘there is no case.’ A Daniel come to judgment! cry all the German Shylocks.”

As with the Kaiser, so with submarine murder, my proposal was a formal trial and verdict before constituted national and civil tribunals—under the Law of Nations and the Common Law of England, to register legal condemnation of these crimes, to make it impossible that they should ever pass *sub silentio* into the practice of nations in war.

#### SORTES VERGILIANÆ.

I happened to relieve my thoughts to turn to Virgil, which I read with interest with the remarkable translation of Mr. Charles J. Billson—the only translation

Known to me in blank verse—keeping line for line with the original. Now and then a passage seemed so apt that I sent it to *The Times* with the heading above. One ran thus, comparing Wilhelm to Juno in her fury :—

“ Haec ubi dicta dedit, terras horrenda petivit :  
Luctificam Allecto dirarum ab sede dearum  
Infernisque ciet tenebris, cui tristia bella  
Iraeque insidiaeque et crimina noxia cordi.”

[AEN., vii., 322.]

“ She finished ; and, to earth descending fierce  
Called from the Dread One's seat in nether dark  
Baleful Allecto, who delights in wars,  
Slanders, and stratagems, and murderous wrath ;”

[CHARLES J. BILLSON.]

For Turkish, Egyptian, Transvaal outbreaks, aircraft raids and slanders to the United States and neutral Powers Juno's appeal to the Fury exactly describes Potsdam :—

“ Tu potes unanimos armare in proelia fratres  
Atque odiis versare domos, tu verbera tectis  
Funereasque inferre faces, tibi nomina mille,  
Mille nocendi artes. Fecundum concute pectus,  
Disjice compositam pacem, sere crimina belli ;  
Arma velit poscatque simul, rapiatque juvenus.”

[AEN., vii., 335.]

“ One-hearted brothers thou canst arm for strife,  
 Blind homes with hate, and hurl thereon thy  
     whips  
 And brands of death. A thousand names are  
     thine,  
 A thousand plagues. Unload thy fruitful breast!  
 Dissever plighted peace, sow seeds of war!  
 Together wake to arms heart, voice, and hand ! ”

[CHARLES J. BILLSON.]

Again, I imagined the peaceful elder citizens of  
 Germany calling on the Kaiser in the words of  
 Drances :—

“ Quid miseros totiens in aperta pericula cives  
 Projicis, o Latio caput horum et causa malorum ?—  
 Nulla salus bello ; pacem te poscimus omnes—

Pone animae, et pulsus abi. Sat funera fusi  
 Vidimus, ingentes et desolavimus agros.

Nos, animae viles, inhumata infletaque turba,  
 Sternamur campis.”

[ÆN., xi., 360–370.]

“ Why wilt thou fling so oft in peril’s mouth  
 The sad-starred men, O source of Latium’s pain ?  
 War hath no salve.

For pity yield !

Go beaten hence ! O we have seen enough  
Of rout and death and the wide waste of War !

We, common men, must cover the wide plain,  
Unwept, unburied ! ”

[CHARLES J. BILLSON.]

Another parallel came from Livy's character of Hannibal :—

“ Inhumana crudelitas, perfidia plus quam  
Punica, nihil veri, nihil sancti, nullus deorum  
metus, nullum jusjurandum, nulla religio.”

[Liv., 21, 4.]

“ Inhuman cruelty, a more than Punic perfidy,  
devoid of truth or of honour, no fear of God, no  
sacredness of an oath, no sense of religious faith.”

#### GERMAN PROFESSORS.

The scandalous, mendacious, and hypocritical manifesto of the German Professors, most of them theologians, should have been treated with silent contempt. But a rather weak reply was published by some British men of learning, whom I was not invited to join. I published in the *Morning Post* my own view of German State Academicians :—

“ I was not invited to join the reply of our

distinguished scholars and professors, perhaps because it is so many years since I was the colleague of James Bryce as Professor of Jurisprudence to the Inns of Court. And, indeed, I do not care to bandy recriminations with these German defenders of the attack on civilisation by the whole Imperial, military, and bureaucratic order. It seems to me waste of time and loss of self-respect to notice these pedants.

“The whole German Press and the entire academic class seem to be banded together as an official bureau in order to spread mendacious insults and spiteful slanders. Not a word comes from them to excuse or deny the defiance of public law and the mockery of public faith by the German Emperor, his Ministers, and his armies. These professors seem to exult in serving the new Attila—rather let us say the new Caligula; for Attila at least was an open soldier, and did not skulk under the Red Cross behind barbed-wire fences.

“We have long known that all German academic and scholastic officials are the creatures of the Government, as obedient to orders as any drill-sergeant. They seem to have sold their consciences for place. Not a word comes from them even of regret for the massacre of

civilians on false charges, for the wanton murder of children, for the wholesale rape of women, the showering of bombs upon sleeping towns in sheer cruelty of destruction. The intellectual energies of *Kultur* seem concentrated on distorting the meaning of our despatches and the speeches of our statesmen, and in manufacturing for their people and neutrals venomous falsehoods. German *Geist* to-day is a human machine to cram lies upon their own people, and to insinuate lies to the world around. Their system of war is based upon lying at home and abroad, on treachery, and terrorism. They think that murdering a few civilians would terrify France into surrender and will drive England to betray the Allies. Their poor conscripts are told that we kill and torture prisoners ; their monuments at home are bedizened with mock laurels ; and neutrals are poisoned with wild inventions.

“ For years past their public men have been tricking our politicians, journalists, and professors to accept them as peaceful leaders of a higher civilisation ; whilst all the while their soldiers, diplomats, and spies (the three are really but one class) were secretly courting our own Royalties and society, studying our naval

and military defences, filling our homes with tens of thousands of reservists having secret orders to spy, to destroy our arsenals and roads, and even planting out bogus industries and laying concrete bases for cannon to bombard the open towns of friendly nations. We have been living unsuspectingly with a nation of assassins plotting to destroy us.

“ Did these Professors of *Kultur* not know of this elaborate conspiracy of Kaisertum, which unites the stealthy treachery of a Mohawk or a Thug to the miracles of science? For years past the ideal of *Kultur* has been to lay down secret mines to destroy their peaceful neighbours. Did these Professors of the Fatherland not know this? Then they are unable to grasp the most obvious facts—the lifework of their own masters under their own eyes. And, if they did know it, and must at least know it now, and yet approve and glory in it, they must be beneath contempt. Why argue with such hypocrites?

“ Not a few of us have known and watched this conspiracy for years. I have preached this ever since the advent of Bismarckism and the new Europe that was formed forty years ago. Not a few of us have foretold not only the tre-

mendous attack on the British Empire designed by German sea power, but the precise steps of the war upon France through Belgium, and to be executed by an overwhelming force of sudden shock in the midst of peace. For my part nothing in this war since the 30th July has at all surprised me, unless it be the foul cruelty with which Belgian civilians have been treated. Indeed, in January, 1913, I wrote a warning which reads now like a summary of events that have since happened. I was denounced as a senile alarmist by some who are now the loudest in calling to arms. Alas! too late is their repentance.

“ May I ask why our eminent academicians and scholars who still profess ‘ friendship and admiration ’ for their German *confrères* never even suspected the huge conspiracy of which civilisation has been the victim ? Why did they accept the stars and crosses of Caligula-Attila ? Why hobnob with the docile creatures of his chancery, and spread at home and abroad the worship of *Geist* and *Kultur* ? Are they fit to instruct us about politics, public law, and international relations, when they were so egregiously mistaken, so blind, so befooled, with regard to the most portentous catastrophe in the memory



of living men? I am glad that they see their blindness now; but why this sentimental friendliness for those who hoodwinked them?

“Surely this should open their eyes to the mountains of portentous clouds on which the claims of *Kultur* rest. I am myself a student of German learning, and quite aware of the enormous industry, subtlety, and ingenuity of German scholarship. We owe deep gratitude to the older race of the Savignys, Rankes, Mommsens. Since 1851 I have been five times in Germany on different occasions down to 1900. I read and speak the language, and twice I lived in Germany for months together, even in the house of a distinguished man of science. I study their theology, their sociology, economics, history and their classics. I am quite aware of the supremacy of German scholars in ancient literature, in many branches of science, in the record of the past in art, manners, and civilisation. But to have edited a Greek play, or to have discovered a new explosive, a new comet, another microbe does not qualify a savant to dogmatise on international morals and the hegemony of the world. Sixty years ago in Leipzig the editor of a famous journal undertook to prove to me that Shakespeare was a German.

Our poet, he said, was the grandest output of the Teutonic mind ; nine-tenths of the Teutonic mind was German, argal—Shakespeare was a German. *Q.E.D.*

“ With the vast accumulation of solid knowledge of provable facts there is too often in the German mind a sudden bounding up into a cloudland of crude and unproven guess-work. In the logic of *Kultur* there seems to be a huge gap in the reasoning of the middle terms. A savant unearths a MS. in Syria, which he deciphers with marvellous industry, learning, and ingenuity. Straightway he cries : ‘ Eureka, behold the original Gospel—the true Gospel ! ’ and he proceeds to turn Christianity upside down. He may have experimented on cultures of microbes for a generation ; and then he calls on earth and heaven to acknowledge the mystery of the Self-creation of the Universe. We hear much of Treitschke to-day—no doubt a man of genius with a gift for research, but what ferocious pyrotechnics were poured forth by this apostle of mendacious swagger. As to Nietzsche, he was anticipated by Shakespeare in Timon, a diseased cynic :—

“ henceforth hated be  
Of Timon, man and all humanity.”

“ They seem to think that to have put the critics right about a few lines in Sophocles, or to have discovered a new chemical dye, dispenses the German Super-man from being bound to humanity, truthfulness, and honour. Charge them with the mutilation of little girls and the violation of nuns in Belgium, and they reply: ‘ Yes! but think of Kant and Hegel!’ It is treason to philosophy, they say, that a man who has translated Schopenhauer should condemn Germans for burning Malines and making captive women a screen for troops in battle. *Kultur*, it seems, has its own ‘ higher law,’ which its Professors expound to the decadent nations of Europe.

“ Let us hold no parley with these arrogant sophists. Let all intellectual commerce be suspended until these official Professors have unlearned the infernal code of ‘ military necessity ’ and ‘ world-policy ’ which, to the indignation of the civilised world, they are ordered by the Vice-Gerent of God at Potsdam to teach to the great Teutonic Super-race.”

THE PRINCE'S FUND : AUGUST, 1914.

When the War began, and we all recognised how tremendous would be the sufferings entailed on

our people at home, and the Prince of Wales started his Relief Fund, I was asked by the Mayor of Bath to attend a town's meeting in the Guildhall and move a resolution. I spoke thus on 18th August, 1914:—

“ Mr. Frederic Harrison said in this great crisis of our country they were all sure that the city of Bath would be true to its ancient renown for loyalty and patriotism and devotion to duty. The Mayor had called upon him to move a resolution, which was to form a committee in response to the appeal of the Prince of Wales. They all knew that the Prince, before he left to join his regiment, made an appeal to his countrymen to provide for those who might suffer from the distress which must be inevitable in this great battle of the nations—distress incalculable, all-pervading, wide and almost out of their power to estimate in the future. It was an independent and indispensable duty which had to be well fulfilled. But that night they had to deal with a far larger business.\* It was not merely those who fought the country's battles who might be requiring help, but it was the great distress of all classes. All would have to join in helping, and no class, neither sex nor age, could possibly be abandoned in this distress, which they saw

must come and come almost at once. The resolution he was to propose dealt with the general question of every want and distress caused by the war, and included all classes, all forms of industry and professions. They intended it to be generally representative of every interest in the city, and they intended to make it a general and representative committee because its duties would be very wide and very general. A very large sum had been collected in response to the Prince's appeal. In a few days it would probably amount to one million pounds. But let them not suppose that a million sterling was too much or even enough. Ten millions would not be too much. Let them remember that this was the greatest struggle to which this country had been committed in the memory of living man. It was the greatest war ever known in history, because it was a universal war amongst the civilised races. Its consequences and the miseries it would entail were incalculable. We knew that our gallant fleet would protect our own land from the ravages of the savage and unscrupulous enemy. But the amount of loss and ruin which it must involve defied all estimate. And he did not think it would be a short war.

Even if the cruel invader of two peaceful countries could be driven back with utter defeat—as they trusted it was being driven back at that very hour—still there were remaining long arrears of wrong to be redressed, and civilisation must be relieved of the monstrous threat of the war demon which had hung over Europe for generations. These tremendous wars of rival nations were not local, nor were they brief struggles. They lasted till one or other was exhausted, and they affected the whole world. He was a very old man and could remember distinctly the Crimean war of sixty years ago, and all its horrors and consequences. He could remember the Franco-German war of forty-four years ago, and himself witnessed for months the terrible carnage it involved and ruin to two countries. The war of to-day was on a scale ten times as great, and it could not end—and it ought not to end—until the curse of Imperial aggression on the weak and peaceful was crushed and for ever made impossible. But it would be a long and arduous task, and we should all have to bear with very great sufferings and difficulties. He moved the following resolution :—

“ ‘ That this meeting of citizens recognises

its duty to make every provision in its power for the relief of suffering and want which must necessarily arise as the result of the war, and pledges itself to use every effort to secure a generous response to the appeal of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, and that a general committee be appointed, consisting of members of the city council, parish clergy, ministers of Free Churches and Nonconformists, magistrates, guardians of the city, professional men, managers of various banks, employers of labour, aid co-ordination committee, presidents of various trade and friendly societies, and representative citizens, in accordance with the list that has been prepared by the Mayor's Emergency Committee.' "

In September, 1914, I was invited to give a lecture on the Causes and Objects of the War to the Workers' Educational Association, of which I am a vice-president. The Mayor, Dr. Preston King, took the chair at the Guildhall, and the lecture was reported thus in the local journals :—

" Mr. Harrison said this war was perhaps the most critical in which this country has been engaged, not even excepting the great war of Napoleon one hundred years ago. Few of us

realised how tremendous is the task before us, and what immense consequences for good or for evil might be hanging upon the issue of this momentous struggle. What was likely to happen if we were to fail? We knew we were not going to fail. And what had we still to do in order to succeed? In many of our wars we had felt we were not entirely with the Government which conducted the wars. But in this war party had completely disappeared, and all parties were supporting the Government. We felt the justice of our cause was admitted by all who knew the facts. What then was it we were fighting for? We were fighting for the honour of our plighted word. Secondly, for the very existence of our country and our Empire as a free and powerful and independent nation; and lastly, which was perhaps most important, we were determined to extirpate from the civilised world this new devil's gospel of force and fraud and plunder. This war was a just cause. We never sought it. It was forced upon us. Mr. Harrison proceeded to deal with the issues which led up to the war, and pointed out that the Emperor William was personally responsible for signing the challenge which he knew must involve Russia and France, but he did not think it would involve ourselves.



Our own Ministers endeavoured to meet the difficulty. Our Government undoubtedly exhausted every possible means to find some mode of international settlement which would avoid the consequences of war. He could only say that we hesitated too long. We ought to have made up our minds earlier. He (the speaker) was in France at the time and hurried home, for he felt sure it was to be war. Having touched on the question of the neutrality of Belgium, the speaker said it had always been an essential part of British policy that we would not allow France or Germany to make war through Belgium. We were bound to protect Belgium. Germany violated their word and broke in upon a peaceful country. With regard to the German offer to England, Mr. Harrison said if he had been Sir Edward Grey he would not have been able to contain himself, and would have thrown the paper in the face of the German Minister and left the room. The real German attack had been upon England. The spy peril was next dealt with, and Mr. Harrison said that many years ago he was in Germany and met a captain in the Engineers, who was a very pleasant man, and in the course of conversation the German told him that he probably knew every road, every well,

and every smithy in his (Mr. Harrison's) county, probably better than he did himself. It was impossible to doubt, therefore, that they had intended for years past to make England the real object of their attack. Now we had seen the hideous ruin they had caused in Belgium and the desperate peril in France, we had seen the retreat and rout of the invaders, and they knew the extreme anxiety in Paris, and it was not past yet. He had a son who had lived there for twenty years and he had heard from him that morning. He was not able to join the forces, but was working night and day with the Red Cross. In his letter he said 'You don't know half what has been happening, or what the peril is. We see daily wounded men brought back from the battlefield.' What he wished to urge upon them was not to think for a moment it was over yet. It was still a very serious problem, and a severe struggle. A great battle was going on, and he trusted it was going on successfully at present. The Allies might be pushed back again. He trusted not. But there was the immense and powerful German fleet still hardly touched, and standing under their impregnable fortress. Supposing in a panic the Kaiser saw his danger and endeavoured to make peace with

the Allies we should still be forced to keep up an enormous fleet. There was but one way : we must break down and challenge this sea power. If they would not come out, the only thing we should have to do would be to deal with them by land. And to do that we should want at least 250,000 men to land on the North German shore as well as our fleet. And that was the only result which would be worth our sacrifice. Even 500,000 men would not be enough. If we were asked what our terms were for peace we could consider no more promises, because the whole German nation had proved themselves to be treacherous. The gospel of Force must be exterminated. The only cure for this aggressive ambition of Germans must be the complete defeat of them. The German creed of Blood and Iron must be met with ruin and famine, and until Germany was reduced to exhaustion she would be a menace to Europe and civilisation. We meant to show our abhorrence of their crimes against humanity by visiting the prime author with public degradation. In concluding the speaker reminded those present that nothing had yet been done to relieve the peril or strain. The German fleet and her Zeppelins must be put an end to and we must do it.

## NO MORE GERMAN PROMISES.

“ As to terms of peace, we could trust no more German promises, no more scraps of paper, because the Germans had shown themselves both treacherous and mendacious. We must make them know that the era of bullying and terrorising was over, and the plea of military necessity must no longer be held over Europe to terrorise it. Blood and iron must be met by famine and ruin ; Germany must be ringed round by enormous armies to bring her to helplessness. Until Germany was reduced to exhaustion, she would remain a menace to Europe. The German methods were not new. In 1870 he (the speaker) wrote a paper headed ‘ Bismarckism,’ in which he spoke of the Germans’ inhuman cruelty, the murder of non-combatants and prisoners, the systematic massacres of civilians. We now know that all Germany was involved in the present situation—its Satanic Emperor, its generals, its Ministers, its clergy. The Emperor stood before the world as the author of lying accusations and falsehoods, and might be known in future history as ‘ The Father of Lies.’ (Applause.) In *The Times* he (the speaker) proposed that there should be a public degrada-

tion of the Kaiser, but some snivelling journalist had turned round and said : ' We must not have any retaliation.' Did that journalist imagine that when we entered Germany we should retaliate by burning, murdering, plundering, and ravishing as they had done ? But we meant to show our national abhorrence of these awful crimes against humanity by visiting the prime author with public degradation, and when we caught him we must do so. (Applause.) It had been pointed out that the German Emperor had never been solemnly crowned. A German officer, when that point was raised, replied : ' William, the first German Emperor, was crowned in Versailles ; and William the Second is waiting until the conclusion of his great war to be crowned in Westminster Abbey.' (Laughter.) Mr. Harrison concluded his address by a strong appeal for a largely increased British Army."

## CHAPTER XIII

### MY LAST THOUGHTS

IN April, 1915, I asked my friends in the University of Aberdeen, who did me the honour to confer on me the Degree of LL.D., to allow me to address the students through the medium of the University Magazine. It was published in that organ on the 1st June, 1915, and by the courtesy of the editor I am allowed to include it in this volume :—

“ At the end of a long and busy life, in the midst of the most awful convulsion of civilisation that has occurred since the break-up of the Roman Empire, I ask leave to write a few last thoughts to the younger students of a famous University which has done me the honour to enrol me among its members.

“ I shall say nothing about the abominations which seem to grow in turpitude each day. We need no Hymns of Hate to urge us to fight to the last drop of our blood. In the helplessness of old age I strive to shut out the hideous present from my mind by filling my spirit with the great

poems of the Old World; and for a portion of the day I find this can be done.

“ Nor can I attempt any speculations as to how Europe is to be restored, pacified, reorganised, when the war is ended—really ended—for some still think there may be shortly a mere intermediate truce. I have a clear idea of how Europe should start afresh in search of a nobler, more humane civilisation; and I have a sure hope that our descendants one day may see something not wholly unlike this vision. Immense things, unexpected, terrific results of this vast human earthquake, have yet, I think, to come, before the ground will be clear for any return to a stable system of International Peace.

“ No! I shall say nothing about the horrors round us to-day. There is nothing to be said but Fight it out!—and I am not the man who can best say this. And I make no vain forecasts about re-settlement of Europe—aye, and of Asia, Africa, Polynesia, when the time comes; for this must largely depend on what may happen between now and then. I wish to speak only of the new economic, social, moral, and religious conditions which must inevitably face civilised man when peace returns.

## " I.—A NEW WORLD.

" I begin with this. The world can never be the same thing in the twentieth century as it was in the nineteenth century, in the early youth of this generation. From Waterloo, exactly one hundred years ago, down to the end of the nineteenth century, there was, from time to time, international strife : menaces of war—fierce but short wars—provinces lost and won ; dynastic revolutions ; social revolutions. But the West of Europe at least did not feel that it was living on a volcano. Since the opening of the present century the whole of patriotic France, the wiser politicians of England, of Belgium, and of Holland have heard subterranean rumblings of a vast upheaval and felt war was in the air. Last year these sombre anticipations were verified with an incredible intensity that surpassed the fears of the deepest forecast. The volcano broke and seemed to open the innermost gates of the infernal regions ; for not only did Death and Destruction pour over Europe on a scale never seen for at least a thousand years, but the very bases of civilised life, of humane sense, and of moral law, were swept away in blood and fire and torture.



“Some day, we know—

“ ‘Claudentur Belli portae ; Furor impius intus  
Saeva sedens super arma, et centum vinctus  
aenis

Post tergum nodis, fremet horridus ore  
cruento.’

[ÆN. I., 294.]

“ ‘War’s gates will close : upon her savage  
arms

Inhuman Rage will sit, by thousand links  
Of brass chained back, and snarl with bloody  
fangs.’

[CHARLES J. BILLSON.]

“I shall not see this day : but you will ; and I warn you that the world will be to all a different thing from what it was in the boyhood and youth of living men.

“To begin with that which underlies all human life—Religion. Can one doubt that there must be deep-seated mischief in the actual religious condition of the nations of Europe ? Under what monstrous perversions and contradictions of all teaching have those who in name adore the Prince of Peace, in near two thousand years, come to this appalling holocaust of nations ! The whole religious system of the peoples of Europe must have fallen into

a morbid state, if it can have left open this cataclysm ; still more, if it has deeply infected it with passion. For see ! how much War has been coloured by Creed ! For two years before the Central European war broke out, hideous slaughter, massacre, and ruin had been raging in the Balkan countries : first, between Cross and Crescent, then between Catholics and Orthodox, or between Greek rite and Bulgarian rite, with a medley of sects, races, and inherited ambitions—largely, no doubt, for local and material mastery, but largely, also, for religious creed, symbol, rite.

“ When in July, 1914, the great European convulsion broke out it sprang directly out of the Balkan imbroglio ; and so far as it was, first, a contest of Slav Orthodoxy against Catholic and Protestant Austro-Germans, it was again deeply coloured by conflicting versions of the Gospel of Christ—whom all the combatants professed to follow, whom all at least invoked, and went to battle chanting hymns to His Name and Glory. I waste no words in attempting to describe the blasphemous follies in which the Kaiser, his priests, his professors, and his soldiers have invoked the Name of the Almighty as if their atrocities were a

blood-offering to their protecting Molóch. The history of fanaticism contains no record of brutality and folly more disgusting, even if we search the bloody orgies of African fetichism.

“Remember, too, how deeply the internal and almost civil war, which so weakened France that Germans believed France to be divided and decadent, was based on religious rancour. Nay, it seems that the immediate cause which induced Potsdam to wait no longer but to declare war at once was the report of German emissaries in Ireland that the secular struggle between Catholic and Protestant there had paralysed British statesmanship, had affected both the efficiency and the discipline of the British Army.

“And now, day by day and hour by hour, ten millions of Christian men with slaughter in their hearts call upon their Maker to help them to slay their enemies. And in three hundred million homes rise up to the Throne of Mercy prayers for help, and protection, and victory—which again means nothing but more slaughter. I cannot pursue the bewildering thought further. I only say that the religion of the peoples of Europe—in its essential basis the same for all, and so utterly at variance with their practice—must be in a morbid state, as

often as not stimulating them to Evil and not to Good.

“ I do not presume to discuss this elemental, underlying problem further. And I add no more than this—that the whole religious system of the peoples of Europe calls aloud for a moral Reformation, for a humane Purification, for the clearing away of a dense overgrowth of obsolete Mysticism and vain-glorious Superstition.

“ The first task of the coming generation will be to find their way to a religious ideal which will form the basis of a purer civilisation.

“ In spite of horrible facts before our eyes—some hundred millions of German race banded together to crush, pillage, and torture their weaker neighbours and to win their ends by enormities of treachery and crime at which humanity shudders—in spite of what we see—the nations engaged in a fight for life on one side and in Hymns of Hate on the other side—still I do believe that when the blood is dried upon the earth and the shattered cities and homes rise again, then the friendly union of the larger part of Europe will be far more keen, more assured, than ever it has been for ages. The centenary of Waterloo will find England and France fighting as brothers in

arms almost in the same land. The ancient jealousy of France, the vulgar British depreciation of French staunchness and patience, must have passed for ever. No one again will ever doubt Belgian courage. No one again will ever think of Russians as barbarians, or denounce the Tsardom as a menace to civilisation. The smaller nations will all see two hundred millions of Britons, French, and Russians indissolubly banded together in a close and permanent alliance to protect them from absorption by a conqueror. .

“ The madness which has infected the German race to become enemies of humanity (for the entire population, even priests, teachers, elders and women, seem to exult in the crimes of their chiefs and armies)—even this must pass off when the war fever is spent. When some millions of their best fighting men are under the sod or beneath the waves ; when the Daimio caste which has deluded the nation is cut to pieces and discredited, even in the bloody trade in which they boasted to be matchless ; when the two Allies have been torn in pieces by every extremity of suffering, then the sound mass of the German people will awake from the delirium of wickedness and folly into which they have

been goaded and drugged. It may need a generation, even two generations, to purge out the poison. But when they have cast out the Hapsburg and Hohenzollern dynasties, and the entire Junkertum of Prussia and Austria is exterminated and crushed, the cool sense of the hard-working people will crave to be again admitted to the brotherhood of the peaceful and laborious peoples of Europe. Europe will be united as it never has been since the *Pax Romana*.

“*Magnus ab integro saeculorum nascitur ordo :  
—redeunt Saturnia regna.*”

## “ II.—A FREE SPIRITUAL POWER.

“ It will be a *new* Europe with many of its inveterate errors redressed. I am not now dealing with things political, but with things spiritual and social.

“ One of the appalling facts of the war is this. A hundred million or more of the people of Central Europe, claiming to be the most cultivated and most advanced, seem to have been bewitched into a delirious outburst of execration towards a friendly nation which has done them no wrong, unless it be a wrong to stand between them and those whom they sought to conquer and to crush. All this seems to us unintel-

ligible by its utter futility as by its inhuman wickedness. The explanation of it is this. For generations the entire intellectual, spiritual, and moral education of the German race has been absolutely controlled by the Civil Power of the State ; ultimately by the Imperial—that is, in effect, by the military chiefs. The State has become a vast inexorable, irresistible fetish. It has become a religion—really the sole religion, even exceeding the religion of Rome to the old Latins—and, as an indisputable and mystical religion, absorbing and dominating every consideration of morality, common sense and humanity. *Deutschland über alles* is the religion of Self-glory, it justifies every crime, it sanctifies every falsehood, and it explains every folly.

“ During the religious wars and revolutions of the sixteenth century we saw whole races and nations transformed into monsters by theological passions. The foulest assassinations were hailed as offerings to God for the sake of the Church. The cries of the Cross, of the Virgin, of the Bible, of the Pope, of Luther, of Calvin, were held to supersede morality, and self-interest ; and even the persecution of witches as ordained according to the Word of God lingered until quite modern times. What in the sixteenth century the Pope,

or Luther, or Knox were to religious fanatics, that in the twentieth century 'the State' has become to German fanatical patriots. The entire population has become possessed of the modern fanaticism of 'the State' as infallible, supreme, all-mighty and all-good; and that because 'the State'—*i.e.*, the dominant soldier caste and its hereditary War Lord—have long possessed absolute authority over every Church, academy, school; so that preachers, professors, journalists, writers,\* and artists are intellectual and moral slaves in its hands as completely as every conscript is like a whipt hound before his drill-sergeant. To every modern German the State, personified by the War Lord, is—God. To them, he is always 'Our God,' as completely their tribal God as ever was Jehovah to Joshua's fighting men.

"Such are the awful consequences of the State getting control of the whole teaching forces—of the preachers, the moralists, the teachers, and even the artists. It is a warning to us all that the absorption of the moral forces by the material forces ends in utter depravation of the nation, the distortion of the moral sense, the extinction of independent judgment, the turning of religion itself into an engine of evil, and at last



the degradation of the artistic faculties to be servile flatterers and ministers of vice, folly, and cruelty.

“ All my life I have preached it as the essential principle of a free and healthy society that the men and the institutions which promote education, thought, morality, religion — be they Churches, universities, schools of any grade, teachers of any study, moralists, writers, priests, ministers, or lay visitors—should be absolutely *free*, able to defy the pressure of politicians, free from State control and State money or monopoly; able to think, to preach, to warn, to criticise the powerful, the wealthy, and the official world without fear or favour or interference. See in Prussia the consequences of setting up Churches controlled, paid, or bribed by the State; academies, schools, all forms of social and art institutions, the very theatres, journals, festivals organised by the ruling caste—and at the head of it an adored ‘ War Lord ’ who gives himself the airs of a War God.

“ ‘ . . . With ravish’d ears  
The monarch hears,  
Assumes the God;  
Affects to nod  
And seems to shake the Spheres.’ ”

“ ‘ Demens ! qui nimbos et non imitabile  
fulmen  
Aere et cornipedum pulsu simularet  
equorum.’ ”

“ It is a general observation that the Germany of Kant, of Goethe, of Beethoven—the profound breadth, humanity, and suavity of the German philosophy, poetry and music—has been dried up for a generation ; has been displaced by bombastic nebulosity, a somewhat scurvý realism, and thunderous battle-hymns of Conquest. For some thirty years almost nothing of the first order of intellectual achievement has been produced by German thought, imagination, or art. Evolution, radium, electricity, wireless telegraphy, aviation, artillery, drama, romance, poetry, bear witness to French, Russian, Polish, Italian, British, and American genius.

“ I have long believed much of German metaphysics to be moonshine ; German specialism to be parading a dry heap of empty husks—the accumulation of worthless pebbles on the infinite sea of practicable knowledge—and their vaunted Biblical, classical, and cosmological discoveries to be too often made up of mysterious guess-work without a solid basis of

real evidence; and not seldom in conditions where proof was *ex hypothesi* impossible. Most of this mountain of ambitious solutions of what are usually insoluble enigmas is an airy palace of what the poet called *Nephelococcygia*, i.e., a cloudland where hard facts do not enter, do not underlie the edifice—are not knit together by long chains of dependent phenomena by hard logic, but are emitted from the inner consciousness of an erudite professor—the very eructations of his over-crammed learning. ‘I frame no hypotheses,’ said our mighty Newton, ‘for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an *hypothesis*.’ I trust that in Britain we follow Newton, and do not lie dormant within a pile of books spinning endless cocoons of guess-work. My own ‘soul was never in Germany,’ and I trust we shall all hasten to keep within the domain of incessant verification of all ideas by the test of demonstrable realities.

“For a whole generation the intellect of studious Germany has been concentrated on world politics, world-wide empire, material supremacy, and the machinery of war by sea and by land. Artistic, spiritual, and poetic life has been stunted, sterilised, and brutalised, to build

up & power in arms before which the nations were to cower, at the inhumanities of which humanity would stagger. We see the result. Every forecast has proved false. Every plan has broken down ; every manœuvre has been exposed. The mechanical, like the diplomatic, artifices, built up in secret at boundless cost and toil for long years, have crumpled in pieces. The tremendous fleet which was to recover the Trident has been locked in its fastness, or blown to wrecks, if any sections of it ventured to sea ; the destruction of British trade has been a sorry farce. The Zeppelin invention—the greatest of modern times, said the Kaiser—has proved to be a costly and a scandalous toy, covering its promoters with ridicule and shame ; the Bismarckian diplomacy which was to divide the Triple *Entente*, to seduce the neutrals, and to justify the war in the eye of history, has been nothing but a tissue of mendacious and abortive trickery.

“ The irresistible army was resisted by a handful of Belgians, and then by the ‘ contemptible little ’ corps of Field-Marshal French, until the French blocked it by a vast impassable barrier. The hopes, the intrigues, the treacheries, wasted in trying to invade Egypt, to rouse Irish

rebellion, South African disaffection, Indian nationalism, overseas indifference, and American good-will—all, to the last point, have proved to be the baseless fabric of their dreams. Every German belief—and on it they were risking their honour, their good name, their very existence as a Great Power—has turned out folly. At this moment the great German people are the Fools of Europe. Why are they so? Because in their arrogance, selfish vanity, and ingrained habit of calculating in the air, without common sense, without regard for truth, facts, human nature, they would believe what their own passion for self-glory prompted them to assume rather than what cool observation enabled them to prove.

“Of course, like every student of modern thought, I quite recognise much of solid achievement by German scholars, critics, and men of science. Mommsen, Ranke, Helmholtz, belong to the immortal order of Kant, Humboldt, Hegel. But their work is part of the nineteenth century glories. So it is with Lepsius, Brugsch, Duncker, Dahlmann, Droysen, and many whom it is needless to name. But how much is there of really first-rate European, world-wide achievement of the twentieth century—since the advent

of William II. ? To me, most of the speculations of the recent Hegelians, Schopenhauerists, Haeckelists,\* is phrase-mongering wind-bag. And even in the brilliant Philippics of Sybel, Treitschke, Nietzsche, there are ludicrous sophisms piled up by arrogance and passion. That is not serious history, nor politics, nor philosophy ; but too many of us have accepted it as gospel on the strength of its bluster and its paradox. I quite agree that Wilamowitz-Moellendorff is a great master of Greek. I have heard him lecture the Historical Congress, cased in a breastplate of dazzling 'orders,' so that he looked like a Bernhardi in a Greek helmet. But great scholar as he is, I do not see that our own scholars who sit at his feet should feel doubts, if after all Germany be not right in asserting herself, and if such mighty Hellenists can really be capable of international offences.

" If we look at German achievements since the dismissal of Bismarck with cool judgment and from the cosmopolitan and human point of view, what we shall find is, first, unrivalled industry and intense powers of persistence in a special field, a servile docility to submit to authority, and blind belief in surrendering the

whole nature to an abstract course of reasoning based on *Deutschland über alles*. The result is a universal specialism carried to the point of mental asthenia, and an exaltation of intellect above either morality or character. A morbid habit of specialism and a vicious trust in intellectual culture and national supremacy are the German productions which have been too freely dumped on our learning and our schools.

### “ III.—A SOCIAL REFORMATION. ”

“ I turn now to our own economic and social conditions within. The vast and tempting field of international relations I leave aside. It will be impossible again for us to believe in ‘ splendid isolation,’ to be indifferent to all that is doing in Europe. When peace returns, it will be revealed to the minds of the least instructed and the most optimistic amongst us how nearly our own discords and our blind absorption in home affairs and material interests had brought us to indescribable ruin. The wondrous fortune of our country, which ever seems to ‘ worry through ’ all its pitfalls, did just save us from collapse as a Great Power and World Empire. I do not believe this war is to be ‘ the end of

war.' But it ought to bind the nations of Europe into a new Union of Peace and amity with limited war services to lessen the 'burden of Armaments'; a confederation of the greater Powers to protect the small nationalities; and above all the consolidation of a new and authoritative Law of Nations.

"But my thoughts turn to our internal domestic conditions.

"It is only too certain that, for one or two generations, we shall have to bear a vast increase of taxation. A doubled income tax with perhaps trebled death duties will only go some way to meet the enormous liabilities the war has cast on the coming generation. The expectation that anything in the way of Indemnity can be obtained from our enemies is a vain hope. Even if the German and Austrian Empires can be forced to replace even part of the material ruin they have caused to four countries they have trampled on, there will be no means of wringing from them, in their ruined and desolate state, even the direct losses which they have caused ourselves. In 1917 I believe we shall have a debt of about £2,500,000,000 to meet, or an annual charge of some £75,000,000. In the meantime food, clothing, and almost every-



thing except house rents will be greatly increased in price. It is a universal experience that the end of a long and destructive war involves years of distress,—such as England knew from 1815 to 1822. After such a war and such a convulsion of industry the distress will be on a scale far more wide and infinitely more severe.

“ An immense reconstruction to make up for industries suspended during several years will begin with fevered energy. And this will find abundant employment for all men and women engaged in the indispensable manufactures. But the return to civil life of one or two millions of men will produce a terrible strain and much confusion. Such a vast resettlement of industry has never happened in modern history ; and no man can predict with confidence on what lines it will be effected. Infinite dislocation of work and wages is more than probable. The masses of the higher skilled workmen will be in demand at high wages ; and the greater financiers, contractors, and capitalists are likely to make vast fortunes—though it is more than probable that some great markets and industries may cross the Atlantic for ever. One thing is certain. The whole American continent will

soon profit incalculably by the long war and stagnation throughout nearly the whole of Europe. The presidency of finance, manufactures, and appliances of all the arts of life will be permanently assured to the United States whilst the nations of Europe are staggering under the obligations they have to meet.

“The acutest sufferings will fall on two classes—first, the poorer, unskilled, unprovided male and female workers and casual labourers; next, on what is called the lower middle class, and generally on the small professional class with no capital, or on the class living entirely on modest investments without any income from trade or other earnings. For the widows, orphans, elders, and dependants of the minor professional class ruin will stare them in the face. As a class they will be decimated or disappear. They have nothing to sell, and no abilities for which the public will pay, whilst the petty capital invested on which this very large and very helpless order of men and women have long struggled and lived will be reduced by taxation and high prices to utter impoverishment. This class, so numerous, so inoffensive, so patient, and indeed so entirely worthy of

sympathy, never had in our age any real claim on the public as an essential and useful element. And its eventual absorption will be, I fear, a sad and inevitable necessity of the new world to which resettlement will give birth.

“ Of all classes perhaps that which will suffer first, and most generally, will be all whose livelihood is dependent on art. All forms of art industry have suffered—will suffer, must suffer. The higher rank of the portrait painters may still find commissions from the wealthy ; and the war and the resettlement will make many capitalists richer than ever. But decades will have to pass before the English middle class will buy any pictures but those of very moderate price. There will be no great demand for new houses, churches, institutes in England, and little spare capital to pay for them if they were wanted. Architecture, music, the higher drama, even the higher literature, will one and all have to wait—say for a decade or even a generation—before the artist world, which hitherto has lived by what may be called the luxuries rather than the necessities of life, will ever be able to return to their wonted existence.

“ In the meantime there will be an immense and general advance in the incomes, the claims, and the powers of the vast class of the skilled workmen. Returning from the field of honour, if not of glory, or from the factories in which they have quite as stoutly fought the battle of their country, the skilled workers will insist on obtaining a great increase of social respect, of financial gains, and of political power. In a word, Socialism will be in the ascendant, not in the dogmatic, formal, and organised way, but in the vague manner in which Socialism means—the Betterment of the Workers. I have never believed in any of the doctrines for the extinction of capital, and the annihilation of the entire order of employers. The war has proved the incalculable resources of the capitalist, and the indispensable need for the capable capitalist. And the universal reconstruction of industry made necessary after such an upheaval will call forth anew all the genius of great captains of industry. Both workmen and capitalists will find vast fields for their energies. Socialism and capitalism have both much to gain—much to learn—much to teach.

“ On the other hand, the war will have forced home to the dullest and most indifferent how

much of our life, of our industry, and our politics is casual, careless, unscientific, and mean. The marvellous resources of Germany under stupendous tasks, the intensity of patriotic devotion of men, women, and children, the religion of State organisation, must impress us all. We may not like it in that form, but we cannot shut our eyes to its power.\* Our shameful craze for sport, our indifference to scientific training, our ineradicable vice of intoxication—all this has been a scandal and a weakness in the face of the world. Our low scientific, and indeed general, education, our impatience of discipline, our domestic and party imbroglios, and the universal rage to get the cheapest of everything, regardless of quality and of the national risks of destroying home industries, will stare us in the face for a generation. Verily, when Peace comes at last, this nation will have much to repent of, much to amend and reorganise, much to learn, and many a cruel lesson to be driven into our souls.”

Those who will have lived through this *colluvies gentium* into a New World will see how much amongst ourselves of ignorance, indiscipline, and vice needs a moral and religious Reformation—how deeply we have to shrink from the perverted

Nationalism that caused this war—how many a lesson we may take from the tremendous organisation we have had to break down, at such a cost of blood, and treasure, and fair hopes of an age of Peace.



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